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Ann Ferguson

This dissertation claims that the problem of self-knowledge involves a kind of
splitting

of the mind or self into a knower and a known, a subject and an object of

knowledge. As

modem

philosophy becomes concerned with the project of certainty,

turn toward the self renders this splitting into a kind of aporia

itself (with certainty)

The goal of this

when

it is

dissertation

is

at

is

modem

constitutively

how

can the self know

once a subject and an object of its own knowing?

not to develop a paradigm of self-awareness that avoids

or escapes the limits of self-certainty, per se; rather

what

:

its

unknowable about

it

considers

how we

might address

the self without recapitulating the limits of the

epistemic subject.

Chapter

I

introduces the problem of self-knowledge and the split

self.

Chapter 2

analyzes Descartes’ Second Meditation in terms of its presentation of self-knowledge as

self-certainty.

Descartes’ res cogitans argument,

I

claim, reveals not only

Descartes conceives of the self as a substance, but also

how

upon a notion of transparent self-awareness which attempts

vii

how

such a conception

relies

to resolve the aporia of the

split self.

Chapter 3 presents Hume’s critique of the philosophical notion of personal

identity, particularly in

terms of its assumption of the self as a substance. Without an

alternative notion of self-awareness, however,

epistemology- leaves

in place the position

introspection. Chapter 4 focuses

Hume’s method of critique-his

empirical

of the knowing self capable of transparent

on Michel Foucault’s

critique of self-knowledge as

knowledge of a substance by an unimpeded knower. Using Foucault’s notion of
“caring” for the

on the

self.

I

self,

I

consider

how

claims of self-knowledge have a productive effect

critique Foucault’s implicit assumption of and failure to provide an

alternative notion

of self-awareness, however. Citing Descartes’

meditations, Chapter 5 explores

my own

example how one can address what

is

relation to self-knowledge, highlighting

constitutively

Through explorations of identity through

self-reflective

unknowable about

the figure of ‘being adopted’

the self.

I

argue that

can begin to unpack both the ontological and the epistemological assumptions of

identity.

viii

by

we
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION: CLAIMING SELF-KNOWLEDGE
THE AGE OF CERTAINTY
In the Sec ond Meditation, Descartes attempts to
provide

can

know

own

his

self, his

notion of what he

is

must evidence

(himself) with certainty. In short, he must present

regarding what he

is,

his self-knowledge,

incorrigibility are three things:

Descartes

this act

an argument for

how

he

with certainty. Because he takes as his example of knowing
something

beyond a doubt

know

IN

own

(

1

)

is

incorrigible.

knowledge of the

of self-reflection, however,

entails

what

I

it is

What

is

that his claim

required for such

self which (2) can be provided

of self-reflection as (3) impossible

act

how

his capacity to

to

be otherwise. As

I

present,

see as a kind of splitting of the

is

not with an object outside the self that Descartes’ rationalist project

is

not attempting to secure his capacity for

making

certain

is

by

self.

concerned.

It

He

judgments about the world

through knowledge of that world, but through knowledge of himself. Nor

is

he relying

on any previous knowledge or the knowledge of others. Descartes’ foundational project
figures his self-knowledge as a product of his lone self-reflection. Hence, as a

subject, he takes his

The

modem

does the self know

own

self as a

known

object.

problem of self-knowledge, thus involves a kind of aporia: how

itself (with certainty)

own knowing? The answer to

this

when

it

is at

question provides

for the presentation of self-knowledge as incorrigible:

secures one’s claims to

must be a way

knowing

know

as

once a subject and an object of its

is

found

in to the third

To know

beyond doubt-to have what

I

the self in a

requirement

way

that

call self-certainty--there

knowledge of itself cannot be otherwise.

that guarantees that the self s

1

The means through which
because the self is

make

split

the self

by the

act

is

provided with self-certainty

of (rationalist)

is

self-awareness, and,

self-reflection, this self-awareness

must

possible that the knowledge the self has of itself can overcome
any doubt or

it

uncertainty the split might engender. In other words, the self-awareness
required by the

demand

for self-certainty in the

modem

rationalist project

self to achieve transparent introspection,

i.e.,

to

know

must make

itself at

it

possible for the

once as both knower and

known.

The legacy of Cartesianism
philosophers and social

self presentation

gender and race
theorists

and

The

in the

to

construction of the

have argued

that

self.

Whether based on

made

split

in

on notions of self and

terms of conceptions of

liberal political subject.

Many

practices individuals claim rights, privileges,

cultural, etc.— based

on what they claim

to be.

nationality, cultural or linguistic affiliation, or ethnicity, for example,

practices reveal not only

its

modem

both represented through and expressed by

this ‘being’ is

origin,

of the mind-body

contemporary understandings of the self through

Through such

and other forms of access— political,

itself.

effects

be called “identity practices” involve a citation of the Cartesian notion

of the nature of the

know

contemporary culture has been explored by many

have been analyzed, for example, especially

critics

what has come

critics.

for

what a

self

is;

their identity.

Identity

importantly they also articulate a self s claim to

Usually based on claims about the body— its color,

its

sex,

its

biological

place of birth— identity practices have been analyzed as both limited by and

possible

What

by a Cartesian-influenced mind-body dualism.

this dissertation investigates,

however,

is

how

the limits of Cartesian

metaphysics not only effect our considerations of the self in terms of its being, but,

2

in its

demand

for self-certainty, cogito thinking or logic
also effects our considerations of the

self in terms of

its

knowing. Descartes’ solitary meditations not only
render the self as a

knowable substance but they also present us with a
,

knowing

itself

with certainty.

self who

a subject capable of

is

suggest that claims of self-knowledge, even those which

I

attempt to offer an alternative to or critique of the self as a
kind of Cartesian substance,
inadvertantly recite the limits of Descartes

in practices

of self-knowledge as

identity practices

self

is

which seem

Even claims

self-certainty.

to challenge the

a product of relational, social practices

knowable substance, must involve a
limits

introspective self-knower

critical

when

they engage

to self-knowledge through

mind-body dualism, arguing

that the

and norms, rather than a given or

epistemology

in

order to avoid reciting the

of Cartesianism.

To be

effective, a critique

of Cartesian metaphysics and

its

implications must

involve an analysis of this model of introspective self-knowing. Such an analysis
involves examining not only the notion of the self as substance, but also a critique of the

paradigm of self-awareness which

facilitates the

paradigm of self-awareness involves

at

seifs claim to self certainty. This

once a positing of the self as an

epistemologically split self and a relationship between these ‘two selves’ whereby any

impediment

to the self s claim to self-certainty

rationalist focus

removed. As noted, Descartes’

on the self as the sole source of his knowledge renders

self-reflection as a practice

which

splits the self into

known. As awareness of or access
relationship

is

between these two

self-knowledge that

is

to the self, self-awareness

selves.

incorrigible,

a self who

i.e.,

In order for the

to

know

3

knows and

is

a

way

of

a self who

is

thus the epistemological

knowing or

itself in

his practice

subject-I to claim

that cannot

be otherwise,

it

must be able

exactly what

certainty,

it is,

i.e.,

know. Thus

to

be aware of itself completely. What
including all that

clarity

is

it

it

claims to be must capture

in order to satisfy Descartes’

requirements for

and distinctness. There can be no part of itself that
the

this relationship

between the subject-I and the

self cannot

must be one which

object-I

renders any possible threats to certainty-any thing which
could shed doubt on the seifs

knowledge of itself-neutral. The idea
self can be.

itself

knowing or

between the

is

figured as transparent, such that the

completely without impediment. What

of modem self-knowledge:
the

subject-I

I’s is

the

in

I

can seemingly

argue,

the aporia

is

order to achieve self-certainty the ‘difference’ between

and the known or object-I must be erased such

is

achieved,

I

offer,

always already including the knowing

that the relation

through the figuration of the known self as

self-i.e.,

ontology, in terms of how the self knows

rationalist (Enlightenment) turn

the production of

this results in

I

one of identity.

This erasure

its

this identity relation

by conceptualizing what the

itself, its (self)

is, its

towards the self presumes the self to be an active part of

own knowledge,
between the

completely knowable, even to

self

epistemology. But, as the

I

claim that the subject-I cannot be contained by

subject-I

and the

object-I.

The

activity of the subject-I

produces the subject-I as a kind of excess, a kind of moreness which

itself.

Cartesian metaphysics, so too do

we

As

the quest for self-certainty

being

resists

is

a legacy

inherit the instability present in claims

certainty through self-knowledge. Rather than attempt to

instability

all that

There can be no unknowns. Thus, as the epistemological relation
between

the ‘two selves,’ self-awareness

know

the self has of itself must thus contain

overcome

this,

I

of the

of self-

think such

can be interestingly appropriated for a more productive and effective notion

4

of self-awareness. The goal of this dissertation
awareness
consider

that avoids or escapes the limits

how there

is

not to develop a paradigm of self-

of self-certainty, per se; rather

an unknowable but actively present self that

How to address this

production of self-knowledge.

more possible ways of engaging
shift

is

subject-I in a

self-knowing as self-making

in

development of self-knowing

that recognizes the

I

How

project.

for

is

present in and yet constructed by

to address this

knowing-subject

ways of being and making our
Thus,

in addition to

Second Meditation

in

what

I

selves

have

is

the

in

its

part of the

my concern.

This

suggest, a

a

how

self-knowledge

way

that

problem

laid out

to

contingency of such knowledge, rather

than attempts to reduce or eliminate such contingency. Exploring
point of view

want

way that encourages

is

towards self-knowing as productive of the self comes from,

is

I

it

is

the seifs

own

the goal of this

engenders more possibilities

concentrates on solving.

above, Chapter 2 analyzes Descartes’

terms of its presentation of self-knowledge as self-certainty. In

order to generate his criteria of certainty-clarity and distinctness-he must present

knowledge as

incorrigible.

Through

his figuring

of the self as a thinking thing,

Descartes attempts to argue that his knowledge of his self is certain, as

immediate

intuition.

contend that
also

how

it

I

it

is

an

focus in this chapter on Descartes’ res cogitans argument, as

reveals not only

such a conception

Though engendered by

self-

is

how

used

Descartes conceives of the self as a substance, but

in order to

overcome what

I

see as the split

his quest for certainty this split also threatens

outcome. Descartes’ presentation of the wax example,
the Meditation. Relying

upon

his

I

I

offer, reveals

method of doubt presented

contends that his knowledge of the wax

itself comes not

5

its

from

self.

successful

what

is at

earlier in the text,

stake in

he

his senses or imagination.

but from his understanding. His knowledge of
the nature of the
activity

provides his argument with an example of how he knows
the nature

this

of something,

I

suggest that

it

split-self of self-knowledge.

similar, but

not.

what

wax

is

certain

uncertain

is

What

is

is

notes, his

that

that

most relevant

for his

itself as

to

argument

is

overcome
not what

the

is

examples of knowing the wax and knowing the

that the self

is

capable of self-reflection and the

judgement about the wax may be

requires the activity of the mind.

it

it

him with what he needs

still

wax

is

contain errors, but

What makes knowledge of the

does not offer a way for the self to be certain about

Descartes attempts to render the self transparent to

self.

know

is

also provides

different about the

different

is

As Descartes

knowing
both

what

And what

is

requires the

of his mind alone.

While

self.

wax

itself

itself as a

such that

it

can

an object of knowing and as a subject of knowing.

Following Hintikka’s famous analysis of the cogito ergo sum argument as a
performative,

evaluate

I

how

the

sum

kind of performative. Interpreting

thinking thing”

I

suggest that

performative. But even so,

argument requires because
performative:

it

is

I

it

it

“I

res cogitans argument seems to also function as a

am

does seem that

argue that

it

we

fails to

know myself as

a

could read the res cogitans as a

achieve the certainty Descartes’

does not meet the requirements of a (successful)

not existentially inconsistent to assume the opposite and

necessary to have to repeat the phrase as

force in the

a thinking thing” as “I

moment of articulation.

it

only seems to accomplish

its

it

seems

performative

My intent in this chapter is to suggest how

that the certainty that Descartes requires

seems

to

be attempted through

this

it

kind of

performative but because he himself locates the activity of the mind as part of the

6

seems

production of the knowledge of a nature, he

is left

with the problem of knowing that

mind. As the burden of Descartes’ ’performative’
involves not establishing what cannot

be otherwise through a positive assertion but instead
erasing the presence of what he
cannot seem to know, the presence of the unknown subject-I
re-appears when, perhaps,
he

is

not stating “I

In

Chapter

am

a thinking thing,” and thus the performative

3,

present

1

identity, particularly in

known,

Hume contends

Hume’s

critique of the philosophical notion of personal

terms of its assumption of the self as a substance.
all

of our knowledge

is

If there is

impression

we have of which

no impression, then

the term

is

a substance

self.

Hume’s

Instead

Hume

tells us,

we

we must

the idea referred to

meaningless.

identity as meaningless, as our investigation

As

He

well

is

derived from our perceptions,

impressions and ideas. In order for a term to be meaningful,
in ourselves the

fails.

i.e.,

our

be able to locate

by the term

is

a copy.

thus critiques the notion of

of our impressions reveals no impression of

find only our successive perceptions.

critique of personal identity presents us with an alternative notion of the

self which importantly introduces the role that experience plays in the constitution of the

self.

While Hume’s epistemology provides him with a method by which he can render

the metaphysical notion of the self as a substance meaningless, this

which

we
this

limits the effectiveness

of his

investigate our impressions, that

critique.

Throughout the Treatise,

we examine and

examiner who can so engage with

its

method

own

who

experience? Without an alternative notion of self-awareness,

of critique— his empirical epistemology— leaves

I

can look

contend,

in place the position

also that

Hume

evaluate them. But

perceptions,

is

who
at its

urges that

or what

is

own

Hume’s method

of the knowing self

capable of transparent introspection. While Hume’s critique of the metaphysical self is

7

aimed

both the notion of the underlying, unchanging,
substance self and the notion of

at

the self as a transparently available container
self, he in effect posits a

seemingly capable of the kind of introspection he
addressing this knowing subject, without a

critiques.

knowing

Without a means of

way of explaining how

it is

that the self

once a product of its perceptions and capable of examining those
perceptions,
subject- 1 remains uninterrogated, placing

beyond the reach of Hume’s

critical

it

is at

this

both outside of the seifs experience and

method.

Part of the reason for this failure

is,

obviously, his method which relies on a kind

of empirical investigation of the self not too unsimilar
kinds of scientific explorations

self

at the time.

to

how one might perform

Perceptions are treated by

Hume

other

as

empirical data which collected together, into the bundle that he analogizes the self as,

can be examined. What he begins to move toward
theater and as a

commonwealth

is

in his

the idea that the self is

analogies of the self as a

composed of its

perceptions,

but that these perceptions so collected interact with one another, affect one another. The
collection

the

is

not static nor

commonwealth

These analogies do

for

is

what holds them

example can change though
however,

not,

relationship between the self and

“On

Personal Identity” what

I

as a

present

way

Hume’s

is

fully

its

Both the content and the form of

together.

its

identity can

answer Hume’s own questions regarding the

perceptions.

He

asks several times in the section

the connection between them.

analysis of the passions or impressions of reflection in

connection and to suggest what

to explore this

remain the same.

its

Book

implications might be for a

notion of self-awareness that both critiqued metaphysical claims and resisted sceptical

criticism.

In particular

I

focus on

Hume’s

section

8

“On

Pride and Humility” as here he

II

obliquely offers a discussion of the relationship
between the ideas of “mine” of and

Though

self.

this discussion fails in the

between the self and
does suggest a

its

perceptions,

way to approach

constitutive. In short, pride

The two
look

is

I

to provide

an answer to the connection

suggest that through

the relation

its

Hume calls

isn’t exactly clear

it

two ideas and two impressions. The

ideas are

impressions are something positive like beauty, and pride.
project

is

that together, these relationships

the attention of the self toward

itself.

analysis of “possession”

between the perceptions and the

the result of what

relationships involved, though

like, are

end

move

at

a “double relationship.”

what the schematic might

mine and

What

my self,

is critical

terms of constructing

if

not determining the

of how the self is able to mis-recognize
identity is through

its

its

and the

for our

once seems

self,

its

directs

to effect a

notion of the self which does not seem to presuppose what that self is. While
unclear what role the pre-given structures of the mind-i.e.,

it

self as

engender the passion of pride which

This double

“my

it

is

predispositions-play

in

the section on pride suggests that part

successive perceptions as perceptions of

mis-recognition of its successive perceptions of its self through

its

notion of ‘mine-ness.’ While this ‘mine-ness’ seems to be generated in relation to

memory,
that

is

the

it is

ultimately unclear

problem of personal

how Hume can

get out of what he calls the “labyrinth”

identity.

Focusing on contemporary philosopher Michel Foucault, Chapter 4 continues
develop not only the notion of the self as

own

activity in relation to

substance

self.

its self.

Like

relational, but also the

Hume, Foucault

Unlike Hume, he includes

in his analysis

selves that in effect, reproduce the self as a kind of substance.

9

importance of the self s

critiques the notion of the

ways

to

in

which we know our

He does

not

fail to

recognize the importance of practices of self-knowledge
as themselves productive of

what the

self can be

and his method of analysis-historical criticism-also
recognizes the

inaccessibility of the

knowing

subject. Focusing

on Foucault’s

both Foucault’s notion of ‘care for the self and suggest

even requires) a notion of self-awareness which can

knowledge while also addressing the

subject-I

at

which

I

how

it

later

work,

I

analyze

sets the stage for (and

once allow the self to claim
suggest

is

self-

constitutively

unknowable.

Throughout
practices

his early

which make

work, Foucault critiques what he terms “normalizing”

the self not only intelligible to others but also intelligible to

itself.

His historical analyses aim not to explain the origins of an idea or practice, and they
strongly reject a notion of historical investigation which traces the

beings have been repressed, violated,
either altered or denied.

Rather,

it is

etc.,

show how

the self has

‘experienced’ in different historical moments. His most famous

shaped, damaged, or repressed, but instead

individual

was

how
it

been

work perhaps,

the

offers

how

the experience of being an

constituted through the experience of ‘having a sexuality.’ Being a

aspect of one’s self or identity,

His goal in his

which

which human

individuals’ sexualities have been

sexual being, Foucault contends, such that one’s sexuality

in

in

such that their ‘natural’ states have been

his project to

History of Sexuality Volume I presents not

way

later

is

is

considered an important

an historical construction.

work, as

I

explore

it, is

to further his criticisms

institutional forces— through the State, psychiatry, the prison

of the ways

system— construct

the possibilities of what the self can be through what he calls power-knowledges.

He

recognizes that what has been absent in his analyses of what he calls technologies of

10

domination has been a way of approaching the seifs
participation

Where

the practices

intelligibility are

is

active in

resisting them.

such technologies.

legitimate recognition or

granted meet with those practices by which the self
acts on and toward

Foucault calls ‘govemmentality.’

itself,

self

demanded by those systems through which

in

its

own

He

suggests in his later

participation in technologies

By engaging

in practices in a

that our activities are constitutive

work

which produce

that,

it, it

of who and what

we

are,

which ‘problematizes’ our actions such

‘expressing'

seem

to

be

some

that

we no

are if part of how they

know

committed

do so

effects

How

is

complicated,

do we know

how we

itself,

to

think about

to rejecting a Cartesian privileged self who

its

own

the self s care for the self:

its

practices are that

is

more

like

an

I

it

is

perhaps

contend,

that our acts

make

who we

and

seems

are

to require a

art object

can

know

itself

experiences, practices, etc. This

which make

than an essence. Without a

it

what

critical

is

other than transparency,

we

are again left with the
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his

how

way
is

for

deeply

the real point of

it is,

as for Foucault,

epistemology,

in

some way

problem of re-instating the

unknowable and un-addressable. Thus despite

us

from a point

however, which figures the relation between the subject-I and the object-I

as at once

may

be aware of itself as constructed. Certainly, Foucault

outside of itself, outside of

the self

as

longer consider them as

are made. In other words, Foucault’s turn towards care

the self to

we

‘natural.’

especially in relation to acts of self-knowing.

we

recognize

is critical

natural self, but as ‘effecting’ or constructing a self, that

This awareness of our actions as constitutive

who we

we

Foucault claims that

practice a kind of caring for and about ourselves. This notion
of care
that

capable of

is

conscious manner, such that

because the

subject-I

movement towards

a

technology of the

Foucault’s earlier critique of self-knowledge as
a disciplinary

self,

practice and of ‘desire’ as in effect, a tool of domination,
his theory of care
short.

He

does,

becoming,

i.e.,

I

claim,

assume a kind of epistemic

relation

between the

comes up

self and

its

self-awareness. Without critical attention to this assumed notion
of self-

awareness, however,

is

it

unclear what exactly Foucault

is

doing with care, leaving the

theory quite hampered.

I

offer a reading a

what

I

call ‘caring

the self can, through a problematization of

the subject-I

knowable

which

is,

as an object

self-knowledge’ as a

its

know

that less subjected

is critical

such caring self-knowing

including that natural self that

I

develop

way which does
is

this

would be

the

itself in a

way

I

politically

way

that avoids both the

I

assumed

in

in the next chapter, is to practice

not reify a natural identity about the

such notions as authenticity.

way closer

to

self,

We do not

our authentic selves.

most undermining practice— personally and

to resist the

not

contend,

politically.

Rather than avoid or overcome the notion of the unknowable of the subject-I,

this opacity as a

self,

for the self to engage in practices of self-

practice caring self-knowing in order to get in any

For Foucault,

production of the

by and more an agent of its own knowing

however, which
in a

how

legacy. This caring self-knowledge,

way

argue, offers Foucault’s critique a positive

What

in the

of certain knowledge. Such a caring self-knowing,

dogmatism and the scepticism of rationalism’s

practices.

explore

claims to self-knowledge begin to address

because of its constitutive role

begins to open up possibilities for the self to

knowing which such

way to

I

try to

use

draw of the authentic and develop a more effective—

and aesthetically— notion of self-awareness.
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Citing Descartes practice of self-reflection
through meditation, Chapter 5

my own relation

explores

one can address what

my narrative

reflects

is

my self-knowledge,

to

constitutively

what

I

highlighting by example

unknowable about

split self comes to

Aware of the

of self-knowledge

necessarily

unknowable about

through the

posed by Foucault,

that at

claim a certain position or even status as a self-knower while
is

that

The presentation of

in this project),

critiques of self-knowledge

to present a relational notion

address that which

is

me, via the empirical turn of Hume

(and the transcendental turn by Kant, an obvious absence

endeavor

it

consider throughout the dissertation as the split-self
of self-

knowledge. The paradigm of this

trope of identity.

the self.

how

my self.

it

once allows

also allows

I

me

me

to

to

Despite Foucault’s

resolute rejection of the figure of the “desiring subject” as a subject position which

reduces the

self to

know

means of making

which

as a

at

what he terms a “docile” subject,

once legitimize

me

I

nonetheless explore

my “desire to

explicit to myself, or problematizing, those practices

and deligitimize

me

as an agent capable of knowing herself

differently.

Thus,

I

explore the notion of identity in general through the figure of ‘being

adopted’— a figuration
argue that

we can

that

is

heavily imbued with the concern for self-knowledge—

begin to unpack both the ontological and the epistemological

assumptions of identity. As an ontological position, being adopted refers to being a

whose

identity

is

‘from’ both one’s biological parents

and one’s adopted

parents.

self

As an

epistemological position, however, being adopted refers to a self whose identity as

singular and coherent, can never be fully knowable.

not reducible to either ‘origin.’

The meaning of adopted

identity

How the adopted self knows her identity is always
13

is

implicated in both so that self-knowledge
available, partial.

of un-certainty,
the rationalist

part of the

I

is

always on-going,

While the figure of the adopted
claim that re figuring identity

self

is

in process,

often framed within a narrative

in general as

adopted pushes us beyond

paradigm of certainty. As such, the unknowability of the

meaning of identity

rather than something

never fully

self becomes

which undermines the

possibility

of self-knowledge.
Identity,

analogized as adopted, thus, not only underscores

substance and construction;

it

how

identity

also offers a critique of modem epistemology

is

both

which

I

believe can redress the split-self involved in the problem of self-knowledge.
Adopted

knowing reconceives
something

to get

the split or difference between the

self,

not as

over-through dogmatic or skeptical arguments-but as a relation

between different conceptions of self. Through figuring

knowledge

knowing and known

as adopted

identity as adopted

knowing, we can critique not only the mind/body

foundational to the late-modem notion of self, but

we can

and

self-

split that is

also address the

knowing

self/known self split that haunts the problem of self-knowledge. This conceptualization

of identity as “adopted,”
prior to the

mind/body

I

argue, figures the split-self of self-knowledge as conceptually

split.

Thus, ‘resolving’

this

epistemological

engender a more productive and coherent critique of identity

mind/body dualism

I

split,

in general

I

urge, will

and the

in particular.

close the dissertation by suggesting

engender ways to normatively evaluate acts
individuals’ pursuits of self-knowledge.

I

how addressing
in

identity as adopted

terms of their implications for

might

all

include as motivating such an ethical

evaluation, the importance of the desire for self-knowledge in terms of maintaining a

14

kind of freedom for the
protected.

self.

Such protection

The

desire to

know who we

entails individuals

are,

I

assert,

must be

having both the freedom

to

pursue the

productions-histories, meanings, contentions, stories, etc.-of
their identities and the

freedom from being

identified with a substantive self that leaves

difference, particularity, or change.

knower-self,

I

urge,

The

must be maintained;

distinction

for

can argue for a personal notion of self that,

it is

on the basis of this distinction

can be revered and respected without assigning to

15

it

for

between the knowing-self and

in its desirability

meaning.

them no room

and

the

that

we

(partial) knowability,

a definite, limited, or universalized

I know that I exist; the question

what

is this

is

T that I know?

1

CHAPTER 2
CARTESIAN METAPHYSICS AND THE PROBLEM OF
SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Introduction

Arriving at the correct perception of reality became a crucial issue
in the 17th
Century. Intellectual and religious thought, affected by the revolutionary
ideas of the

new

science as well as the changes in notions of location and place resulting from
the

‘age of discovery’ and the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, were in a
state of

dramatic flux.

As

notions of political and religious authority were shifting, so too were

the understandings of the origins of such authority.

knower himself than on God

or the (feudal) lord,

More dependent on

the

mind of the

knowledge became understood

correct correspondence between the thoughts of an individual and the world.

thinker approached his

it

to

own

thinking in relation to the world-that

is,

how

as a

How a

he represented

himself— affected the accuracy of his thoughts. There was thus a conceptual

shift

involved in terms of how knowledge was formed in the mind; no longer mediated

through church or king, the

new model

involved pursuing knowledge as in some sense

immediate. As thinking was considered to be acts of representing the world to the
individual mind, the thinker gained

new

responsibility in the production of knowledge.

While the authority of institutional systems were put
certainty of knowledge based

on the authority of the

into question,

however, so the

self became an issue.

a kind of subjectivism loomed, making sceptical critique more powerful.
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The

threat

A critical

of

concern

in the 17th

knowledge claims

Century was

to the

the individual could

know, and how

to relate these

worlds of science, religion, and industry. Just as new

methods were being developed
were methods being

how

bom

to

to test the ‘scientific’

prove that

man qua

Descartes wanted this certainty about his

own

scientific

knowledge of the world, so too

individual could have certainty.

thinking.

To

Rene

fight the rise in skeptical

thought, Descartes wanted a foundation of certainty upon which
a First Philosophy

could be

built.

Descartes' focus on the individual as an authoritative source of

knowledge can be found
Method.

in the

In this latter text

opening of the Meditations as well as

we can

its

own

in his

Search for

see Descartes’ project as intending both to provide

science with a foundational grounding in reason, and to enable the individual thinker to

claim a kind of autonomy through his/her practice of reason.
his project

I

and

its

He

offers a description of

promise, writing,

shall bring to light the true riches

of our souls, opening up

to

each of us

means whereby we can find within ourselves, without any help from
anyone else, all the knowledge which we may need for the conduct of
life, and the means of using it in order to acquire all the most abstruse
items of knowledge which the human mind is capable of possessing.
the

(CSM

II

400,

AT X

496).

Not only does Descartes’ method

figure the individual as capable of discovering

such knowledge autonomously, but he also clearly suggests that

human

all individuals as

beings are so capable. Thus present here are the seeds of Enlightenment

humanism— individual autonomy that

is

also democratically distributed to

the correct practice or use of our reason then,

need” as

all

of this knowledge

is

we

can access

“all the

available within each one of us.

17

all.

Through

knowledge we may

There
individual

s

is

thus an interesting democratic ideal at

access to knowledge since each individual

knowledge and the same means

As

knowledge

that

own

his/her

work here regarding

is

for the discovery

is

endowed with both

same

the

of even the most abstruse knowledge.

present in the individual in a

way that

thought, Descartes’ method must provide a

inward, to find within himself the knowledge that

the

in

is

he/she can access through

way that

the individual can turn

some sense already

2

there.

Descartes work thus reflects an intellectual shift away from
external authority

and toward

internal authority.

Viewing philosophy

as scientific, Descartes attempts to

prove both that an accurate representation of the world

is

possible, and that philosophy

can be used to guarantee such accuracy. In his quest for a foundation of certainty,
Descartes presents in The Meditations both a First Philosophy and a philosophical
,

method

(his

method of doubt and

the logical argumentation — cogito reasoning— it

engenders) which can become the means for such a foundation. Perhaps because of the

ways

in

which the

Descartes’

own method

of narrative of his
part

self as

own

knower had become

involves both an examination of the self as knower and a kind

thinking on the matter.

of the thinking (and the exposition)

knowledge

As

a crucial issue in the 17th Century,

itself.

How he comes to his thoughts becomes
Hence, the self and

its

relation to

its

own

figure importantly in Descartes' analysis.

Descartes’ goal

is to

ascertain the certainty of knowledge, to put forth a First

Philosophy upon which other philosophies, as well as science

itself,

can be grounded, he

needs to show that his philosophy can provide other systems of knowledge with
foundational certainty. His argument thus involves using his method
certainty could be proven as possible. His argument relies
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to

upon finding

show

that

first that

about

which he could have no doubt

how
to

he can find a

know

3

Descartes approaches the problem of how he
can know,

.

way to have

certainty, through the

problem of self-knowledge.

himselj with certainty becomes a crucial issue for
his larger argument

crux of this issue, however,

have such self-knowledge

is

not only to discover what he

that is certain, that

was without

is,

4

The

.

but also to find a

a doubt.

He

How

way

to

thus has to

consider not only what the self is thought to be-a self-evidencing
substance-but also
the

way

itself)

in

which he has knowledge of this

immediately, that

Thus Descartes'

means of providing

is,

In short, this self has to be

self.

project in the Meditations involves using self-knowledge as a

his philosophy with an

its

ideas, he

be proven as unable to be

itself, its

idea of itself,

example of an idea which can be shown

is

must show

in error.

He

that

that the self can

can have

it

attempts to

show

at least

one idea which can

that the seifs

such an incorrigible idea. What

this

and

to

know

that

enables the self able to

it

knows

know

itself as such.

that its idea

awareness cannot be self-reflection as

is

corrigible

guarantees

we

to

have certain

knowledge of

demands then

conceive of self-awareness as that which allows the self to be able both to
directly

(to

without mediation.

be incorrigible. As Descartes wants to conclude

knowledge through

known

is

that

know

he

itself

Self-awareness must be that which

of itself is

true.

As

such,

ordinarily understand

it,

I

offer, self-

since self-reflection

and Descartes’ foundational project requires a kind of self-awareness which

its

certainty.

It

must render the idea the

self has

of itself an idea

that

cannot

be otherwise.

As we
as his

see in the

Second Meditation then Descartes
,

example of knowing something beyond

a doubt.
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As

turns toward self-knowledge

such, he must provide an

argument which secures
myself which

sum

I

that the

possess,”

true.( 19/28)

knowledge of

“this

Moving from

the cogito to the

res cogitans Descartes' project involves not
only claiming with certainty the
,

has of this existence-that
project, the

can

unmistakably

is

existence of the self-that

I

knowledge he has of himself,

know

I

am-but

I

know

also claiming with certainty the knowledge
the self

this

T that

am. Thus, a

itself,

but also

how

it

can

know

knowledge he

that the

know,

that he claims to

that

its

Archimedian point he
that

is

looking

knowledge of itself is

his idea of his self,

for,

by which he can secure

but

it

must make

desires, Descartes

certainty will provide his project not only with an

knowing

of Descartes'

critical feature

problem of self-knowledge becomes a problem concerning not
just how

short, to achieve the certain

I

I

is

the

I

that

he

is.

certain.

it

the

In

unmistakable

Achieving

this

example of such knowing, the

will also provide

him with

the

method of

certainty in general.

His resolution to the problem of self-certainty thus involves presenting the

ontology of the self to be such that awareness of it on

immediately

to the

it

will evidence

mind. What the self is must be such that

of its nature without impediment. What

it

is

must make

it

it

is

its

nature

capable of being aware

capable of immediate

self-

awareness, such that this awareness results in an idea the self has of itself which cannot

be wrong. Thus, the self s conception of itself as having such an ontology must be

immediately evidential. Descartes attempts

to resolve the

problem of knowing the

self

with certainty by conceiving the nature of the self as pure thinking, res cogitans. By

conceiving of the ontology of the

I

as a thinking thing (or, as

cogitans as a conscious thing), Descartes’ knowledge of the
,

cannot seemingly be

in error.
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some
‘I,

translate res

’-“the

T that

I

know”-

Descartes engenders the self s capacity for
immediate self-awareness by making
the self a purely rational substance or
thinking thing,

sum

res cogitans.

not in arguing that the self is not such a substance,
per se\ rather,

am

I

My interest is

interested in

how

conceiving of the self as a thinking thing seems to
undermine rather than support
Descartes’ need for an incorrigible idea. But rather than
satisfying his
certainty, the

argument he develops

seems instead
this chapter is

to

make such

how

to

demand

for

prove the notion of the self as a thinking thing

satisfaction impossible.

What I would

like to focus

on

in

Descartes reaches what seems to be an impasse in the Second

Meditation, through his presentation of the

wax example, he

argues that to

know

the

nature of anything (outside of himself he states), requires the presence
of the mind.

Knowing something’s

nature cannot be doubted because

it

comes

to us not through the

senses or the imagination but by an act of the mind. Thus any idea of something’s
nature involves the presence of this act of mind. While
a result of the

mind having acted

,

it

seems

that the idea

it

could be argued that an idea

we have

is

of something’s nature

presumes the presence of this active mind.

The big question of the Second Meditation then

is

not “is the self a thinking

thing” but does conceiving of the self as a thinking thing satisfy the need in Descartes'

foundational philosophy for an idea which can be

can thus generate the

shown

criteria for assessing the truth

to

be incorrigible and which

of the idea of our judgments. Does

conceiving of the self as a thinking substance, in other words, engender a way for the
self to be

aware of itself immediately, without impediment, without any chance of it

being wrong?

certainty,

I

What

argue,

Descartes needs to do in order to have self-knowledge provide

is to

self-

eliminate any possibility that the self s awareness of itself could
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be wrong. Descartes' requirement that self-knowledge
be incorrigible requires

awareness be such that any act of self-reflection whereby
the self considers
act

that self-

itself is

an

of immediate awareness. Self-knowledge can come
from introspection, but

introspection must not maintain a difference between
a self trying to
self which

self has

it

knows. To

satisfy Descartes'

need

for incorrigibility, the

of itself through introspection must render not only what

be in error, but moreover

it

must renders the

know

relation

between the

it

and a

itself

knowledge the

knows

as unable to

self and itself one of

transparency.

Many commentators
which
to

in

it

have discussed sum res cogitans

engages the mind/body

split in

Descartes,

i.e.,

how

it

be exclusively rational or cognitive as opposed to the body
terms of the

way

in

which

it

sets

interested in both of these issues,

in terms

5

is

I

wonder

if the

sum

split

up the mind

to set

to itself.

While

split

6
.

am

or distinction seems to rely upon

might depend

sum

res cogitans

res cogitans argument doesn’t itself contain a split that

reducible to the mind/body split

I

it

on what the transparency of the mind

could be understood as doing or enabling and what the mind/body
upon; for while the mind/body

in

Others have analyzed

.

up the mind as transparent

my focus

seems

of the way

In other words, as providing

immediate

is

not

self-

awareness, the res cogitans argument seems to be trying to make indistinguishable the

two

I’s in

Descartes' question, “what

possible two

I’s

here— an

begging the question

By

to

I

who

is

is this ‘I’ that

knowing and an

make them

I

I

know?” But

who

is

since there are

known, Descartes may be

indistinguishable.

rendering the nature of the

I

thinking thing-ness, Descartes' self-knowledge

can seemingly overcome the conceptual gap that divides

22

this split-I.

By making

the

,

nature of the

however,

is

I

thinking, Descartes’ self can

know

itself

a result of the differentiation between the

the self that exists and the self that

is

known,

that

rationalist project itself. This split is necessary

Rationalist project

While

itself.

I

do not

fully

I

,

with certainty. This

knowing

self and the

split,

known

self,

seems constituted by the Cartesian
claim, due to the

develop

demands of the

this critique here,

it

is

my

position that Rationalism engenders a split between
the I-subject and the I-object as

problem of attaining epistemological certainty within the

locates the

activity alone

7
.

As

self-knowledge as a problem,

i.e.,

how can

through these two figurations of self.
thinking myself to be,

is in fact,

question— in other words, “what

the self know itself if/when

How can know
I

that the

‘I’

the self I really

am? The

is this ‘I’ that

know?”— already

I

I

of mental

limits

a splitting of the self, this differentiation engenders the

it

problem of

is

thematized

am knowing

(rationalist)

it

or

framing of the

figures the

two

I’s as

possibly distinct.

Thus, within

paradigm, self-knowledge as knowledge of my nature (as a

this

thinking thing) must be that which can contend with this apparent

knowledge must be
what

it

that

which presents the

self with

this

knowledge must be

.

Self-

knowledge of its own ontology—

is— and with the knowledge that this knowledge

knowledge of myself and

8

split

I

must have

It is

Descartes'

is correct.

self-evident.

presentation and supposed resolution of this split through the figure of the seifs nature

as a thinking thing that

we examine. By conceiving of the

thinking thing, Descartes

immediate

intuition,

Meditation

,

is

tries to

make

the

knowledge the

and therefore, clear and

to present not

what he

is,

distinct.

per se but
,

23

nature of the self as a

self has

His focus

of its self an

in the

Second

to present self-knowledge as

an

immediate

which

intuition such that he can provide his

The

is incorrigible.

with the

criteria

argument an example of a proposition

certainty that such incorrigibility gives

him

will provide

of clarity and distinctness he needs.

Descartes

is

trying to

make

identical the self that he is

and the self that he knows

himself to be by making his nature, his essence, be the res
cogitans. His resolution
the

problem of self-knowledge implies a model of self-identity between
the

knows and
knowing

the

I

him

who

my nature.

is

known.

In short,

can be certain that

I

Not only then does Descartes

to

who

I

am what know am by

I

I

I

substantialize the self, but this turn

towards self-as-thinking-substance also entails an act of self-identity which
enables one
to not only achieve self-knowledge, but also to

certainty

seems

knowing

itself

can become

What
I)

this

in the act

I

proves however,

of knowing, but

known

rationalist

about

I

framework

his notion

known, and the knowing
10

Hence

.

I),

is

not that

rather, that

to

I

I

have of myself

11
.

know myself as I am knowing

I

I

know

that

be a relation of then

but the

This

as capable of

I

the ‘idea’

9
.

known and

is

what

I

think

not the

I

am

I

is

knowing

the idea of the

I

i.e.,

,

as a

what

I

am.

(the subject

(the ‘I’) that the

has. This suggests that self-knowledge within the Cartesian

entails a kind

itself with certainty,

while knowing.

seems

(the object

thinking or knowing

the self with certainty

Third Meditation ) a clear and distinct idea

the identity relation

and the

as fully

‘I’

without the impediment of doubt

later (in the

What
knower

to establish the

know

Two

it

of ‘blind spot’:

does not seem in

this

if the self

framework

know some

does

that

it

can

know

thing

itself

aspects of Descartes' argument seem to engender this blindspot:

of what an idea

is

and his requirements

for certainty.

As we

shall see,

idea of something’s nature involves the presence of an active thinking mind; this

24

any

includes the idea of the nature of the self as
well. And, as the requirements for
certainty

involve clarity and distinctness,

when having an

thinking, even

other words, the subject

is

I

conditions of certainty for

it

it

does not seem that the self engaged

idea of itself,

never able to

is

know

itself in a

idea of something and as such can never be identical
to

And

of

thus present clearly and distinctly. In

is

way that

always involved, for Descartes,

self cannot be identical to the idea.

in the act

as the subject

in the

production of any

The producer of the

it.

I

satisfies the

idea, the

actively part of the

is

production of the idea of itself, the idea can never fully capture-or
grasp, as Descartes
writes-the subject

Any

I.

idea the subject

I

has of itself-even of it as an active,

thinking subject-entails a productive relation between the subject

marking part of the
never grasp

and the

as not included in (and always outside of) this idea.

I

this active

the idea itself relies

I

I

as that

upon

is

I

idea, thus

The idea can

always posited as part of the conceiving of the idea—

a distinction

never be identical. Thus the subject

between

and the subject

it

I.

Therefore they can

cannot have a clear and distinct idea of itself

I

13

.

If it is the case that self-knowledge for Descartes involves a blindspot such that

the self cannot

know

itself

while

it

is

knowing,

i.e.,

as a subject

I,

then

we must

ask:

does Descartes' project provide self-knowledge as self-certainty? Does his knowledge

of his object

it

I

constitute self-certainty?

deal with this blindspot ?

attempts to

know

14

with certainty

seeing

made

possible,

but because

does (for him

it

at least),

it

I

is

that the

I

that

he

contend, not because

renders

its

own

then

how does

the self as a thinking thing Descartes

what he

is.

T that he has an idea

of.

with certainty that the idea he has of his self is

‘sees’

itself,

if

By conceptualizing

What he
is

And

is is this

it

makes

This

the self completely visible to

‘blindspot’ m-visible.

25

in fact

The knowing or

subject

I

becomes

invisible as

idea of the object

self- transparency

invisible,

self.

I

it

T as

makes

it

I

I

and the

through

of the

I

between the

(the self known) thus produces

I

it

is

impossible that

Descartes

it

could

know

Second Meditation

conceived of by the

thus functions as a

I.

I

split)

a thinking thing seems to offer the self self-knowledge,
this

Descartes must contend with.

it

has and the object

I

identity relation

through a kind of self-opacity by rendering the
unknowable subject

Descartes' focus in the

nature,

The

I.

hidden behind what seems to be certainty regarding
the whole (or not

in fact

on the

itself as the object

that the subject

While making the

move

knows

15
I.

is

itself as a subject

on not only the

means of uniting
overcome

or

making an

the split in his

(a) substantializing the self as a thinking thing,

as a thinking thing,

and

as

exists but also

it

This focus engenders a kind of split-self which

By conceiving of self-knowledge

tries to

I

of knowledge.

as

knowledge of this

identity relation

sum

between the

res cogitans argument

which conceptualizes the nature

(b) constructing the relations

between the Fs as ones of

transparency and identity. The metaphysics of the res cogitans claims to accomplish
this

because

it

assumes the

can be identical to what

knowledge as

it

self as rational substance

knows

self-certainty

itself as,

what

its

is

transparent to itself such that

idea of itself is.

It

can have

self-

16
.

However, rather than discovering a method whereby the
can be obtained, Descartes' project of developing a

of unstable self-identity and hence

fails to

First

certainty of judgments

Philosophy engenders a model

provide certain self-knowledge

17
.

This

unstable self is presented in Descartes' argument as capable of self-knowledge. But

failure to achieve

it

is

it

characteristic

of the

modem

subject,

whose model of such

its

self-

identity then generates the desire for such knowledge. In other words, since Descartes

26

has inadvertently posited the subject as a
split-self in search of identity, his project
of

achieving certain self-knowledge, which has
been taken up by the

caused subjects
the split

which

by such

constituted

a project .'

8

Because the

self-knowledge cannot be overcome, the knowing subject

knows himself through knowing

falsely believing he

this self-identity (relation) that will secure his

Rather than try to resolve the
suggest instead that this
the gap

between the

instability is present

I’s

produce.

it

is left

choosing between

his substance or (forever) seeking

knowledge of his thinking- or knowing-I.
of Descartes' project,

and yet denied.

I

It is

unstable because

cannot develop here)

depends upon a kind of self-knowledge

its

is at

my goal

is to

engenders.

split-I

(a) to

once required and

subject can be achieved

by

legacy of rationalism and the epistemological

By addressing

of the subject, can offer ways

achievement of certainty

that the subject is unable to

A more productive and coherent philosophy of the

it

model of

or overcoming the split render a philosophical subject whose

announcing and addressing the
instability

split self

split-self in this

(should) remain aporetic. Rationalist attempts at closing

split

(and political legitimacy, a point

impossible as

subject, has

such certain self-knowledge-and hence identity-to
overcome

to desire

is

modem

the instabilities of the subject, such a philosophy

analyze

how

the epistemological issues involved in

self-knowledge have both metaphysical as well as political effects, and (b) to begin to

unpack the ways

and desire

in

which these
19

for identity

.

By

in self-knowledge), in other

effects

have been reiterated

focusing on the instability of the

words,

it

becomes possible

terms of the seifs attempts to overcome

suggest

how

the gap

between the

its

split I’s (a

own
gap

contemporary notions of

in

I

(or the anxiety involved

to thematize self-knowledge in

(constitutive) instability. Thus,

I

27

I

will

see as thematizable through the desire

to

know) might be used

differently.

an identity-relation between the
nature.

I’s

Self-knowledge can be claimed without resorting
to
such as

is

present in the Cartesian notion of one’s

Furthermore, the aporia of self-knowledge that the
Cartesian tradition generates

should be maintained since

it

is

both constitutive of the

modem

self,

and necessary

for

20
theorizing political change and resistance regarding this
self
.

Method

Descartes'

The goal of Descartes Meditations

is

to

prove through logical argument that one

can have certainty about one’s knowledge of the world. Through his method
of doubt,

whereby he renders uncertain anything he can have

a single doubt about, Descartes

discovers that the one thing he can, for the sake of argument, have certainty about
fact that

the

is

he exists. This gives him existential knowledge, as he can assert without doubt

that he exists.

But as his project

in the

Meditations

is to

provide a foundational First

Philosophy, he needs this indubitable claim to generate an incorrigible proposition

(which

clarity

in turn,

and

exists; but

he can use to generate his

distinctness).

he also must

Such

criteria

forjudging true propositions,

incorrigibility requires not only that he

know what

it

is

that

himself is impossible to be otherwise, that

he

is,

is.

how

knows

Thus he must show how
it

is

i.e.,

that he

his idea

an immediate intuition. Thus

He

Descartes’ argument rests upon his resolution of the problem of self-knowledge.

must be able

to claim that his idea

knowledge must be able
moreover,

it

of his self cannot be wrong. His claim

to survive his

must be able

to provide

method of doubt,

him with

it

his criteria

28

of

must be

to self-

incorrigible,

of certainty.

and

One would
as,

who

the

we know

I

think that the problem of self-knowledge-involving
such questions

who knowing and who

is

they are the

problem upon which

same-would be
to build

self

is,

(or

I

me) who

is

being known, and

of opportunities for doubt.

full

argument

no gaps, no

that has

in fact, perfect for his project.

knowledge involves the problem of the
distinguishing the

the

how do

seems a sticky

It

an argument for certainty. But, as Descartes’ concern

really with presenting a logical

knowledge of the

is

knowing from

the

split

known

is

possibilities for error,

While the problem of self-

between the two selves of knowing, of
self,

the resolution to the problem gives

him

the logical seamlessness that he seeks. For as he argues throughout
his Replies to his

objectors, his

not a syllogistic argument.

is

thinking things,

is

I

he writes in the Second Set of Replies, “this

not derived by

am, or

I

exist’,

but recognizes

“And when we become aware

it

is

that

we

a primary notion

means of any syllogism. When someone says

‘I

am

are

which

thinking, therefore

he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism,
as

something self-evident by a simple

intuition

of the mind.”(100,

21

140)

Methodological Doubt
In Meditations Descartes sets out to find a

paradox of uncertainty:

if

is

doubtful, this

which admits of the
false;

and

I

will

slightest

proceed

resolve what appears to be his

he does not have certainty, then

uncertain? Instead ofjudging what

namely what

way to

is

what

doubt

in this

is certain,

I

way

is

how

as his methodological doubt. “Anything

will set aside just as if

I

is

he begins with a weaker judgment,

known

until

can he decide what

I

had found

it

recognize something certain,

29

to

be wholly

or, if

nothing

else, until

I

at least

recognize for certain that there

method of doubt he proposes

to find either that

is

no

which

certainty.” (16, 24)

is

Using his

certain, or that there is only the

certainty of uncertainty.

We see in the First Meditation, however, that such a distinction between
and uncertain when

certain

or a deception,

more

carefully,

how
I

all

seems uncertain,

know something
know

certain

Archimedian

on such

demon? By what
that cannot

I

means of which being

him through dreams

criteria

a dream,

think about this

knows comes

to

can he

something

tell that

or

by

can he make the claim that he does in
that

cannot be untrue?

can be doubted?

He needs

How

the

fact

can he even

to find, he suggests, an

what he can know, what he can base
in the sciences that

is

would be

his philosophy

stable

and

Finding this point will not only give him something about which he can

move, he can use

is

this point

by which he can

not only uncertainty, but moreover, in a kind of Platonic

of certainty as that by which he can know certainty,

identify a

mark

differentiating certain

This epistemological Archimedian point, then,

have any doubt. He must use the doubting method

by which he can be able

know something

so? “As

is

How

can establish something

be certain such that there

as that

if all

point, if he to find out

lasting. ( 17, 18)

it

is

asleep .”(13, 79)

be a deception,

from uncertain,

that he

that

see plainly that there are never any sure signs by

unreal or a deception, if in fact all he

actions of an evil

highly problematic. If all

know for certain,

can Descartes

awake can be distinguished from being
is

is

what

to

know

certain

is

from uncertain.

that about

for, as

he

is

that

is,

22

which he cannot

looking for the criterion

from uncertain, he cannot merely claim or

as z^-certain out of belief or from previous experience. Rather than

knowing something

is

uncertain, then, he

must only decide

30

if

it

is

doubtable.

He

has

eliminated as possible certainties, thus, any
thoughts that

any

come

to

him from

his senses,

could be part of a dream, and any that could
originate from the hands of a

that

demonic deceiver. All these thoughts,

all this

which he has previously thought of as

knowledge, can be doubted.

He
19)

thus discovers that there

While he may

He cannot
there

is

in fact

not exist

thinks thoughts, he exists.

the fact that he exists as deceived.

proposition, I am, I exist,

conceived

in

my mind.”

(

1

As

I

am

commented

am

exist.

If

I

impossible.”(13,

.

I

must

whenever

if

finally

he

is

he

exists.

being deceived,

conclude that

put forward by

it is

that

this

me

or

a Thinking Thing

is

specifically tied to the

sure of the proposition “I exist,” he claims, whenever

it;

that

that Descartes' existence could

must

is

26)

7,

forward” the proposition or conceive

I

.

Even

indicated here, Descartes' certainty of his existence

of thinking.

walking,

“.

necessarily true

is

I

activity

something “about which doubt

be dreaming or being deceived, he cannot doubt

As he

;

is

am

is,

whenever

I

think

it.

be proven through any

daring to eat a peach,

I

must

exist.

“put

I

Many critics
23

act.

While

If

it

I

have

am

could be

countered that one could be dreaming of doing such activities that does not get to the
heart of Descartes' argument.

thinking about

dreaming,

my existence

if in this

thinking about his

dream

own

I

I

It

could be presented, for instance, that even when

am

I

could be dreaming. Descartes would reply that even

am

thinking about myself existing, then

existence so essential to providing

him with

does such thinking guarantee certainty about his existence?
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And

is

I

exist.

only

am

Why is

certainty?

it

I

How

when

I

think

about the proposition that

evidence

exist that

it

that is existing?

that

to

He

know,
first

that

he understands

this

‘I’,

most

is.

I

exists,

“But

T

that

is,

him

now

exist, or

“So

I

must be on

to think

my guard

and so making a mistake

and evident of all.”

While he dismisses
of them-either through

in the

what does

I

that

he exists?

know what he
show

is

in his

sufficient

something was knowledge, was

is

that

he

is

certain,

not mistaken. While

it

when
is

not mistaken in terms of what this

against carelessly taking something else to be

very item of knowledge that

I

maintain

false information

from

knows through

is

the

of his doubts about what he

He

his perceptions

his senses, or false thoughts at the

is

seem

hands

to involve a

cannot be either his body or his soul as

previously understood, as both of these can be doubted. If he

‘malicious deceiver,’ then he can doubt that he

is (his

mean

do not yet have

as doubtable those things he

different kind of possible mistake.

can doubt that he

it

(17, 25).

evil deceiver-his presentation

in nutrition,

would other thoughts

necessarily exists ”(17, 25) His senses and

Hence, Descartes needs to be certain

certain

of the

he

this proposition.

necessary that he exists, he must be sure he
existence

that

for certain, that he exists, if he does not

his evil deceiver could cause

not.

know

presents the fact that he exists; he then must

understanding of what this

was

can

might not be doubtable

How can he claim

it

I

claim?

this

While

argument

I

is

is

being deceived by the

his body. If he is dreaming, then he

previous notion of) a soul-defined in terms of the acts involved

movement, and perception— as he has had

things while dreaming.
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the experience of doing such

What he cannot
is

the fact that he

is

doubt, what he cannot separate from

thinking.

As he

who

he

his being,

writes,

Thinking? At last I have discovered it-thought;
this alone
from me. I am, I exist-that is certain. But for how

am

from

is,

inseparable

is

long? For as long as
totally to cease from thinking, I

thinking. For

it could be that were I
should totally cease to exist. At present I am not
admitting anything
except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the
strict sense only a thing
that thinks, that is, I am a mind, or intelligence,
or intellect, or reasonI

words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now. But
for all that
I am a thing which is real
and which truly exists. But what kind of thing?
As I have just said-a thinking thing.(18, 27)

He has concluded

here that he

thinking from being, from what he

is

a thinking thing because he cannot separate

As

is.

case that as he thought so he existed, cogito ergo
in this

form

in the

thinking thing,

does

it

mean

to

res cogitans.

He

is

that

it

was

sum (though he does

Meditations ), his second claim here

sum

was

his first claim

he

that as

is

necessarily the

not propose this

exists, so

he

is

a

what he cannot be deceived about. But what

be a thinking thing? What

is

How

a thinking thing?

know

does he

himself as a thinking thing?
Descartes then moves in his argument to show

how

it

is that

he cannot be

mistaken about being a thinking thing. His two possible mistakes involve
could be wrong about what he thinks his self is (how
could be wrong about the fact that

same

I

in different instances,

problem

raises the spectre

it

is

the

same

it is

self (that

doing different thinking).

of the second, as

it

distinct),

and second,

has identity, that

it

How he

that he

first,

answers the

it

that

is

he

the

first

problematizes the very issue of how the

self knows itself.

As he cannot doubt
doubt. “I

know

that

I

that

he exists, he must be able to

exist,” he writes. “[T]he question
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is,

know what he

what

is this ‘I’

is

without

that

I

know?”

(18, 27) There are,

it

answering the

“what

that

first,

seems, two questions implied here, however.
is this

‘I’?” but

“what

is this

He

T that I knowT

he will use his imagination to consider what else
he might be, he

how

to present

of the

self,

is that

it

begins not by

he knows himself. Although he

is

While he

states

also beginning

is

concerned with the ontology

he also must present the what that he knows the what
that
,

is this self-

knowledge.

He
which
thing

is

begins his presentation of what the

known from

that

which

is

T

is that

he knows, by distinguishing that

imagined. That he knows his being

not simply an example of imagining himself as such.

is

What

is

is at

a thinking

stake

is

not the

difference between thinking and imagining as acts of the mind, per se, but
rather the
issue of how and

articulate

how

his

self-reflection7

reflecting

self that

image

4

knowledge

self,

he

is

to

know himself to

a thinking thing

is

be.

He needs

not produced

to

make

clear that the self which he

knows

let

to

by an

of

act

that is a

the

not in fact an

is

not a representation of himself perceived by himself.

it is

Why not

that

him

such that the self is an object of imagination, and a knowledge of

He wants

is not.

acts allow

Hence, he needs to distinguish a kind of self-knowledge

on the

at all;

what such

25

knowledge one has of oneself be one’s self-image? What

stake if our self-knowledge

is

a product of our imagination? If how he

knew

is at

his self

were via imagination, he could doubt what he knew, because imagining involves
producing images, and images are doubtable,
are images of

yet unaware,

the mind).

is

doubtable.

which

On

all

the

I

that is their relationship to that

As imagined, they are images of things of which

which they
the

‘I’ is

thus invents, and which take the form of corporeal things (in

three points, they can be doubted. Taking these in reverse order then,
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each concern Descartes raises about images
makes

clear that self-knowledge cannot

it

be certain and be an image. As an image takes
the form of a corporeal thing,

it

can, like

knowledge based on the senses, be based on a mistaken
perception. As invented,
the

image cannot not provide us with the Archimedian point
we

cannot

know

if

it

something which

what
the

I

I

do not yet know,

that

I

in fact

for again,

how

understood

strictly as

we have been

quite certain that

unaware; so

this

it

could

I

are looking for, for

my being cannot be based on

of,

know whether I am
taking

it,”

or

am

not that thing? “If

Descartes writes, “then

knowledge of it does not depend on things whose existence

cannot depend on any of the things which

very word ‘invent’ shows

He concludes

me my mistake.”

that he cannot

know

we

be true or not. And, as an image of

am unaware

do not know,

‘I’ is

And

an invention that might

is

then,

I

invent in

I

it

is

am

as yet

my imagination.

(18-19, 27-28 )

his self through his imagination.

But

this is

not only because these images are doubtable. Descartes writes, “I thus realize that none

of the things

that the imagination enables

of myself which

from such things

I

it

have added emphasis

is to

perceive

its

to grasp is at all relevant to this

mind must

possess, and that the

if

me

own

to Descartes’ use

it

most carefully diverted

nature as distinctly as possible.” (19, 28)

of ‘things’ because

imagination an unreliable vehicle for self-certainty

which

therefore be

knowledge

imagines as a thing, as a kind of object.

is

It is

it

seems

the fact that

it

that

I

what makes

represents that

not only that such things are

inventions, and hence not real, but as they are things, they are separable from thinking,

separable from the

self.

thinking. “For even

real, the

if,

What
as

I

is

clear

and indubitable

is that

imagining

is

part

of

have supposed, none of the objects of my imagination are

power of imagination

is

something which really exists and
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is

part

of my

thinking. (19, 29)

seems

to

The

be perceiving, but might not be

expenence

which

T that he knows

What

the

T

It is

the act of “‘having a sensory

The conclusion thus seems

I.

is, is

to be that

what

not through sensing or imagining. In addition,

not the content of this thinking about

is

an object of his thought which could be
thinking.

so.

inseparable from the

is

knows himself to be he knows

Descartes

this

objects Descartes perceives or imagines
he perceives, he truly

false and/or

it.

It is

not, like

an image,

could be separated from his

not known, in fact, through examining the contents of
his

thoughts.

So how does he know
about

are

how

those things which

known with much more

in the imagination.

And

grasp of things which

that

which

is

true

and

I

yet,

are outside of him.

not.

Why? He

we know

it is

will not

problem
thinking.

through images, which are so easily doubtable,

surely surprising that

at this

I

‘I’

which cannot be pictured

should have a more distinct

unknown, and foreign

self.”(20, 29)

to

also puzzled here because

As he

is

I

have of

26

has previously argued that the self cannot be

is

me, than

point in his narrative/argument the puzzle of how to

it

seems easier

known

to

know

like other

things which

himself, that self should be most “true and known,” but

suggests that this inability to

kind of epistemological laziness. “But

and

confession, he “cannot stop thinking”

distinctness than this puzzling

known-my own

know himself when he
known. He

By his own

realize are doubtful,

Descartes presents

things are

it?

I

know himself more

see what

it is:

distinctly

it

comes from

is

a

my mind enjoys wandering off

submit to being restrained within the bounds of truth.”(20, 29-30 ) As the

thus,

is

the habit of thinking, he needs to— as he reminds us often— to change his

27
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The
In order then, to

something

know

How

distinctly.

Wax Example

his self distinctly, he

must know what

finally, false as true.

what

it

is

example,

over time,

tell

him

But when

etc.

it

is

not distinct as distinct, what

So,

i.e.,

we can

wax

in front

of him

So what was

things distinctly, but

that

is distinct

must be admitted

It

it

in the

I

wax

how we

that

that

arrived at

Descartes uses the example of the

is

that epistemological laziness

is

distinctly

due

its

what

it

we do

is

(and

wax

are mistaken in

I

is

to its scent, shape, color,

it

does; no one denies

not necessarily

know

it,

no one

understood with such distinctness?

by means of the senses.”(20, 30)

way to

as a

how we

discuss not

think

we do

so.

how we know
Finding out that

bodily objects in some sense better than

selves— we are in fact mistaken in terms of how

we have

things:

we know

first,

our

understood such distinctness;

and second, by recognizing the error of our epistemological ways, we can recognize

how

well

we

can distinctly grasp the notion of the

Hence, as
that the

is,

being. His senses, for

do not know the being of things through our senses suggests two

in fact

know

uncertain as certain, and what

believe that something

Evidently none of the features which

we

to

begins to melt, those features (of its body) are no longer present. “But

does the same wax remain?
thinks otherwise.

is

it,

has identity), but be mistaken about

that the

is

does he, or people, commonly think of things that are

understood as such, he asks. The problem, as he finds
tempts us to see what

it

we

are able to admit that the

knowledge we had about

change, there must be another

the

wax does

way of knowing

which can be known despite whatever changes

self.

wax

is

the same, and able to recognize

not explain that sameness-despite-

the wax.

the
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The wax

wax may go

itself

through.

has a nature

It is

not

dependent on these (second order qualities) of
the wax

Nor

itself.

knowledge of it

the

is

a product of the imagination, as Descartes
argues that he cannot imagine
possible changes and as such verify that
the nature

is still

it

the

same wax. 28

of the wax with the senses or with the imagination,

“perceived by

my mind

“But what

it is,

all

of the

Instead of perceiving

Descartes writes,

alone,” he states.(21, 37)

wax which

is this

is

perceived by the mind alone?” (Or “which can be

conceived only by the understanding or the mind” [French
version]?) (21,37) Here,
Descartes

is

inquiring not only about the wax, and

which the mind can grasp such

nature.

.

its

nature, but also about the

,[T]he perception

I

have of it

purely mental scrutiny.”(21, 37) His perception of the nature
of the
not based on empirical

knowledge— not on

with features similar those
nature of the object, “the

known through

wax

itself,” in a

his senses nor

on

wax

way

in

is

a case of.

is

a perception

.

.

his imagining the object

the senses. Instead, he

way which cannot be

is

perceiving the

doubted. While one

might (habitually) mistake the reason or cause of one’s belief as the senses, such as
vision, Descartes claims that

is in itself, is

What

his faculty

is at

what he

is

really using

of judgment.(21, 32)

stake here

is that

is

“[W]hen

distinguish the

I

and consider
perception

sees what something really

29

such a nature

but through the mind’s perception of it through

something

when he

is

its

not evidenced through the senses,

judgment. As such, the nature of

only perceivable by Descartes through his ‘purely mental

it

now

wax from

naked-then although
requires a

human

its

activity.’

outward forms-take the clothes

my judgment may still

mind.”(22, 32)

By using

off, as

it

were,

contain errors, at least

the correct

my

method of

thinking— of separating out what can be separated from the wax, by fully “concentrating
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on what the wax is”- Descartes can know the
nature of the wax,
stripped of the dressings provided

by mistaking

inward form,

its

sensible features for certain knowledge.

This correct method of thinking then, can get a grasp
of the nature of a thing.

Does

this include the

perceive the

truer

wax

mind

or self itself? “What,

so distinctly? Surely

and more certain than

nature of his self?

What

mental activity?

knowing

surely

know

his

If

own

self.

ask,

my awareness

my awareness of the wax,

evident. ”(22, 33) If Descartes can

is

I

the

know

is this

of my

T which seems to

own

but also

much more

the nature of the wax,

method by which he knows

how
wax

the

much

self is not merely

distinct

can he not

itself

and

know

the

with pure

a nature only requires pure mental activity, then he can

As

the different features of an object do not affect the

grasping of its nature, Descartes seems to hold that the mental activity by which one
grasps the nature of a thing would be the same no matter what the thing: “the result that

I

have grasped

in the case

of the wax

may be

applied to everything else located outside

me.”(22, 33) Descartes can thus judge that something exists, that

it is,

not by his

perception of it, but by his understanding of it. Only the mental act of understanding

needed

something

to perceive that

now know

that

exists.

even bodies are not

faculty of the imagination but

by

is

Descartes writes:

strictly

perceived by the senses or the

the intellect alone, and that this

perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their

being understood; and in
easier

this

view

I

know

plainly that

I

can achieve an

and more evident perception of mind than of anything

else. (22-23,

34)

Knowing
But
the

isn’t there a

human mind

then

the Thinking

problem with the above?

how

is

I

If the perception

Descartes to get a grasp of the mind
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of a nature requires

itself,

of its nature?

Is

he splitting the self into the thinking self and
so.

Instead

it

Meditations

seems

is that

or the imagination.

known through

that

what Descartes

certain

The

What

It

does not seem

trying to set up here at this point in the

distinctness of something— its being,

that as

is

of judgment?

knowledge can come from the mind

the understanding.

Second Meditation

is

this faculty

itself

its

without the senses

existence— can be

Descartes has proven then by the end of the

one perceives the existence of something through the

understanding then he should certainly be able to easily and certainly
perceive his

Hence,

existence.

we

are to conclude perhaps, that self-knowledge

of the self but of the understanding knowing
to

assume

it

is

itself

self-evident that the understanding

is

own

not the perception

through itself Descartes here seems
part of the self.

is

then, the need for the self to be self-evidencing, for

to

it

We begin to

be transparent

sense,

0

to itself.

The

foundational certainty of self-knowledge, as the understanding knowing itself through
itself, is

a pure intuition.

“I

The question of whether

know myself as

Descartes' example of knowledge of the

adequate analogy for self-knowledge

the

that

wax and

how

knows

the

I

the self

this

is

is

aware of itself is always

same way

as

it

would be enough

if

knows

I

ask,

is this ‘I’

is

an

in effect,

through an idea, so that the

I

the wax, as an idea via the understanding.

Descartes did not

which seems

wax example shows,

indirectly,

Meditation direct his interrogation toward the

(“What,

wax

a tricky one. Perhaps as objects of perception

are similarly perceived. Perhaps the

the self in the

And maybe

a thinking thing”

I

(who

to perceive the

40

at the

is

end of the Second

the subject) perceiving the wax.

wax

so distinctly ?”)

And

perhaps

we

could even overlook

this

questioning regarding the subject perceiving
the

Descartes did not in the next paragraph conclude:

merely much truer and more certain than
distinct

“my awareness

my awareness of the wax,

and evident.” 22,33 The problem of the Second
Meditation

can Descartes show that his perception of himself that
immediate, self-evident intuition?

direct,

and distinct? What

And how

is at

but also

I

think

through an idea

How can he present

is

how

does the

the

self

not

is

much more

How

is this:

in fact a

an idea of his

wax example

‘I’

into this presentation? Clearly the

fit

as clear

wax example

is

title.

I

better

want

helps Descartes develop the certainty that he seeks

regarding his knowledge of his mind, or

self, particularly as that certainty is

through the vehicle of self-awareness. 31

think the

I

wax example

approach (and ‘resolve’) the problematic of self-awareness

see this problematic as follows:

wax

argument regarding how the mind

in Descartes'

than the body, the point of the meditation according to the chapter

to consider

to

is

own

if

stake?

example must serve a purpose

known

of my

wax

As he

is

developed

offers Descartes a

way

that defines his project.

using self-awareness as his

medium

I

for

discovering an idea about which he can be absolutely certain, the idea of the/his self that

he has must be able to account for not only the self that he
that is

clear

is

aware of but also the

self

being aware. In other words, for the idea of his self to be absolutely certain

and

distinct)

it

must be unable

to

be

false.

aspect of the self which could

make

kind of self-knowledge that

complete as

is

Therefore, there can be no

the idea false.

aware and the object self that the subject

is

it

As

(i.e.,

unknown

such, the idea must accomplish a

necessarily includes the subject self that

aware

of.

This ‘inclusion’ means that the

idea of the self cannot leave open the possibility that the self could be otherwise.

41

is

It is

in

fact

a kind of logical exclusion or a
kind of negation.

that is a

performative as

something

we

will see

something

left out,

The

idea (as expressed in a claim

below) negates the possibility

cannot reach, something that

it

that there is

not automatically

is

present and evident and immediate in the
32
idea itself
.

It is

I

with intent that

I

use the word ‘accomplish’ in regards to
the idea of the self

think that what Descartes reaches at the
end of the Second Meditation

performative that he needs, that gives his claim
the certainty required.

wax example

offers

him

is

I

the last piece he needs so that he can revisit
the

the

think that the

sum

res

cogitans argument, and reveal the idea of himself as
a thinking thing as clear and
distinct.

The wax example thus helps resolve

the

problem

that

on self-awareness as the medium through which he can find

The wax example comes up when

it

comes from

his reliance

primary certainty.

his

does to help re-problematize the presence of

the subject-I after Descartes has presented through his
argument of doubt that he

thinking thing.

I

of both the mind
the perceiving.

offer that Descartes uses the

that is required in

Once

any perception, and

awareness and (attempt

to his

to) resolve

I

is at

made

problem of knowing the

T who

is

is

doing

visible through the

wax

self through self-

it.

exist

and

I

issue for Descartes

am
is

a thinking thing

how

to grasp

what

it

is

that

he

thinking thing thinking. Methodological doubt has pushed him to claim that

be sure of is that he

a

to reveal the presence

to highlight the

these parts of perception have been

example, Descartes can go back

What

wax example both

is

is

all

as a

he can

a thinking thing, that thinking cannot be separated from him; his

42

existence while he

he

is

am,

I

thinking cannot be doubted.

It

could be that he only exists while

thinking, he says; he does not know.
“Thought alone

exist— that

be that were
that

is

I

he exists

But for

is certain.

totally to cease

is true

1

long? For as long as

from thinking,

inseparable from me.

am

1

thinking. For

it

1

could

should totally cease to exist.” His belief

1

whenever “put forward by me or conceived

We can sum
(

how

is

in

my mind.”

up Descartes' argument about the knowing self
as follows:

am thinking
When I am thinking
I

)

(2)

exist

I

Therefore
I

exist

(4)

I

know

(5)

If

(3)

I

am

Therefore (by
(6)

I

Thus
that this

I

am

I

exist only

thinking
1

and

at least

I

when

am

I

am

at least a

thinking

thinking thing

5)

a thinking thing

33

the truth of his claim that he exists

“which

is real

and which

is

self-evidential.

But what of his claim

truly exists” is a thinking thing? (18, 27)

While he

necessarily exists, there could be doubt, he poses, about his knowledge of his

perceives himself.

What he has known himself to be

I,

how

he

before no longer holds up under

methodological doubt. Nor do images he can conjure or “invent” of himself. These, too

can be doubted as they are copies of corporeal things, perceptions of which can be

wrong. “So

T, and
certain

so

I

must be on

making

my guard against

a mistake in the very item of

and evident of all.”

( 1

7,

25)

He must be

certainty will be produced not simply

and

carelessly taking something else to be this

this his larger project in the

certainty can be achieved. This

knowledge

certain of this

by knowing

Meditations —

method

that

I,

of what

his true self, but also

the

method

entails only admitting

43

maintain

I

is

is

it is.

the

most

This

by knowing--

whereby such

what

is true:

“At present

I

am

not admitting anything except what

is

34
sense only a thing that thinks.” (18,
27)

completely known,

know):

know

“I

understood

i.e.,

that

strictly as

I

necessarily true.

And what

which does not include

exist; the question

we have been

is,

taking

is this ‘I’

then

it,

am, then,

must be

in the strict

which

that

which he does not know

that

what

is true

I

it

is

that

know?

I

(or cannot

If the

quite certain that

is

T

is

knowledge of it

does not depend on things of whose existence I am as
yet unaware .” (18-19, 27-28,

emphasis added)

What

is

unknown about

awareness simply make evident to him what his
he

is

only a thing that thinks

Why can’t his refection on this

Descartes' self?

satisfy

‘I’

what seem

Why doesn’t his assertion that

is?

to

be the requirements of this method?

Each time Descartes conceives of himself as a thinking

While he knows
thing), he

that he exists while

does not

know

he

is

thing, he

is,

of course, thinking.

thinking (and therefore, that

that he is essentially a thinking thing.

a thinking thing while he thinks ?

He must be

self-

is

a thinking

Does he know

that

he

is

a thinking thing, but being sure that he

exists while he is thinking doesn’t necessitate either that he is only or that he

is

essentially a thinking thing— especially if it could be argued that there are things about

this

am

‘I’

he does not know.

that

And

the fact that there

a thinking thing’ indicates that there

is

a subject-I

is

a subject thinking the thought

which might not be

i

fully grasped

35

in this predicate.

Thus, there

These two

I’s

is

an

1

thinking about the

T that exists, that

are constitutive of self-reflection. This gap

is

a thinking thing.

between the knowledge he has

of himself as a thinking thing (which comes from methodological doubt) and the
awareness that he has of himself thinking

(that

he

44

is

a thinking thing)

is

the conceptual

distance he must overcome in order for
his knowledge of himself to be
pure, certain
intuition.

the

is

He must make

that

I

he

no possibility

What

The

is.

sure that the

that

I

he knows himself to be (as a thinking thing)

idea he has of himself must be exactly
what he

this entails is

“I

know

he be sure that the

about what he

body or

knowing

the

I

that

that

I

I

who

I

exist; the question

know

is

the

I

he has proven exists,

of

his imagination.

itself as

me

i.e.,

I

what

is this

an object.

am? As he cannot

I

in self-awareness

doing the

I

know?”

he cannot use his

who

I

knowledge of myself which

I

most carefully diverted from such things

nature as distinctly as possible.” (19, 28)

is

He needs

a

if

nothing about his

itself clearly

and

There

is

He needs

distinctly.

a sense in

but what

it

a subject aware

it

is

a

method which

perceive

its

own

will allow

him

know through

“to perceive his

make

own

sure that there

T which he does not (cannot) know, so that the mind can perceive

res cogitans argument

moment

way

method which can produce or

nature as distinctly as possible.” This method must thus be able to

is

a

is

possess, and that the

“grasp” this knowledge of himself that he has, that renders what he can
self-reflection certain.

How can

validate his judgment

certainty,

of an

that

thus realize that none of the things that the imagination enables

I

therefore be

T that

knowing

These will not get him the proof that he wants, which

to grasp is at all relevant to this

mind must

that

is,

by using anything he doesn’t know with

is

contend with the implicit distinction

to

with no doubt,

for error.

the idea he has of himself as a thinking thing,
necessarily entails the

thinking.

is

is
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which what Descartes

to capture in his idea

is in toto.

is

trying to accomplish with the

of his self not what the self is

sum

at the

Such completeness would be rendered by knowing

45

that

the self is (and can only be)

that Descartes is using the

what

sum

knows

it

itself as.
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??Thus we could perhaps suggest

res cogitans argument in combination
with these

unstated but assumed claims which would
continue from our

summary of Descartes'

argument on page 21 above: ??

Those properties

(7)

distinguish
(8)

I

can only

i.e.,

it

can

I

know

for certain that a thing has are those

from other things

know

those which

which

(e.g. its essence).

for certain those things
I

which I can know completely,
can clearly distinguish from other things.

Perhaps Descartes intends to establish premises
(7) and (8) by the wax example.

Through
nature of the

wax example

the

wax presupposes

must perceive

my own

Descartes makes

that

it

my knowledge

clear that

possess knowledge of myself and that

I

I

of the

(the

mind)

nature as distinctly as possible. So, therefore:

possess knowledge of myself

(9)

I

(10)

To know my

self with certainty

I

must perceive

my nature

as distinctly as

possible

By knowing
knowing
his idea

(as not

it

his nature clearly he will not be

as distinctly as possible, he will be certain that he

of his T will not include something

known)

that he

‘unknowns’ about
“I

is.

The idea of his

I

it

is

knows

not, nor leave out

as clear

and

distinct

it

it is,

and by

completely, that

any part of himself

must have no

it.

must therefore admit,” he

way revealed by my

writes, “that the nature of this piece of wax

imagination, but

though Descartes touches,
...purely

mistaken in what

perceived by

feels, sees, etc. the

mental scrutiny.” (21,31)

mental scrutiny whereby

is

my mind

alone.” (21,31)

wax, perception of its nature

is

in

no

Even

“is a case

of

We know the nature of something through acts of

we remove

that

which things seem
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to

be-we

“take the clothes

off,” Descartes

writes-and consider them “naked.” As
naked, we perceive only

natures such that our judgments of them,
our ideas as to what these natures are,
require a

human mind.”

And

scrutiny.

summary,

How we know

“my judgement may still

while

human mind.”

requires a

In

(22,33)

is

“now

through an act of pure mental

contain errors,

at least

my perception now

(22, 33)

would seem

it

a nature

their

that Descartes thinks that the

wax example

has

revealed the following line of thought:

(11)

I

know

the

wax’s nature

Perception of a nature entails the presence of an active
2)
(perceiving) mind
Therefore
(

1

(13)

When know the
I

wax’s nature,

I

also

know

that

I

know

it

through the

presence of an active mind

What Descartes needs

to

do now

is

to connect this active

mind with

knowledge of

his

his self.

While

knowing

that

it

its

seems

that

nature

is

what

is

useful about the

I

to say about this

know

insight

it

offers

self, clearly

mind, or about myself?”) What

and

shown

is

in

distinctly.

(“But what

terms of how

we

the nature of the wax, in other words, does not give the argument an immediate

answer

to the

problem of how the mind must

distinctly as possible.” (19, 28)

is

words, in knowing the nature of the wax,

that

I

know

until

I

act “if

What we need

which we know the nature of the mind

blow

is this

a naked perception which requires the mind, this does not give

us immediate access to knowing the nature of the

am

wax example

still

it

to

is

do

such that what

I

also

know
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is

own

nature as

ascertain that the

we know

is

certain.

method by
In other

the nature of myself, but

can show the method by which

Descartes,

to perceive its

I

know my

nature.

I

do not

So, for

(14)

Self-knowledge,

know I am

Again, the issue of concern
either

what

I

am

or

know

(e.g., “I

that

I

am

x) implies that “I

is

making

sure that there are

how I know what am. He

asks, “But

I

mind, or about myself?” (22, 33) What

Is

the

mind

that is required in

thinking thing)? If so, then

is

the relation here

how do I know

that

is

by addressing

think

I

is left

the issue of the

he writes, “What,

I

ask,

‘I

is this ‘I’

to

mind

Can

clearly

way to make

I

I

which seems

to say about this

that

and

that is

thus perceive this

I

know

that

I

am

(as a

distinctly (as a

sure that there are no

prove for accomplishing his

doing the perceiving.

I

between the mind

any perception the mind

thinking thing)? Descartes indicates that the

unknowns here (what

that

no unknowns about

am

what

present in any perception and myself? Are they
the same?

mind?

know

x”.

He

criteria

of certainty)

raises this concern

to perceive the

wax

when

so distinctly?” (22,

33)

If his interrogation

cogito ),

it

is

now

way of knowing

before was addressing the

addressing the

his

‘I’

who knows

what he

is

which he knows exists (via the

that he exists.

such that he grasps the

said above, be unclarity about

is,

I

‘I’

I

He must come up

with a

completely. This means there cannot, as

or indistinction about

how

he knows what he

so that his thinking of himself, his idea of himself, does not fully grasp what he

The key here

much

truer

make

I

what he writes next: “Surely

and more certain than

and evident.”
certain?

is

(22, 33

offer that

it

my awareness

emphasis added)

is

my awareness

is.

of my own self is, not merely

of the wax, but also much more

distinct

Why is his awareness of himself truer and more

so because he can, with the tools provided by the

the claim that he can through his awareness
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know

his

mind with

wax example,

certainty.

Perceiving the

wax might allow him

perception, but

which seems

it

to understand that the

to perceive the

wax

so distinctly?”

way to know

that

certain... [and]

the perceiver”

So
doesn

t

more
and

the question

is

it

is

it

outside of

doing the perceiving. Descartes’ claim

is

of himself is

that

which can be “truer and more

how

is

seems, such perceptions can never be completely certain.

does self-awareness accomplish
it

Descartes?

this for

It

produces an idea of the perceiver doing the perceiving

don’t think that this perceiver can be

I

known

in certain

40
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.

think this

is

the fundamental (and constitutive) paradigm of self-awareness.

more below.) Trying

how does

this self is that is perceiving the

distinct

to perceive the self

wax

or perceiving

tell

us what

perception of his self “even more distinctly.”

for Descartes to perceive clearly

question eliminated?

itself.

it

is

is

and

I

the perceiver?’ but

He does

argue that

distinctly,

He

is

perceiving itself is

He does

not state what

asserts that

it

is

wax seemed
(if)

distinct,

and thereby have

not, as stated, provide a description

perceives outside of knowing himself as a thinking thing.

then the

self-awareness engenders

certainty,

by eliminating the question.
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more

as such. Instead, he continues to

stating that if his perception of the

so not by answering ‘who

who

Descartes get around this?

and evident, but doesn’t then

compare the examples

way

Our perceptions of things

is this ‘I’

9

an aporetic endeavor. So

a

ask,

and evident.” Perceiving the wax cannot answer “who

because

perceiving.

will discuss this

(I

distinct

therefore,

accomplish

while he

terms

his perception

I

our perceptions are clear and distinct
because

they leave unanswered this question of who
is that

required in any

is

cannot produce the answer to the question:
“What,

ourselves do not allow a

here, then,

mind

of this

I

it

How

who

does

is this

Self-knowledge as Performative
Descartes can

is,

not because he

be an

now know

knows

perceiving that

I

I

that his idea

the thing that he

He knows

thinks or perceives, because (and this

is

is

what he

perceiving- for there would

his

that his idea

is

I

still

with certainty because he has

of himself includes himself as he

the true definition of certainty)

cannot be

it

We can read Descartes' claim about his self-knowledge as implicitly

entailing a performative. “Surely

and more certain than
evident

while he

and so on. Instead he knows

erased this problem altogether.

otherwise.

is

of himself as a thinking thing

my awareness

of my own self is not merely much

my awareness of the wax, but also much more

can be read as meaning the following: Through

distinct

my awareness

and

of myself I

know myself (with

certainty) to

stated in the text,

think that Descartes reaches certainty about his self-perception

I

be a thinking thing. Though

it

is

truer

nowhere

specifically

because of the implied performative here. Because his self-knowledge has
met the

demands

for clarity

and distinctness as

method by which he knows
needs:

I

know myself as

performative.’)

there

is

a thinking thing.

(I

know myself (to be

made

true

his nature

and knowing the

engenders the performative he

shall refer to this as the ‘thinking thing

a thinking thing’ entails certainty in the sense that

no lingering question about who the
is

(knowing

that nature) this in turn,

T know myself as

because the statement

I

set out

by

its

I

is

who

utterance..

is

doing the knowing or perceiving

In other words, as a thinking thing

,

a thinking thing).

Jaako Hintikka has argues that Descartes’ cogito ergo sum argument functions as
a performative
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Briefly, he presents Descartes’ claim

validating utterance, the opposite of which

is

‘I

think therefore

existentially inconsistent.
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I

am”

He

as a self-

cannot

convince us that he does not

exist,

by saying

“I

do not

exist.”

To do

so

would be

self-

defeating. Perhaps the

sum

Certainly if Hintikka

correct that Descartes’ statements about
his existence in the

is

res cogitans argument functions in
the

same way?

COglt° ar § ument can be considered (like)
utterances, those statements about his
being a

thinking thing could be as well

So

seems then

it

by presenting
arise here
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that Descartes has achieved the certainty
his project

his idea of his self in the

however: Does Descartes’

“I

requirements for a performative? And,
certainty

order.

clarity

and distinctness

The answer

to the

“I

it

requires.

especially as

it

is

As

I

needs?

questions

is

4^

I

to give

him

the criteria of

will address these in reverse

the res cogitans if it

is

not a

at the end.

have described

it,

the

fails to

Because self-awareness involves both an

problem of self-knowledge—

I

who

is

problem of using awareness of oneself as the means

that his idea

of the

I

self.

I’s.

(all of)

—engenders

aware and an
to

I

a split in the

who

is

aware

of,

self-knowledge entails

For Descartes to achieve certainty, he must know

that he perceives

necessarily and unerringly

perceiving his

provide his argument with

framed by Descartes’ methodological doubt

addressing the relation of these

this

enough

perceive myself as a thinking thing ”

the certainty

the

critical

a thinking thing” really satisfy the

if so, is that

that he

Two

think that Descartes’ resolution to the problem of self-knowledge
through the

performative

self.

am

implied question, what

performative will be suggested

I

—

form of a performative.

demands

—what

what he

He must overcome

is,

I

have been calling the object-I

including the

I

that

the epistemological gap

he

is

—

is

while he

between the

I’s.

is

While

could be achieved through a logical deduction of their identity through a syllogism
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or an inference, the
Instead he

strict

requirements of Descartes' method
deny these options.

must accomplish

identity in

some

other way.

Does recasting

“I

am

a thinking

thing” as the performative "I perceive
myself as a thinking thing" accomplish
this
identity?

and

think

I

it

does not. Or

if

does,

it

does so

it

of his

criteria

of clarity

distinctness.

If

it

does achieve or present an identity of the

or erasure rather than a true identity relation.
performative,

is

whatever the

knows

I

evident in the (idea of the) object-I;
that

at the cost

what seems

idea of his

is

I

to

uncertain. This

is

through a kind of collapse

the subject-I is through the

its

difference from the object-I

is

in fact, a singularity.

is

not

is

made opaque

made
so

This means that his

through a kind of negation. Rather than making the subject-I

not the

is

accounted for (and

still

same

the res cogitans

it is,

much

as

it

doubtable) thus lurks

doesn

t

that Descartes needs, for there

at the

fails.

is still,

am

Therefore his idea of himself is not

I

the res cogitans

is

it

such that

subject-I as

edges of the claim,

The

it is

still

“I

not

not

am

a thinking

res cogitans thus does not provide

is

not the transparency

contend, an unaccounted for subject-I which

a thinking thing” even if it

is

is

a performative.

distinct.

The presence of this lurking uncertain
but

it

leave un-certainty visible. This

present but erased through the “I

fails,

makes

The presence of the

thing.

This means that the performative

perfonnative

is

not clear. This lack of a positive account suggests
that what the

knowable by providing us what

certainty as

it

the object-I to be. Thus, the subject-I

be a relation of identity,

performative achieves

thing.

What

I’s

also suggests that

not a performative

it

subject-I not only indicates

is

not a performative

comes from what seems

52

to

at all.

how

the

Evidence that

be the need to repeat

the utterance. If “I

am

a thinking thing” can be read as “I
perceive myself a* a thinking

thing (perceives)- then

I

can be certain of the subject-I only when

utterance. In other words, “I

know myself as

myself as a thinking thing." While he
thinking (in the cogito he
),
the res cogitans).

when he

is

is

a thinking thing

may only be

articulating the

when lam perceiving

certain that he exists while he

only not uncertain of what the

The erased or assumed

am

I

I

subject-I returns to

is

is

while he

its

position as uncertain

is

thinking (in

not perceiving his self (as a thinking thing).
Certainty thus comes only in the

moment of articulation
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This raises the question of existential inconsistency,
another requirement of the
performative according to Hintikka
the claim yet

deny

that the state

is

that

of affairs

it

would be

existentially inconsistent to state

refers to exists.

it

Would

it

be existentially

inconsistent to say “I do not perceive myself as a perceiving thing
(perceives

)V

wouldn’t seem

so.

self-defeating.

But these questions do not quite get

Certainly to articulate the claim, “I

cogitans argument; for there

is

something

What

is

am'”? This

accomplished.

is trickier

might not understand
that “I don’t exist”

instead,

is

is.

a kind of force about

immediately, but

What

“I

it

not a thinking thing,”

what

is at

such that

work

I

it

still

is

think that

is

not

res

in its articulation

the

I

might know

existentially inconsistent.
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itself.

that

I

am”

in turn,

But

it

is

way

obliges,

The statement

perhaps an unclear relation between perceiving and being, which

how

We

not existentially inconsistent in the

do not perceive myself as the thing

in

sum

not inconceivable.

a re-consideration of the terms “perceive” and “am.”

even exposes) a tension present

in the

is

about, “I do not perceive myself as the thing that I

than the others, but

it

at

am

It

signals

announces (or
not

It is

through the

this tension in the

ra cogitans.

problem of self-knowledge

In order to establish that his idea
of himself

distinctly certain, he argues that he is
a thinking thing.

being a performative as
Is “I

am

we have

presented

it

that this equation

offer something different.

The

relation

additional requirement for

am when I am perceiving (or thinking),

through the object-I. So

I

am”)

self-verifying?

if the res

defeating” in the sense that

it

cogitans

is

is

then

opaque

I

will

to the

make
it

I

is

so because

it

be a performative, and

it

is

cannot

that subject-I

defeats the presence of the self that

to

If

I.

seems

it

know

known

it is

“self-

cannot

be more of a kind of tautology

or the description of a deterministic point of view at worst. In either case,
to

think that

accomplishes the transparency he

self-verifying,

know. This form of self-verification thus seem

seem

I

between perceiving and being

rendered transparent by the erasing of that which
I

and

His argument relies on an equation of perceiving and
being.

it is.

While commentators have argued

what

clearly

a thinking thing” as “I perceive myself
as a thinking thing (perceives)" (or even

Descartes thinks that

I

An

is

involves a statement being self-verifying.

our simpler form “I perceive myself as the thing
that

needs,

that Descartes tries to resolve

it

at best

does not

does not satisfy the limits of Descartes’ method.

Conclusion

I

claim that certain self-knowledge of the sort that Descartes

aporetic because there

is

correct,

however,

is

a

way

in

which the

in asserting this

I

is

subject-I

present in the

his attempt to erase the certain presence of this

is

unknowable.

that

I

unknowable

I
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I

is

seeking

I

is

think Descartes

know. His mistake

—an attempt which

lies in

doesn't even provtde him with the certainty
he seeks-in order to
if

not knowable

How
I
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do

the self that

consequences

I

I

if

know

myself,

how

can

I

way distinguish between

am

a product of the

we

are to consider that

know

I

I

know

I

am

and

am

how I know

how can

that self?

oneself might be

know myself (only)

then

as myself is myself, if

This has important

how one might know

as that social-

question those practices,

I

let

know them?
Thus the legacy of the Cartesianism

knowledge)

a complicated one:

is

method by which

for the

modem

subject (and

its self-

on the one hand Cartesian metaphysics

offers a

the truth of our perceptions can seemingly be ascertained,

method contains

this

is that in

know

what

way I know myself?

historical epistemological subject that

hand

that

the self that

influenced by social or historical factors. If I

alone

pass as certain

it

.

cannot in some

Is

make

implicit within

it

an aporia that makes

some very important ways we do know

it

on the other

uncertain.

ourselves as ourselves, but

The

we

issue

not

ourselves completely as the assumption of self-knowledge as certain requires.

How can we resolve this problem?
outside of her

own

The answer

outside of the dialectic of self-knowledge.

Descartes' ‘resolution’ and trying to find a

the self,

I

By

finding a

think

not to assert that there

is

a self who

is

thinking about herself. In addition to being impossible, this would

re-enact the logics of Cartesian self-knowing

difficulty.

is

we can

way

to

by assuming

a kind of certainty that stands

The answer then

way to

lies in

going back to

address that which gave his argument

approach that which

is

constitutively

begin to open up a space between the I’s— the
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unknowable about

‘I’ I

know myself

and the

to be,

I

doing the knowing-in a way

that has eptstemological as
well as political

potential.

What
be addressed

how

it

I

just begin to raise here are the
problematics of self-knowledge that will

in the next three chapters.

might be possible

to recognize

In those chapters,

to Cartesian

Cartesian epistemology and yet seems to rely on

and skeptical epistemology,

unknowableness of the

I.

develop an argument for

what seems aporetic about self-knowledge.

examine how Hume’s skeptical response

his critical analysis

I

He does provide

it.

metaphysics both critiques

Despite (and perhaps because of)

Hume

us with

is

some

unable to address the
useful tools, however, in his

highlighting of the role of other persons in the constitution
of the

work of Michel Foucault whose work
as

it

self.

raises

If what the self is

is:

through

its

how

how

and

I

the self cares about

itself.

One

later

identity.

I

this ethical relation

offer that

what

notion of self-knowledge

is

is

work

the self knows (her world, her reality, her self)

historical construction, then

What

work

question this

how

is

freedom possible?

I

might involve

I

present in

is

present Foucault’s

development of the ethics of self-knowledge as involving a relation the
itself.

then present the

consistently confronts the issue of self-knowledge

pursues the problematics of theorizing the historical subject.
His

approaches as an ethical concern

I

self has towards

my chapter on

adopted

necessary for an ethical (and more efficaciously agentic)
the

development of a notion of relationality of the

self.

In

addition to relations with others, this relationality entails a cultivation of relation with

one’s

own

otherness.

Descartes as a

way

I

use the aporia of (modem) self-knowledge as

to thematize this otherness.

developing a relation between self positions

Thus

raised

by

ethical self-knowledge involves

we know and
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first

self positions

we

(constitutively) cannot

know.

Cartesian metaphysics of the

way

that effects,

I

end the dissertation with a suggestion
regarding how

human

subject sets up the problem of self-knowledge
in a

on the one hand, a sense of being determined
by one’s point of view

and, on the other hand, a sense of being free
from

problem of self-knowledge as a way
as a

way

to conceive

to enable its freedom.
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46
it .

I

offer

my solution

of a self that can use

its

to the

self-knowledge

Notes
'

Rene Des cartes, Medita tions on

n nR

Philosophy

First

.

In

The Philosophical

Volume TT eds John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff,
and Dugald
^ t°(Cambridge,
^
Murdoch.
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 18, 27. All

^

f DeSCarteSl

’

-

quotes

from Descartes works should be considered from
the translation by Cottingham,
Stoothoff, Murdoch and (for volume III) Kenny
(known as CSM or
for).

As

CSMK as called

is

customary, the

page number listed refers to their text, while the second
listed refers to standard twelve-volume
edition of Descartes' works translated by
Adam
and Tannery (known as AT). I have italicized the AT
version for clarity. I shall use intext citation where it is clear to do so.
first

Of course, the dynamics here involve a tension between the individual
and the
universal which frame the limits of the humanist
Individual: rather than knowledge
~

being produced by each individual qua its particularity,
knowledge is universally in
and thus all can use Descartes' method of reasoning to attain it.
I cannot

all,

address this

fully here, but the epistemological
in

which

modem

individual

political

qua universal

dynamics involved here clearly resonate with the way
authority and autonomy become constituted through the

subject/individual.

There is, as will be discussed later, much interesting debate about how
Descartes argument for the existence of God (in the Third Meditation both
relies upon
)
and dispels the certainty about the self as a thinking thing that he reaches in the
Second
Meditation.
4

While Descartes writes

in the first person, using

autobiographical voice, his argument of course

is

what seems

to

be an

not really based on any kind of

personal reflections or introspections.

It has become common in contemporary
Descartes scholarship to refer to the figure of the ‘I’ in the Meditations as “the

meditator

so as to avoid this confusion.

I

do not use

this

convention, however, and, for

simplicity’s sake, discuss Descartes' problem in terms of his

does not reflect any belief on

my part in

knowledge of his

self.

This

Descartes' project as involving his personal

self-knowledge or quest.

There

is

controversy about whether or not the mind

cognitive activity. Feelings, perceptions, sensations,
the

body

that suggests the

mind engages

all

in other kinds

such as feeling pain, involve the mind

seem

exclusively limited to

to involve a relation with

of activity. See Cottingham,

“Descartes on ‘Thought’” for an argument that thinking
activities

is

is

just thinking, but other

in activities that are

connected to the

body. John Cottingham, “Descartes on ‘Thought,’” Philosophical Quarterly 28 (July
1978): 208-214.
6

Under “Works on Particular Topics,” Chappell and Doney’s Twenty-five Years
of Descartes Scholarship, 1960-1984 list 264 references for “Mind, Mental Faculties
and Operations, Mind and Body.” Vere Chappell and Willis Doney, eds., Twenty-five
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^ars

of Descartes Scholarship, 1960-1984 (New
York: Garland Publishing,

As
between

I

interpret the shift

self and world in

from pre-modem

to

modem philosophy,

pre-modem philosophy becomes

Inc.,

the split

relocated in the self through

rationalism. This splitting of the self is thus
constitutive of modem subjectivity.
develop elsewhere what l am calling a
‘post-rationalist’ notion of the
self.

this post-rationalist

paradigm,

contend,

I

Critical to

a re-assessment and appropriation or
use of
rather than erasure of this constitutive split
of the self. As I see it, we cannot escape the
split-I, but (as should become clear by
the conclusion of this work) we can
thematize the
relation between the I’s differently. I am not
refusing the possibilities of the split-I for
I

is

self-knowledge, but instead am suggesting that we might
get more productive (and
coherent) self-knowledge from a re-evaluation of the
relation between the I’s.
g

As develop throughout
I

the

how we

the larger work,

not limited to just one way. There are
overcoming it or denying it.
split-I

is

This understanding,

I

‘contend’ with the legacy of

more options than

either

think, will allow us to thematize the substance notion
of

self as an identity relation

between these two conceptions of self. This is what will be
his critique of Descartes involves not just arguing
that there is no substance that is the self, but that there is
no personal identity that is the
self. I am trying to get at how identity is already part of
Descartes' move to
substantialize the self. What is key here is how in this identity move, the
I-subject
interesting to explore in

Hume: how

collapses into the I-object.

The

as

thinks cannot

know

but knows that it is and
becomes a model for selfknowledge-knowing oneself as an object of knowledge and knowing one’s ontology,
but NOT knowing oneself as a knower knowing. The identity relation thus leaves the I
that

it

is

thinking and that

it

is

I

it

a thinking thing.

I

itself

think this

subject outside of the knowing, un-represented.
It

has been important to

me

to find a

way to understand

notion of self as substance and the constitution of identity.

making
it,

in

must

way to be that substance, to know
could provide self-knowledge, and hence, agency. Substance

the self a substance alone doesn’t engender a

such a

way that

is

entail identity (together these

identity relation

an agent can be constituted

the gap
I.

to

between the

monism and a dualism), and the selfsome way produce some excess such that

a triad— a

who can know

in

his identity, his substance, his essence. This

and adoption chapter because

this

excess or ‘hanging

way that resists being an act of identity which closes
knowing I and the known I, the substance I and the meta-substance

be conceptualized

By making

make

must remain incomplete, or

will tie in to the Foucault chapter

F needs

the relation between the

My intuition here is that

in a

trying to close the gap

by making the

split self a

substance,

I

argue,

Descartes’ metaphysics engenders a present and knowable self and an implicit and
covert

from

knowing

its

own

self who can

assume the position of the universal knower, detached

specificity.

59

In another project,

I analyze how this
conception of nature and the
epistemological agency it entails, is influential
to the development of the idea of
objective neutrality. In brief, I argue that
self-knowledge as knowledge of one’s nature
evidences one s autonomy from that nature.
It does so in accordance
with the logic
implied here in Descartes: I can know myself
transparently such that what is known is
certain and this engenders a knower
who is both identified with the known and (yet)
able to know itself objectively. By knowing
one’s nature then, within the context of
moral theory, one could distinguish oneself from
one’s subjectivity-i.e., one’s body,
family, social circumstance, and other such
influences. As others have claimed, of
course, only particular natures could allow such
a claim of moral neutrality. (These
would be those who could claim (the nature of) universal
subjectivity. See Iris Marion
Young Ju stice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press,

Thus Descartes' theory of knowledge, “that the only truths
which are certain,
undeniable, indubitable, are those revealing the essential
nature of things,” is made
evident through this naturalizing of his idea of himself.
Don Locke, “Mind, Matter, and
the Meditations,” Mind 90 ( 1 98 ): 343-366.
1
1

As

the

metaphor of vision

representation of cognition, so too

cognitive failure. There

is

is

heavily relied upon in philosophy’s

the

metaphor of blindness used

to represent a

a strong and important

movement in philosophy, especially
write on the issues entailed in notions of ‘disability,’ to disassociate the vision capacities and cognitive capacities. As I appreciate
this critique, I

among

philosophers

is

who

use blind spot with the awareness of its negative implications because
whereby such implications are constituted.

it

does also

cite

the history

Amy

1

I agree with
Morgan Schmitter who claims that this failure serves a
certain function in Descartes' argument. See her “Representation, Self-representation,
and the Passions in Descartes,” The Review of Metaphysics (Dec 1994), 48:2, 331-358.
.

I

consider the aporia of self-knowledge as self-certainty to be constitutive of the

modem

self.

14

Descartes' use of terms like ‘intuition’-which in the Latin
to look at or inspect— reflect his conceptualization

inner vision. See John Cottingham,

A

would be

“intueri,”

of the understanding as a kind of

Descartes Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell

Publishers, 1993), 94-96.
15
1

follow James

Sum Res CogitansE The
16

As we

Camey on

Philosophical

will see, because

James Camey,

this point.

Review

knowing

“

Cogito Ergo,
,

Sum and

71 (Oct 1962): 492-496.

the ‘nature’ of something for Descartes

involves knowing one’s knowledge of it, knowing the nature of one’s self as thinking
itself is

that

it

an attempt to eliminate any doubt one could have about such knowledge,

could be

solipsistic.
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i.e.,

I

agree with

Amy Morgan

Schmitter that this failure

project as he can never put the subject

or represented completely in a

way

I

in the position

is

necessary

in Descartes’

of the object and make

that will guarantee certainty.

it

known

Thus the

certainty of
self-knowledge (as know,
ng the substance of the subject I as a thinking thing) is a, once
a certainty gained through knowing and
a certainty gained through not
knowtng. This is
he aporta of self-knowledge as self-certainty,
and it is constitutive of the modem
self I

suggest. Schmitter, ibid.

*
,

,

Adopted.

lmPortance of this desire to know the self in
chapter 5, “Being
Unlike French philosopher and historian
Michel Foucault, whose work
t0 the

discuss in detail in a later chapter,

we

contend that desire’s role in the constitution
of the
self must be interrogated and problematized
because it is so fundamental to the making
of the modem self. While Foucault’s position
is that because desire has
been that
through which subjectivity has been most effectively
controlled through power
it is

not a good

I

medium through which

relations,

to

make new

or resistant practices of the self.
As his analyses— especially in the History of Sexualitv -focus
on the limiting effects of
sexual desire on subjectivity, he offers instead that we
should focus on pleasure rather
than desire. I suggest that exploring our desires
regarding self-knowledge can open up

new ways

to relate to both our desire to know and our
self-knowledge. Because identity
such an important political tool in contemporary US
culture-consider debates around
gay marriage, affirmative action, voting rights and general
issues of representation-I
also think that how we desire identity must be
interrogated so that we are not
reinscribing those limits of the modem subject in order to
gain social and political
legitimacy. For an analysis of modem political philosophy
and its relation
is

to the

constitution of political subjects in search of legitimacy
see
Injury:

Wendy Brown,

States of

Power and Freed om in Late Modernity Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
1995. Brown’s assessment, through an appropriation of the Nietszchean
notion
.

Press,

of ressentiment,

is rather pessimistic. I am hoping that my view
provides a more
positive alternative reading of the possible uses of identity. Michel
Foucault, The
History of Sexuality: Vol. I: An Introduction Translated by Robert Hurley
(New
.

York: Vintage Books, 1990).

The term
used

in

used here has taken on a very important cultural and
20th century. While this usage is not identical to the term as
does retain much of the metaphysical underpinnings. While I

‘identity’

political valence in the

metaphysics,

it

cannot fully develop this here (and I allude to it more in chapter 5) there is an important
connection between the modem subject’s struggle for self-knowledge through the
epistemological framework of self-certainty and the ways in which the late-modern
subject has struggled in relation to the concept of identity. Culturally and politically, an
identity (which one is thought to have, rather than achieve functions as a token or
)
symbol of having both having and being able to know (because one has) a unified self or

essence.

By

presenting one’s self as having an identity, one presents one’s self as

someone capable of achieving

certain self-knowledge.

one both has and knows, identity
legitimate self and knower.

is

that

which

As

it

reflects

an ontology that

constitutes one as a certain kind of

Rather than reflecting an actual essence or inner
61

self,

identity functions productively, as
those

who are able to claim knowing it thus produce
themselves as epistemological subjects who
are capable of self-certainty. Again
I
cannot develop this fully here, but as I note
elsewhere, presenting oneself as so

capable
not a minor issue, either politically or
philosophically. Such self-certainty is a
critical
component, for example, of the notion that a
particular individual is able to claim
access
to universal values. The evidencing
of self-knowledge evidences the subject
as able at
once to produce himself as both a subjective
individual who has his own particularity
and an objective Individual who can epistemologically
‘step back’ from himself and
consider his own subjective position. This
‘splitting’ enables the individual to
present
himself as not fully determined by his own particularism
(a moral condition ascribed to
women, for instance, in much modem moral and political
theory) and thus allows him to
present himself as capable of assuming the
position of a morally
is

objective agent.

20

It is my aim that these new
ways of critiquing the Cartesian substantial subject
avoid assuming cogito logic as part of their critique.
I do not want to oppose or
analyze
the Cartesian subject by assuming, e.g., an
epistemological subject who stands outside
of her own construction, who can claim a position of certainty
because she can assume a
position of objectivity in relation to her own identity.
Instead, this

post-Cartesian (or

post-rationalist) subject claims her identity position

completely, objectively, or with certainty.

moving beyond

the

we can approach

I

aware of her IN-ability

develop

demand of certainty that

this later as

do so

‘adopted identity.’

constitutive of cogito logic,

is

to

I

By

think that

the aporia of self-knowledge via Cartesianism

itself; in other words,
already a tension such that self-certainty is reached by
the self and not knowing the self. How to rescue this position
of not

think that in Descartes there

I

is

BOTH knowing
knowing from a logic of LACK
knowing (i.e., uncertainty about

is

the primary goal of this dissertation.

A post-lack un-

the self does not equal lack or ignorance) will help us

engender a kind of ethical knowing regarding self-knowledge.
2

There has been much discussion about the topic of how Descartes moves from
cogito ergo sum to res cogitans. I think this quote indicates that the certainty gained

from the cogito argument is necessary for the res cogitans argument. Descartes’ goal is
to push his investigation beyond the certainty of his existence to the certainty of his
judgments. As I present later in this chapter, Descartes achieves the latter through his
elimination (or “escape”
subject-I.

Hence he needs

strength of his certainty,

a

is

to

its

word he uses

in a related context)

add the res cogitans

force,

the positive provision of certainty.

comes from
I

to the cogito

of the uncertainty of the
ergo sum because the

the erasure of that uncertainty, not from

also see the cogito

and the res cogitans connected

as both ‘intuitions’ are achieved as performatives.

“ One

22

can think of Socrates’ argument

at the

to escape his death sentence, as his friends request.

end of the Crito where he refuses

While he might not

particular outcome, he has lived his life under Athenian law.
if the

law does not apply to him, would make

he had, before his sentencing, consented

it

to the

To

like this

act outside the law, as

impossible to say what justice was, as

laws as

62

if

they were just.

Hobbes, for one found that Descartes' sum res
cogitans argument did not
necessarily entail that the self had to be a
thinking thing. See the Third Set
of
Objections, in
II,
pp 121-137. This issue of the relation between the cogito
argument and the res cogitans argument will be
discussed in more detail later
I use Hintikka’s analysis
of the cogito as a performative to present
how res
cogitans could be performative as well. I will
suggest that it fails to meet Hintikka’s
criteria. He argues that as a performative,
the ergo sum can only come from thinking
not any other activity. “The performance
through which an existentially inconsistent
sentence defeats itself can be an act of thinking
of it, but it cannot possibly be an act of
wi ing or feeling. Jaakko Hintikka, “ Cogito
Ergo Sum Inference or
7”

CSM

’

,

D escartes: A
Dame

-4

he

,

There

argument

is in

is

a tension present here, as the

the form of a narrative.

As

Doney (Notre Dame,

reflecting

many allusions

In

IN: Notre

means by which Descartes presents

such, there are

on himself-as he sits and considers
inventories of what he previously thought he knew,
is

Performance

:

Collectio n of Critical Essays ed. Willis
University Press), 130.

his

to the fact that

his past thoughts, as he takes

etc. Hence, there is a way in which
the language of the text continually refers to thinking
as self-reflection. This seems to
be a kind of excessive act, as Descartes seems to limit if not
control the way in which
language, especially as writing, opens up possibilities for reflection,
refraction, and,
I

am

thinking of Derrida here, r^-signification. See Limited Inc., especially
“Signature
Event C ontext for Derrida s understanding of linguistic meaning as
made

possible by

structures

which allow

iteration

and

re-iteration.

Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc

(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993).
25

Ironically, while Descartes constructs his

argument so as

that self-knowledge is representational, that the self he

Lacan’s reading of the Cartesian cogito involves the

knows

is

way which

to

avoid the notion

an image (of himself),
Descartes cannot escape

the self-as-image construct. Rather than being recognized as image, the

I of the cogito
mis-recognized as transparent, self-evidencing, and self-same. As such, it becomes
the mirror-image which is mistaken for substance. See Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror

is

Stage as Formative of the Function of the

Sheridan
26

27

,” in Escrits:

(New York: W. W. Norton and Company,
The

issue of ‘otherness’ at stake here

is

A

Selection trans. Alan
,

1977), 1-7.

important to note.

Descartes’ writings (in the Meditations and in the Discourse ) are importantly

confessional.

known with

The

figuration (especially through writing) of the cogito as that

certainty through a kind of object-less thinking,

I

am

which

is

inclined to think via

Derrida and Freud, as in need of constant re-signification. Like a disavowal, the act

must be repeated, and as such,
‘return
It is

is

constituted through

of the repressed,’ as the need here

is

not so

this split-disavowal-essence logic that that

its

repetition.

much

It

is

prohibitive as

not just the
it

is

productive.

Lacan reads as the legacy of the

Cartesian subject.
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28
’

This again seems to be an example of
Descartes’ Platonism: he cannot
of the possible examples of what the wax
can be and therefore know its
nature because he knows all possible
features of it. Socrates’ discussion with
Meno for
example about the definition of virtue, suggests
Plato’s point that no example of the
Idea can define it.

imagine

all

29

He compares

mistake as being “tricked by ordinary ways of
talking” (2
especially in terms of the tensions inherent in
Descartes’
literary’ style, shall be explored later.
I am thinking about the
ways in which, again, the
in Platonic dialogues, there are many
discussions about the relationship between
language and knowledge. The Paradox of Inquiry,
e.g., seems to involve this problem
of providing final definition. I would think that given
Descartes’ goal of setting up a
First Philosophy based on a self-evident
First Principle, the way in which

^ ow

*

an S ua 8 e

i

this

s at issue,

.

linguistic

meaning

is

constructed

is

problematic.

30

See Margaret Wilson’s work on what she refers to as “the
doctrine of
epistemological transparency.” Margaret Wilson, Descartes
(New York: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1982), 50.
3

Unlike some commentators,

Meditation

is

transparent.

problem of self-awareness

I

do not think

think that that there

I

is

that self-awareness in the

a tension (which

Second

is heuristic) in

the

that reflects the epistemological

problems of Cartesian selfSee Norman Malcolm, “Descartes's Proof that his Essence is Thinking,” ]n_
Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays ed. Willis Doney (Notre
Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 312-337.

certainty.

,

32
It is

interesting to connect this to disavowal.

Put in Lacan’s and Zizek’s
readings of self here or later in terms of what this disavowal does, how the performative

needs to be re-iterated

(cf.

Butler) in order for the self-knowledge to be present as the

opaque unknowable thinking-I continuously

The argument above only yielded
certain knowledge,
to

show

(6') “I

am

i.e.,

fallible beliefs).
34

that he

sense,

is

at least a

means

in

may

not

really succeeds in

Descartes discusses this ‘only’

at least a

that

which survives

thinking thing.” But for

of clarity and distinctness, Descartes has

thinking thing and no

He never

am

Descartes writes,

more than

a thinking thing” (to rule

know about himself and hence would

doing

this

in his replies...

without begging the question.

he states that he does not mean

only a thinking thing in the sense of exclusively

i.e.,

35

(6) “I

to generate his criteria

out physical properties and others that he

be

returns.

that,

but only in the

‘strict’

his doubt.

Some commentators have

noted that

it

is

unclear what

‘I

am

a thinking thing’

terms of the question of essentially a thinking thing or only a thinking thing.
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thls d° es not ca tur e the subject
I, perhaps at least-and
P
this seems criticaldoes not^leave the thinking I, the subject I,
present but unknowable-we will return
to
this later for there is important
move being made by the performative that seems
to
accomplish a kind of erasure of an epistemological
opacity than an epistemological
ransparency. Rather than accomplishing a
positive epistemology where Descartes
knows something with certainty, perhaps what the
performative he reaches does is
accomplish a kind of negative epistemology where
what cannot be certain is
t

unknowable

way which

in a

is

made
some sense,
unknowable as it would

not threatening to certainty, and thus

is,

in

epistemologically invisible. Hence there is an erasure
of what is
for Descartes' project prohibit certainty.
Perhaps we can call this an erased opacity that
then appears as transparency. (There is an implicit
and denied recognition of the limit of
reason here that seems a curious and important
precursor to the Kantian critical project.

Kant

of Cartesianism .) Of course, Derrida would return,
that there is
necessarily a trace of what could not be seen.
will return to this notion of the trace,
and how if we remove the demands for clarity and distinctness
required by Cartesian
certainty, we might be able to recognize the way
the self is opaque to itself without
losing self-knowledge.
s

critique

We

37

There

a distinction here

between Descartes' knowledge of his self which he
possesses and knowledge of his nature which he has yet to perceive
which I think is
critical to our project. As a distinction or dis-articulation
at least Descartes'
is

comments

suggest what

stake in using self-awareness as his vehicle for self-knowledge.

is at

While Descartes possesses knowledge of himself (present
grasp his nature such that he

knows

tense), there are

with certainty (future conditional).

it

I

ways of to
think

Descartes verb tenses indicate the tension that is involved in the paradigm of
knowing
the self through the event/space of self-awareness. He has knowledge of
himself, but he

must be careful with
perception certain.

with “What else

am

his thinking if he

He
I?”

is

to perceive his nature in a

has already claimed that he

and then goes on

is

way that makes that
He follows that

a thinking thing.

to present that

what he

is

cannot depend on his

The I is neither a bodily thing nor an imagined thing. I cannot thus know
the I by knowing what it corresponds to (as an object in the world or an invention of my
mind). I have the knowledge of myself, however, as I know that I exist and that I am a
imagination.

thinking thing.

To be

certain

of my knowledge of this

I, then, is not simply to possess
be self-awareness) but to cultivate the mind’s practice of thinking about its
nature in such a way that “perceive[s] its nature as distinctly as possible.”

(i.e.,

it

to

38

Feminists and other

critics

have written about the way

in

which the Cartesian

self becomes through cogito reasoning, self-originating or a product of kind of

“ontogenesis.” There are several places in the Meditations and in the Replies where

Descartes raises the issue of his origin.
the Meditations

“was not what was

the cause that preserves

me

makes

that

which

is

at

says that his question concerning himself in

the cause that originally produced me, but

at present.

the succession of causes.” (77, 107)

about his origin, his attempt

He

In this

way I aimed

to escape the

what

is

whole issue of

While the ‘cause’ of his idea of himself is not

“escaping the whole issue”

is

interesting

is it

again

not knowable (and perhaps would lead to an infinite regress) a non-
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See Susan Bordo, “The Body and the
Reproduction of Femininity.” In
Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist R e constructions of
Being and Knowing eds
Alison Jaggar and Susan Bordo (New Brunswisk,
NJ: Rutgers University
issue.

,

Press, 1989)
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mind

That

is, it

so that what

doesn’t if we don’t want to consider what the
perceiver

is

produced as certain knowledge of the

not body. This reading

perceiver perceiving
really

seems

is

is

not incompatible with

my reading.

I

purely

is is

purely

mind and

can argue that the
is

what mind as not body

mean.

to

How

am

is that is is

not knowable except as thinking which

I

think the opacity of the self can be

can be addressed in a productive
I

I

way

of course, indebted

performative. While

my

is

known, or how its unknowability
the theme of the last two chapters.

Jaakko Hintikka’s reading of the cogito as a
understanding of performatives come from Austin, I think
to

Hintikka’s reading of the cogito ergo sum argument as a performative
is very
productive. In his seminal article, “ Cogito Ergo Sum: Inference or
Performance”
Hintikka presents the force of the cogito argument as a performative comes
from the
,

fact that

it is existentially self-verifying.
Whereas existentially inconsistent statements
are self-defeating, he says, “their negations verify themselves when they
are expressly
uttered or otherwise expressed.” “I am” is such a sentence, he tells us.
“Descartes

does

not demonstrate this indubitability [of

sentence

I

am

(T

exist’) is not

by

T am’] by deducing sum from

itself logically true, either.

cog//o...[and] the

Descartes realizes that

its

from an act of thinking, namely from an attempt to think the
contrary. The function of the word cogito in Descartes' dictum is to refer to the thoughtact through which the existential self-verifiability of T exist’ manifests itself.” Jaakko
indubitability results

“

Cogito Ergo Sum: Inference or Performance?” In Descartes: A Collection of
Critical Essays ed. Willis Doney (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press), 109Hintikka,

,

,

110

.

4

“

I

think that the difference between claims about existential knowledge and

propositional knowledge might undermine

perhaps less relevant), however,
cogito arguments using the

same

is that

this.

What

is

incontrovertible (though

Descartes does present the res cogitans and the

literary styles,

i.e.,

as a kind of introspective silent

soliloquy.
4
'

There

is

a third question as well.

argument as such; does he mean

to put

it

Does Descartes intend

in the

to present his

form of a performative.

I

think there

evidence in the text that the kind of immediacy and indubitability that he wants
achieved through a kind of performative logic, but

I

am

is

is

not going to claim that this

is

what he intended.
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that he is

Because he relied on the notion of awareness, Descartes does seem
always perceiving himself,

that

to suggest

he cannot be unaware of himself. As always
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aware of himself he

is always perceiving himself,
therefore he could not fail to do so
This does not lesson the failure of the res cogitans,
I think, for it could be
argued that
this awareness does not give him what
he needs for certainty. If it did, then he would
not need the wax example and the argument for
self-certainty that follows it What he is
trying to be certain of is the relation of his
idea of his I and the I that he is aware of If
he was ar § uin g that awareness simply provided the I
to itself self-evidently then we
would have to ask why he goes on to present his argument
regarding judgments and the
understanding and we would still be left with uncertainty

regarding ideas. In other

words, simply being aware of the self doesn’t guarantee
that the idea one has of oneself
is that self. Descartes would have base
that certainty on an argument that proved
that
‘being aware of the self (or awareness) is the same
as ‘having an idea of the self (or
thinking). This is what he is trying to establish so
the argument that we are always
aware of ourselves and thus always perceiving ourselves would
be assume a circular
logic. See Malcolm on self-awareness.
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how we

Here we begin

resolve

it,

to sense that

problematize

it,

how we approach

leave

it

problem of self-knowledgeunresolved-has import in relation to the
the

issues of freedom and determinism. There are many implications
which I would like to
address, but cannot do so here. In particular, I think there are three
issues concerning
the modem subject that Descartes' ‘resolution’ to the problem of

self-knowledge effect:
conception of self-awareness, notions of substance and essence, and the mind-body
distinction. I will come back to these issues in the conclusion after I have
developed my
post-Cartesian notion of self-knowledge. I think there are fissures or fault lines in
Descartes' presentation of these due to the furtive presence of the unknowable self. I
think we can crack the issues open once we have fully addressed the hidden I-subject.
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While

cannot fully develop these ideas here,

I believe that two poles
regarding perspective are those that define the space of modem moral agency. As many
feminist philosophers have pointed out, what seems crucial in modem philosophical
I

thought in terms of determining which point of view one gets to have is the ‘proximity’
one has to the body, i.e., that which renders one more ‘uncertain’ of one’s knowledge.
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Th e controversy concerning identity
is
not merely a dispute of words
1

.

Everything related to us, which produces
pleasure
or pain, produces likewise pride or
2
humility

CHAPTER

HUME

3

CONCERN WITH THE SELF: PERSONAL IDENTITY
AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-AWARENESS

S

Introduction

As we saw

how

he can

him with

know

in the last chapter,

Descartes presents in the Meditations not only

himself, but also what this self-knowledge

is

and how

it

can provide

the criteria of truth— clarity and distinctness.
Descartes attempts to resolve the

problem of self-certainty, of how
idea of his self,

is

to

be certain that the self he knows himself as,

actually the self that he

is,

i.e.,

his

through his substantialization of the self as

a thinking thing. Conceptualized as a thinking thing, Descartes
claims his knowledge of

himself

thing,

is

incorrigible.

whenever he

knows what
he knows

is

incorrigible because, as

thinking, his nature

his nature

this nature

It is

is,

is

made

it is

his nature to

be a thinking

He

thus not only

present to him.

but he also claims to have an infallible method through which

with certainty, as

it is

made

present to

him

as an immediate

intuition.

If his

argument does provide an idea of self that

is

incorrigible,

it

does so not by

providing a positive description of what the self is, nor by effectively arguing
self can

know

itself

through intuition. Rather,

I

how

the

offer that such an idea of self that could
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not be wrong, that could not be
otherwise,

doubt or

fallibility.

The key

produced by erasing

is

to assuring the incorrigibility

all

possible causes of

of the idea of the

self lies in

self-awareness. In order to satisfy the
retirements of certamty, self-awareness
in
Descartes'

itself

model has

to be transparent

without impediment.

depends upon an erasure;
that

I

it

who

I

such that the self is epistemologically
ava.lable

maintain that the development of such
self-transparency

in order for the self to be
transparently present to itself such

can achieve self-knowledge knowledge
that
is

to

is

certain, the presence

of the subject-

doing the knowing must be removed as a
possible cause of doubt.

The

subject-I poses a threat to certainty
because the idea of any nature for

3
Descartes requires the presence and activity of
the mind.

As

the subject-I

is

always an

active part of the production of the idea
of something’s nature, and thus part of but
different

grasps.

from

that idea (of a nature),

Arriving

uncertainty,

at

it

is

unclear what an idea of the self’s nature

certamty through self-knowledge thus requires the
removal of this

which Descartes accomplishes by removing

that is the idea

of his nature and the

and the wax are not the same

is

I

that is this activity

this difference

between the

of the mind. That the subject-I

not a problem for Descartes’ project. That the

T might not be the same threatens the certainty of Descartes' self-knowledge.
project requires that he close this gap between the

same, or

at that least their difference is

made

I

s

I

Thus

his

such that they are rendered the

for certainty engenders (1)

an ontological

notion of the self as a thinking substance and (2) a model of self-awareness that
transparency. This self-awareness allows the self to

knowing

and the

imperceptible.

Thus Descartes' epistemological quest

‘neutralizes’ the role that the

‘I’

know

itself

is self-

with certainty as

self or subject-I plays in the production of
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it

its

self-knowledge

4

In effect, Descartes' substantialization

.

of the self resolves the problem

of self-knowledge as a problem by getting
the position of the

subject-I out

of its

own

way.

While Hume’s

critique of personal identity in the
Treatise clearly attacks the

metaphysical notion of the self as a substance
that underlies experience,
fails to critique the subject-I

Hume challenges

project.

substance

self,

self and the

but he

known

It

its

relation to self-knowledge, a failure

suggest that he

which

limits his

the philosophical notion of a unifying,
coherent, unchanging

fails to

self.

and

I

is

address the epistemological relation between the
knowing
this relation,

contend, which engenders the problem of

I

self-knowledge as a problem for Descartes’ project. Through
his conception of the self
as a substance he attempts to resolve the problem
such that the self can have selfcertainty.

Hume's

Without addressing

this

problematic issue of the knowing

of the metaphysical notion of self is not only

critique

splits the self into a

knowing

I

and a known

I,

I

or subject-I,

less effective, but

it

also

thus reproducing the rationalist

framework.

While he
one-the bundle

offers a notion of the self s ontology that challenges the metaphysical

self rather than the substance self-he doesn’t supply this bundle-self

with a notion of self-awareness,
itself through

awareness,

i.e.,

which self-knowledge

Hume

with an epistemic relationship that the self has with

is

produced. Lacking such a

critical

model of self-

inadvertently reproduces the dynamics of self-awareness that

consistent with the rationalist paradigm,

i.e.,

without an alternative version of self-

awareness, Hume’s epistemology ends up positing a subject-I
transparent introspection

5
.

This dynamic

is

is

what

70

I

who

is

capable of

have been referring

to as the split-

Not only does

self.

him

a

Hume

way to contend

posit this

The

)

but his method of analysis also
seems to deny

with this subject-I.

So Hume's dilemma can be
(1

I,

self or

mind

stated as follows:

(the subject-I) can be

aware of (know)

its

impressions, as well as the succession of its
experiences
self or object-I)

An

(2)

own

(i.e.,

the bundle-

impression of x must be locatable for the idea of
x to be meaningful

But
There

(3)

is

no impression of a subject-I

in experience

Therefore
It is

(5)

( 1 )

Hume must

Thus
wants

not meaningful and therefore false to claim that
a subject-I exists
cannot be known for certain, since
(1) requires that a subject-I exists

(4)

to

either give

up

avoid scepticism, or he must

(1),

which he does not want

tacitly

assume

that (3) is false

to

do because he

and

impression of the object-I (the succession of perceptions, or the bundle
also the impression of the subject-I, since the subject-I

give up (3),

Hume

=

that the

self) is actually

the object-I. But in order to

needs a different theory of what self-awareness

is,

one which does

not tacitly assume, like Descartes', that knowledge of the self is incorrigible
(that
the subject-I

is

is,

that

transparent to itself as the object-I). 6

Confronting the Split-Self of (Self-) Awareness

Hume

wants his critique

in the Treatise not

only to render such Cartesian-

influenced notions as the substantive self “meaningless,” but to do so in a

allows him to

make

a positive contribution. In short,

rationalism’s conclusions

and scepticism’s

Hume

response. For

is

criticizing both

Hume

must not only develop a method whereby rationalism’s concepts
must also make sure

that this

method does not

fall
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way which

to

accomplish

this,

he

are demolished, but he

prey to scepticism’s criticisms. The

key to-and the weakness

Hume, our

of,

perhaps-his method

his reliance

is

ideas are not ‘representations' of
things in the world,

on 'experience.' For

whose

'correspondence' to those objects can be
tested. Nor are tdeas the immediate
notions of

such things

in the

world, present in and immediately
avatlable to our minds. Instead,

they are copies of our impressions.

it,

What we know of the world

and these perceptions are impressions and

the

copy of an impression.

impression an idea

While

is

a

Hume s

We

must be able

If an idea is

ideas.

to find through

are our perceptions of

meaningful,

our experience what

copy of-no impression, then no meaningful

epistemology thus involves a

shift

away from

idea.

the notion that

ideas are transparent representations of objects,
his empiricist turn does

upon the notion

that

we can

access such experience

7
.

must be

it

still

seem

We must be able to reflect on our

experiences in order to examine our ideas and their corresponding
impressions.
reflection,

however, which reveals the weakness of Hume's method as he

theorize the notion of the self as a

such access engenders.

knowing or observing

If experience is

subject.

Thus Hume's

task in the Treatise

the self as non-substantial and he

a

way to

is

it

is

It is

this

unable to

self (or self-reflecting self) that

going to be an effective tool with which

dismantle the Cartesian subject, however,

to rely

must not inadvertently reproduce

to

that very

twofold: he must provide an ontology of

must develop a

critical

epistemology which allows for

refer to or look at our experience without positing an epistemologically

privileged subject which, though constituted by Hume's method,

of critique

8
.

As

is

outside of its realm

a posited but unaddressable self, this posited subject-I seems to function

quite like a substance self that can stand outside of its perceptions and observe

Without a way

to address

it,

Hume's

critique

itself.

of the substance self is undermined.
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In order to

avoid the possibility of reproducing
a substance

in effect, reproduce

what

I

have been calling the

‘split-self

self which is capable of knowing
itself or reflecting
critique

of personal identity

have pointed

Hume

out,

in

Book I runs

this risk,

on

9

Hume

self,

must

not,

by positing or assuming a

itself transparently.

Hume’s

however. As many commentators

analyzes our ascription of personal identity
to our successive

perceptions as a kind of habitual mistake,
but he does not answer or adequately
address
the question raised therein: if the self
is (nothing

perceptions, then

who

more than)

a succession of

(or what) is perceiving the self as such 10
?
In effect then, the

section on personal identity raises the issues
of both what the self is and

or perceive the

how we know

self.

Thus we can read Hume's
perhaps engendering) a tension:

critique

how

can

of personal identity as containing (and

we

critique the notion

of the self as substance

while also presenting a notion of having self-awareness
otherwise

,

i.e.,

non-

dogmatically, such that neither a version of the rationalist
positing of self nor a
scepticist negation

of self is reproduced. This tension

reflects the

two

related

philosophical notions of the self implicit in Hume's analysis: the thinking
thing

substance and the (transparently knowable) container mind. 11
there are

some

of what we

call

philosophers,

our Self,”

I

who

imagine

contend he

is

we

are every

When

moment

he writes that

intimately conscious

concerned with the model of epistemological

transparency that such continuous, uninterrupted and complete awareness relies upon.
(251) Thus, the self that

Hume

are conscious of,

known

is

(objectively,

i.e.,

the

is

critiquing

is

both the self these philosophers think

we

or object self, and the implied transcendental self who

unimpededly) conscious as such,

i.e.,
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the

knowing or

subject

12

self.

Hume

critiques the metaphysical notion of
the substance self through his

empiricist epistemology. According to
this epistemological approach
ideas are copies of

impressions such that for an idea to be
meaningful

we must be

impression. Thus the critique of substance
self relies upon a
to assess its

own

impressions

if

I

way

impressions. But if the self is constituted by

impressions and ideas-then what

am

is it that is

in part constituted

perceptions and myself such that

which perceptions both

I

able to locate

its

it

in

such a

way that

the self can reflect

self that

is

perceptions. But what

the relation

between a

self and

its

would

could have such self-reflection?

we can

can

assess

I

can assess them? There must be a way for

must avoid positing a

though

How

my

the relation between those

is

consistent, this self- re flection

reflection constitute?

perceptions-its

Hume

in

constitute the self, such that the self is the bundle
of its

perceptions, but constitute

it

for the self to be able

doing the assessing?

by them? What

its

And what

upon

itself.

To be

not a product of its

perceptions be such that

kind of self-awareness such acts of self-

Hume's philosophy cannot

directly

answer these questions,

benefit from tracing the reasons for this failure.

Critique of Self as Substance

In his

A

Treatise of Human Nature,

Hume

argues against the notion of an

essential self, a self that precedes experience in the world, a self that

unified.

According

to

Hume,

is

the idea of a unified whole.

coherent and

the identity of any object, including that of a person,

fiction that is acribed to objects

out of social convention,

is

due

to a kind

one whereby

While

we

of mistake.

13

is

a

This mistake out of habit,

ascribe to successive multiple perceptions

this is a habit
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which everyday folks make

that

seems

to

be functional or useful,

them

that

Hume’s

it

is

also a practice performed

sceptical philosophy in

Book

I

is

by philosophers.

concerned.

It is

with

Hume’s epistemology

specifically challenges the metaphysical
conception of self as an underlying substance.

He contends

that while philosophers

might recognize the self as having continuous

perceptions, they also assume a constant
unchanging self as underlying such change.

This substance self functions as the grounding
of their certainty.
notion of self-as-substance asserting that personal
identity
collection of perceptions.

We have, he writes, “no

of a collection of particular
talk or reason

concerning

According

to

qualities,

it.”

Hume

s

nor have

Hume

challenges this

no more than

is itself

a

idea of substance, distinct from that

we any other meaning when we

either

(16)

epistemology, every idea must have a corresponding

impression. “Ideas produce the images of themselves in
are supposed to be derived from impressions,

it still

new

remains

ideas but as the

true, that all

first

ideas

our simple

ideas proceed either mediately or immediately, from their corespondent
impressions.”
(7)

What

then

is

the impression of a unified self? he asks. If there

impression to the idea of personal identity,
meaningless. For

would

Hume

also entail that

self or person,

no corresponding

contends, then the term

is

the idea of the self as a substance that unites our impressions

we have an
is

Hume

is

impression of that uniting, underlying

self.

He

not any one impression, but that to which our several

impressions and ideas are suppos’d to have reference.

If

any impression

gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the

same, thro’ the whole course of our
after that

manner. But there

is

lives; since self is

suppos’d to exist

no impression constant and

(251)
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invariable.

writes,

Nor could
themselves

.

.

the self be

of our impressions

all

succeed each other, and never

all

at

once, as our impressions

same

exist at the

time.

It

cannot,

therefore be from any of these impressions,
or from any other,” he concludes,
“that the

idea of self is deriv d; and consequently
there
It is

is

our experience that

here explained.” (251)

What

tells

is

us that

is

no such idea.” (252)

we have no

are

The sentence

wrong on two

it

is

it

is

here

says not

[i.e.,

we have no

it

idea

by philosophers]

indicates that our experience suggests that the
philosophers

counts: there

and simplicity” and there

Hume

interesting here is that

of self, but we have no idea of self "after the manner
explained.

“idea of self, after the manner

is

is

no impression of the

no idea of self like

that

self as having “perfect identity

which we have. This indicates

not impossible that there could be other ideas of the
self that

we do

that

have.

Self as a Bundle

Although he
those philosophers

tells

us that with them he can no longer reason,

who contend

that they

Hume

critiques

can “upon serious and unprejudic’d reflexion”

observe something other than their perceptions when they “enter most intimately in

what they

call

themselves. (252)

He

continues presenting the famous bundle analogy:

But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to
affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or
collection of different perceptions,

which succeed each other with an
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. (252) 14

What we

are, are

bundles of perceptions and, as such,

This comparison accomplishes two things: (1)
container,

per se, as the whole

is

made by

As

we

are always changing.

a bundle or collection the self is not

the perceptions themselves. There
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is

no

inside or outside of the bundle.
Because of this (2) there

or looking at the perceptions.

our being the bundles.
perceptions:

Our thought

Our (epistemological)

also

no perceiver watch,
ng

role as bundles is not separate

We are present however, but as part of the production

“Our eyes cannot
is still

is

more

from

of the

turn in their sockets without varying
our perceptions.

variable than our sight; and

all

our other senses and faculties

contribute to this change.” (252-253) 15

This image of the rapid change of our
perceptions
it

suggests

how

short the duration of a perception

because the image suggests something about
nothing but bundles of perceptions,

Hume

is (a

is

important, not only because

blink long perhaps), but also

how we produce

tells us,

but

mechanism through which those perceptions change.

we

All

those changes.

We are

are also part of the

we have

to

do

is

but

move our

eyes and our perceptions, and therefore our selves, are altered.
The self-as-bundle
notion makes distinguishing the self perceiving from the self as
perceptions problematic
as

it

seems

between

made

to challenge the mind-as-container

‘inside’

and ‘outside’ the

Importantly then, as bundles

distinction

we seem

both to be

(up) of our bundled perceptions, and to be participants in the production of those

perceptions. There

perceptions

we

is

have,

movement of our

some way
if,

as

in

Hume

which the bundles

suggests,

new

that

we

are are able to affect the

perceptions result from the mere

eyes.

In addition to questions

What

self.

model by dissolving any

about the bundles- What holds the bundle together?

binds the bundle or collects the perceptions into a collection?— questions arise

here about the relation between this self that

we

are that

seems

to affect (or

even

engender) our perceptions and those perceptions which, bundled together, seem
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to

constitute our selves.

that both

seem

instance,

how

to

What

the relation

is

engender the other

these things. But

to say that since

how do make
I

things and perceptions that are

is

in this

bundle analogy?

If we are just bundles, for

are ‘we’ different from our
perceptions of other things? For

would be ridiculous

method,

between our perceptions and our
selves such

I

me? More
if,

it

perceive this desk, this computer, this
room,

the distinction

the following problem:

Hume

as

am

between perceptions as perceptions
of

importantly, perhaps, for

Hume

I

Hume's

critical

presents, the self is a collection or

bundle, and the self is itself constituted by such
perceptions such that any flicker of the

eyes changes not only what the self sees but what
the self is as a seer, then
self search

its

or not an idea

depends for

‘own’ impressions, observe
is

its

meaningful?

effectiveness

If

its

own

can the

experiences in order to assess whether

Hume's argument against

upon

how

the idea of the substance self

the notion that the self (or

able to do an inventory of its impressions, then what

some

part

of it, perhaps)

relation to those impressions,

is its

especially given that the bundle-self seems to be in constant flux?
In other words,

can

my impressions even be

them

to

me? How can have
I

the self that

I

am

is

mine without some sense of me or
a point of view from which

always changing? Because

move of identifying how

the self knows with

what the

aporetic notion of self. Seemingly identical to

to

be able to know them. From whence does

does the necessary
impressions come?

knowing

itself

(if

Hume

its

I

can assess

seems
self

at least a

is,

such that

it

seems

to

its

this capacity

impressions.
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relate

if

to repeat the rationalist

he seems to engender an

impressions, the self is also supposed

come? And from whence

presume but not theorize

can evaluate

way to

how

my impressions

only temporary) differentiation between the self and

Hume

is

It

its

a subject capable of

must

in

some sense be

able to

stand apart from the self that

is

constituted by those perceptions,
however. Without

some notion of self-awareness which could
allow

the self to be able to reflect

on

impressions without being separate from
them, Hume's epistemology seems
to

its

re-

instantiate a Cartesian subject-I.

Relation of Perceptions to Self: The Problem
of Sameness
Certainly,

from which

it

it

would be contradictory

could examine

What we need

then, for his

epistemology,

is

to

a

way

be able to consider

its

method of critique

own
this

upon

which has

itself (as

(its

to

ascnbe

to not

to the self a position

be undermined by his

changing position constituted by

its

perceptions,

perceptions. This must of course, thus be able to
address

notion of possession as well.

which constitute what the

reflect

Hume

impressions that was in fact outside of its
perceptions.

for the self, as a

what we might mean by
that

its

for

self is, perhaps the

something which

own) perceptions would

is

As

these perceptions are also

development of a way

constituted

offer such a

by

its

means

perceptions) as something
16

.

that the self can

Hume's

critique

of the

substance self notion of identity through the analogy of the self as a
bundle, however,

seems

to fail as

it is

unable to critique both

objective knower. Because

to

be able to

know

analogy must— if it

knowing or

we

that

is to

subject-I.

cannot address

presumed as able

seems

once the self as substance and the self as

to identify the

bundle of impressions that

‘have’ with the bundle of perceptions that

satisfy the requirements

we

are,

Hume's

it

the perceptions are ‘mine’ and thus the subject-I which

know them

is

we seem

of his epistemology— posit an implicit

Thus, by making the self be the bundle of perceptions,

how

to

we

it

at

also left un-addressable.
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seems

is

Through

the analogy of the bundle,

constituted through

it is

its

perceptions,

it

seems, in order to do

weakened:

needed

in the first case

would show

that

the second case,

it

is

it

so.

is

receive a notion of a self that, as

either unable to

is

constructed through them; or if it

them,

we

is

examine

able to examine them,

its

it

impressions because

must be

from

different

In either case, the critique of
the substance self is

weakened because such a

that the idea

self cannot

of the self as a substance as meaningless;
and

weakened because

that self

seems

to

subject-I capable of (objective) introspection,
a position

we can

an epistemological structure whereby there

Hume
is

is critical of.

As

such,

a self who claims to have

access to his perceptions. While the bundle analogy seems
to

17

a reliance on

evaluate our concepts.

is

in

assume the position of the

Implied by Hume's experience-focused epistemology
observation” as a tool with which

do the assessment

make

Hume

posits

some kind of

the relation

between

the bundle and the self one of identity, this access suggests
the notion that the self and
the perceptions are not (necessarily) identical.

what

is it

that differentiates

18

The

persistent questions however, are

them and how can we know and/or

utilize this difference.

Hume’s own

description of his self-reflection exhibits this difference: “For

when

most intimately

I

enter

into

what

I

call myself,

I

my part,

always stumble on some particular

perception of other, of heat of cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure,” he
says. (252,

emphasis

know what

the self is as, even

there

is

an

I

perceptions.

posited

in original) Present here are the

who

is

Hume seems

when denouncing

push

in trying to

the notion of the metaphysical self

considering himself, even

to

dynamics involved

if

he considers he

to the forefront the aporetic nature

80

is

only his

of this problem as

he writes,

never catch myself at any time
without a perception, and never can
observe

“I

any thing but the perception.”
(252, emphasis

Hume

in original)

raises several things here: while

are only perceptions,

it

is

also clear that

those perceptions, including

I

it is

19

clear that

‘when

I

turn inward’ there

cannot perceive any thing that

my self having them. How

I

is

separate from

catch myself, perhaps,

catching perceptions, but this seems to leave
unexplained what the relationship

between

my self perceiving and my perceptions. Some

one else

is

by

is

(like Descartes,

perhaps?) might “perceive something simple
and continu’d, which he calls himself, tho’
I

am

certain there

think, that

Hume

Meditation.

He

is

is

is

no such principle

Hume

if

what

I

am

is

how

itself:

can

I

my perceptions, who

a safe assumption,

It is

to self;

identical, according to

is

and

how

is

perceiving them?

I

can

I

perceive

20

to the self:

“After what

are they connected with it?” he asks.

no impression of the

Hume's epistemological

How

enter myself?

does investigate the relation of the perceptions

(252, emphasis added) While there

self as singular

investigation, there

is

and

a question of the

between the notion of self and the perceptions we commonly speak of as

relation

having.

This notion of possession,

I

While he overtly asks “what gives us so
is

tells us.

thus presenting not only Descartes' (and other
Cartesians’) solution to

manner, therefore, do they belong

there

Hume

me,”

here reconstructing the problem of perception
from Descartes'

the problem, but also the problem

myself? Even

in

claim,

is critical

to

Hume’s

great a propension to ascribe identity...” (252)

also an implicit question regarding ‘owning’ or ‘having’:

can we) claim our perceptions as ‘ours’?
perceptions, but

we

also attribute to

presentation of self.

them

Why do we

(and

how

We not only ascribe identities to successive
qualities including that

81

of possession.
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Certainly if my perceptions are mine,
there must be a relationship
between myself and

my perceptions. As
such a

way

that

I

can assess

cannot

I

tell

my own perceptions,

the difference

they must not constitute

between them and me. What might

difference be, between the self and the
perceptions that belong to

me

in

this

it?

The Theatre Analogy: The Notion of Difference
The
analogy as

and

its

theatre analogy perhaps offers a

it

way out of the problems of the bundle

begins to develop a more complicated notion of the
relation between a self

perceptions.

Hume

but explicitly refers to

notion of self that

is

discusses not “mankind” as he does in the bundle analogy,

mind

here. This again points to his concern with presenting
a

not a substance-but something else-and

aware of itself— but aware of itself in some other way.
perceptions?

limits

And can

it

of the (Cartesian)

do so

differently,

rationalist

i.e.,

How

is

also not transparently

can the self be aware of its

without reproducing the epistemological

paradigm of self-awareness equals transparent

self-

knowledge?

As Hume
successively

writes,

make

“The mind

is

a kind of theatre, where several perceptions

their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide

variety of postures and situations.” (253) There are

two

away, and mingle

central issues at

in

an

work

infinite

in this

comparison: one about the theatre as a kind of mental space or place and one about the
constitution of this space as a theatre.

While the mind as

a bundle is the bundle

itself,

there

is

no structure

there

is

such structure. The mind as a theatre has perceptions which pass through

the place

that holds the

bundle together,

where the perceptions can “make

it

seems.

their appearance,”
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As

a theatre, however,

it; it

and most importantly

is

where they can “mingle" on-goingly,
successively. They form “postures
and
as they dance across the stage. This
stage,

however permanent

because of the presence and performance taking
place.

room, or a

pier, for instance, there

These

there.

activities are the

simplicity in [the

mind]

at

must be

To be

We

performances of perceptions. Thus there
in different

bundle,

is

mind

made from

.

They

.

how
It

engagement, that

split-self kind

it

seems

mind

to

in the

to relate to

is

we

the place that

it

is

mind,

as such.

ways of

isn’t

is

theatre, like the

is

way

a

away and mingle”

mind

I

as a

that the “play”

in their activity

merely the presence of perceptions, but

their

movement

,

the stuff of mind. Thus, the self is not aware of its perceptions

how
way

it

itself.

clear that the perceptions

the self could

in

watch

know

somehow make

could perceive

this,

which the perceptions

are active

and

the self,

itself as such.

how

our propensities: the perceptions are active on the

it

The

their activity

stage,

and our

‘receptive’ via our propensities. (These propensities, however, activate the

imagination.)

have

be

no

are the successive

constitute

has, but moreover, there

they “pass, re-pass, glide

analogy makes

does not fully answer

key seems

which

of way. The mind as a

as a kind of voyeuristic attendant, for a theatre cannot

this

is

“is properly

the shift from bundle to theatre opens up

the perceptions

constitutes the mind.

While

stage

as not a container, and awareness of mind as not
presupposing an

some

itself in

of the perceptions,

their

the perceptions, as performances,

how

is a

certain kinds of activities that take
place

one time, nor identity

can begin to see

presenting the

watching

is

it

might seem,

a stage, rather than a

perceptions only, that constitute the mind.”
(253) While there
that is the theatre,

it

situations”

the

Hume

most

seems

to gesture to this aporia

distant notion

of self-awareness as he writes, “nor

of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of
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the materials of which

it

is

compos’d.” (253) This indicates not only
our lack

in

terms

of knowing the what of the mind, but also
the inherent problem of how the
mind knows
or

We cannot have a notion of this mind (yet) because to do

aware of itself.

is

mind

posit a

therefore

there

is

it

that is distinct

seems the mind

from

is too.

The perceptions

perceptions.

The mind

is

constituted

not a static concept of mind that would
refer to

notion of this “distant” place for
a thing

its

we can have

it

is

by

some

always deferred. There

its

are always changing,

perceptions therefore

place. There can be

is

no referent

and not something else? And what about the
Certainly in the metaphor of the

does

this

propensity.

.

theatre analogy

does

it

mind

notion relate to the

.to

way

distinction

as a theatre

in

is

“mind” as

to

work

make

it

between theatre and

a theater

‘real life’?

which we have a tendency, a “natural

to represent not only the

Hume thinks

that

also the notion ofperformance]

imagine that simplicity and identity”

suggest that

no

a notion of separate from these ongoing
perceptions.

But what about the audience? What about the
conventions

how

so would

that is not there?

How does the

mind, but the processes of mind? What

about the relationship between perceptions and objects,

between impressions and ideas?
Both the bundle analogy and the theatre analogy present the

by

its

constantly changing perceptions.

What

is

different about

self as constituted

them

is

(1) while the

bundle model of self seems (problematically) to present a model of the self qua an
individual, the theatre

model of the mind

is

implicitly social;

and

(2)

while

we

are the

bundles of our perceptions, the mind as a theatre implicitly entails a notion of

performance such

that

what happens on the stage

is

in

an important way, not

‘real’

or

not ‘true.’ Hence the theatre analogy gives us a glimmer of what might be necessary for
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a notion of self-awareness that could
provide something other than the two
options of

self-knowledge offered by the bundle analogy:
either no self-knowledge or

knowledge

that reproduces a Cartesian subject-I.

Such an

alternative

other in relation to the

self.

model of self-awareness

from

itself.

entails implicitly the notion

This otherness can be understood

in relation to other selves (or bundles)

different

self-

and the self in relation

its

terms of both the self

in

to itself as other than or

The introduction of a notion of otherness

the self can help us approach the relation
of the self to

of the

into the constitution of

perceptions, such that

we can

develop a notion of self-awareness that does not limit
but enhances Hume's critique of
the substance self.

The

theatre analogy thus provides a notion of difference

selves and our perceptions as

distinction

Hume
offer

is

two

between Teal’

life

between our

includes both the presence of an audience and the

it

and performance or

As

‘art.’

a theatre, the

mind

for

both social and aesthetic. The bundle analogy and the threatre analogy
thus
different possible relations

entails a relation

of identity such

between the

that the

self and

its

perceptions.

bundle of perceptions

The bundle

the self; the theatre

is

analogy entails a relation of difference such that the perceptions appear on the stage of
our minds. While the theatre analogy suggests a
perceptions,

it

does not explain

how

way to

distinguish the

they are connected however
,

2

mind from

the

’

.

The Imagination

Where
Hume.

perceptions appear in the theatre

How the perceptions— as

is

on the stage of the imagination

for

changing and successive— are mis-recognized as a
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unified and unchanging object

“Of Personal

Identity,”

due

is

Hume assigns

to the practices

of the imagination.

to imagination the role

In the section,

of the ‘mistake’ maker:

That action of the imagination, by which
we consider the uninterrupted
and invariable object, and that by which
we reflect on the succession of
related objects, are almost the same
to the feeling, nor is there
much
more effort of thought requr’d in the latter case
than
in the former.

relation facilitates the transition of
the

and renders

its

passage as smooth as

mind from one

if

it

The

object to another,

contemplated on continu’d

object. (254)

Because the feelings of these perceptions are
another, the imagination doesn’t

mind

to experience

them

regarding identity; even

in the

make them

same way. 24

when we

similar, because they resemble

the same, but

it

seems

to

one

encourage the

We have propensities to make this mistake

correct ourselves, says

Hume, “we cannot long

sustain

our philosophy, or take off this biass from the imagination.”(254)
This bias of the imagination

accordance with

its

is

principles. “This resemblance of feeling

perceptions [of identity and diversity]

makes us
is

the force the imagination has

substitute the notion

is

on perceptions

between the

in

different

the cause of the confusion and mistake, and

of identity, instead of that of related objects.” 25 (254)

not the perceptions or feelings (about them) that engenders the ‘mistake,’

It

Hume

suggests, but rather their relation of resemblance to one another that does.
This relation
is

formed by the “gentle force” of the imagination, guided as

principles. (10) For

Hume,

bonds which hold ideas together as they

some new

into

new

thing that

its

universal

ideas are copies or faint versions of impressions, and they

can be separated and re-united by the imagination “in what form

make them

by

it is

are

formed

into

it

pleases.” (10)

new complex

ideas,

The

do not

ideas which contain the (old) ideas, or melt them together to form

is

the

new

idea; instead they connect
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them

in

terms of the

way each

“

Mea

the

natUra " y introduces anot her.”(10)

way

new

that

idea.

it

travels or

A complex

moves through

idea

is

give rise to other ideas in the

It

is

the

way

the imaginat.on connects them,

the ideas in relation to each
other that forms the

thus a product of associations; the

mind

is

way ideas

necessarily

through their relations which are, in
turn, effected

according to principles. These principles
of association are three: resemblance,
contiguity,

and cause and

effect.

These three principles are those which guide
imagination
relations

between

imagination to

They connect

ideas.

move

the ideas

by engendering ways

must “run along the

parts

of space and time

associations of cause and effect, “there

in the fancy,

original ideas

acts

is

no

in

it;” in

conceive

relation,

its

new

and makes one idea more readily

ideas

is

the

way the

associations of contiguity,

objects;” and in

which produces a stronger
recall another.

have resemblance, contiguity, and cause and

connects them into

for the

the relations. In associations of resemblance,
the imagination

runs easily form one idea to any other that resembles

connexion

formation of

or act between them. These movements,
or acts of association,

make “connexions” from

it

in the

..”(11) So the

effect as qualities, but

what

imagination follows these qualities in

its

of association.

Pride and Possession

From
critique

the theatre and bundle analogies, then,

of the Cartesian notion of self, but also

Hume

begins to present not only his

his positive (yet non-metaphysical)

model of self-awareness. This self-awareness seems

to

be an awareness that suggests

both a subject and an object that are diverse and/or multiple. What could
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this self-

awareness be?
his

“

own

And how

critique

T 's CTident

’

could

it

connect to Hume's comment that
seems to contradict

of those philosophers who consider
the

that the ,dea - or rath er impression,

present with us..."? (317)

One way to approach

this

ourselves to ourselves,

is

way

of ourselves

is

How-and perhaps where-does this

to explore

to see the notion

how we becomes
I

would

of mine as a

does not refer to an object, but rather to a

intimate presence occur?

objects of concern to ourselves

like to suggest that the passion

What

relational notion.

relation.

As

pride

way to

different

it

refers,

it

that

is

might

think of the relation between the perceptions
and the self that

begins his analysis of the passions in Book

“arise immediately

from good or

evil,

II

it

is

in turn

both

with the indirect passions,

from pain or pleasure” as do the

27
passions, “but by the conjunction of other qualities.”
(2 76)

human

means

and connected.

Hume
which

this

of pride

shows us how the

perception of the idea of mine might be constitutive
of the ‘me’
offer a

always intimately

suggested model of self-awareness, this
intimate presence of

through impressions of reflection. 26
offers a

self transparently knowable:

By nature,

for

direct

Hume,

beings have dispositions for certain emotions, such as pride.
These dispositions

for certain dispositions

Hume

calls propensities.
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And

also

by

nature, this

impression of reflection produces an idea to which the impression
pride and humility, this idea

is

that

of the

He

self.

is

emotion or

attached.

29

For

calls this attached idea the “object”

of the passion.

As

the object of the passion, however, the self should not be conceived of or

understood as some

strictly identical object.

critiques such an idea.

He

In

Book

repeats this rejection in

88

I,

Hume completely rejects

Book

II:

and

“[t]his object [of pride

and

humility] is

an intimate

self,

or that succession of related ideas
and impressions, of which we have

memory and

consciousness.” (277, emphasis added)

Hume raises

the

tension present in the problem of
self-awareness here: the self is a
succession of related
ideas and impressions

is

and we have “intimate memory and
consciousness” of it. What

our intimate consciousness of a succession
of perceptions?

this

consciousness and these memories?

And what

is

Who or what

is

having

the relation between the

experience of pride and the (experience of)
this consciousness? 30

The

self as the object of pride

of the metaphysical self in Book
indirect passions

Pnde

concern.

to

I.

seems

The

to see

is

how

not what the self is, but

this self becomes

how

the

an object of

not only directs our attention to our selves, an
action which might seem
self attending or looking at itself, but

engender a whole system of self-awareness.

passions.

be consistent with Hume's earlier critique

issue here

might offer a way for us

presume an already pre-existing

humility, that,

to

Hume

writes,

the

view

fixes

It is

on the

self, as

it

also

seems

to

the object of pride and

when we are actuated by either of these

(277 emphasis added) This actuation occurs not as a result of direct
,

experience of our selves, or from having some feeling of
self or selfness. The self— as
the object of pride, as the object of our

exists

it.

Instead

impression.

call self

,

it

Hume

is

concern— neither causes the passion nor pre-

produced through our associations

‘tis

impossible

sufficient alone to excite them. ”(277-278) His

briefly, is this:

an

writes, ‘But tho’ that connected succession of perceptions,

be always the object of these two passions,

CAUSE, or be

in conjunction with

as the object of both humility and pride

the self alone can cause

them since they

are different.
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is

can be their

argument against

the self,

Nor

it

which we

it is

this,

not possible that

are passions solely caused

by

our nature, or else

we would

be experiencing them

all

of the time. Instead these

passions are caused by a double relation. 31

The Double Relation
This double relation
this

is

a relation between

two ideas and two impressions.

double relation introduces the force and presence
of difference

seems

engender a notion of mine-ness

to

is

when

the passion

is

plac d betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces

(278) The

first

idea

my self. And there
in the

is

are

that

and the idea which

it

excited.

it,

“Here then

and the other

of something being mine, and the second

two impressions of pleasure involved

which causes pride has two components:

is

is

is

the

a passion

produc’d by

it.”

idea, is the idea

of

as well: a pleasing quality

cause or subject and a pleasing quality (taken) in the object

‘subject’

also

our concern here. There are two ideas

involved in the passion of pride-the idea which
excites
object of the passion’s attention,

way that

in a

How

the quality

(self).

which

Thus, the

elicits

pleasure (or

pain in the case of humility) and the status of the subject (or thing) as being
related to
(my) self

Hume

instances,

I

generalizes this into a principle:

suppose

to

be so in

all;.

.

“What

I

.every cause of pride,

discover to be true in

by

its

some

peculiar qualities,

produces a separate pleasure, and of humility a separate uneasiness.” As regards the
subject

to

which these

qualities adhere”:

something nearly related

What

is

key here

“these subjects are either parts of ourselves or

to us.” (285)

is

that the cause, cannot be “our selves,” proper, but

parts of ourselves. Whether part of us directly (a body part,

(something

we own,

e.g.), the

cause of the pleasure that
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e.g.) or part

must be

of us indirectly

become— through pride—

pleasure

we

take in our selves, must be
related to us.

possessions.

there

They are

which are related

things

me” and

the idea of

whence does

is

Hume

this idea

of “mine" come? And from

Double Relation Works

associations of both impressions and ideas
concur on the

tells us,

same

must be render’d so much more easy and
what

Hume

calls a

much

greater violence, and the transition to

natural.” (284)”

“double relation of ideas and impressions,” (286)

subject side, a quality such as beauty

Let

to

s call that Pj.

me, there

is

attached to something,

is

move from

it

to another impression

The idea of the vase includes

On

the object side,

are determined

self,

On

the

a vase. Let’s call

this quality

which resembles

the idea of property, so that if

it

it.

belongs

the idea of it being mine. Let’s call this idea D. Because of the

principles of association, this idea enlivens the

Dj.

e.g.,

P (for impression). Through the principles of association

enlivens the imagination to

it

The double impulse involved

involves an impression and an idea on both the subject
and object ‘sides.’

this quality

object,

they assist each other and “bestow on the mind
a double impulse. The

passion, therefore, must arise with so

in pride, or

does

of (my) self come?

How the
When

(inter-related) questions here

the relation between the idea of
mine or “related to

my self? From whence

this idea

are properties or

to us, but clearly not identical
to us as

must be a connection of relation. 32
There are three

which we must address: What

new

They

by

Hume

nature.

to

move from

it

to another idea,

presents two “original qualities” concerning pride which

They

and the sensation excited

mind

are:

the object of pride (and humility)

in the soul

by pride
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is

is

always the

pleasure (and by humility

is

pain).

These properties of the passions he
says are "establish VT while
those of the cause of the
passions are "suppos ’dr The establish’d
properties are established by nature.
They are
set like a

kind of structure of the mind. The
supposed properties of the cause are

“foreign” and

more

variable.

When

I

behold a beautiful vase that

produced by the beauty enlivens the mind
the vase

Already

They

is

mine

in the

the idea of it as

to

move

mine enlivens

mind, according to

this

the

is

to another feeling like

mind

to

move

to pleasure P,

They resemble

impressions and ideas are related. “From
is

deriv’d.” (286)

From

the

this

two

As

the

and the idea from

pleasure of the vase’s beauty combined with
the idea that

the passion

it.

schema, are the established properties of
pride.

mind moves from pleasure P

actuate the original feelings of pride.

Because

it.

to another idea like

are there as both already-determined
but possible P, and D,.

excited, the

mine the pleasure

it

is

mind

D

is

to D,.

The

mine, moves the mind to

the causal perceptions.

The two

double relation of ideas and impressions,

acts

of association the connexions between

the ideas and impressions are engendered, and
relations of resemblance, which are
assisted

by the other

pair,

occur in the imagination. Together, these form the

dynamics of pride.

Hume s

analysis of the passion of pride begins to offer a picture of how the
self

can be aware of itself,

problems of the

how

rationalist

it

to itself, without

reproducing the

paradigm of self-transparent introspection, including

susceptibility to scepticism.

still

can be of concern

To avoid

problems of the

the

rationalist

its

paradigm while

providing a positive model of both self and self-awareness, Hume's model must

avoid both positing a substance self and engendering a subject-I/object-I
the latter

means

that

he must not posit an

I

who knows
92

itself outside

split.

of its

own

Avoiding
practices

of knowing. Because Hume's
ep.stemology

knowledge or reason (deduction or
avoid positing an

I

who

is

inference), but through experience,
he

separate from

presentation of pride gestures toward
a

approach

to self-awareness.

epistemology

is

It

questions.

is

experience of itself.

way of developing such

way

to

be aware of the

identity raised above,

(metaphysical) questions in a
directed at?” and “what

its

new way. “What

is

of pride and

its

never

to the first question

Hume

object.

the feeling of pride

and “to

fails to

itself:

tells

self,

this

seems

answer some

the self that the gaze of the passion

seem

The organs

to

is

to be the critical

Myself

to lie in the relation

It

seems here

in the

this idea

idea, viz. that

of self?

It

seems

of self

of pride produces

it

comes from

the

are so dispos’d as to produce the passion; and the passion,

produces a certain idea.” (287) But as

is

we

learned from the

said to produce,

is

imagination by the related idea of “mine” through the principle of

association. If the vase

would not

between the passion

that the passion

double relation of pride, the idea of the self which the passion

I

to

(or re-d,rect) the old

emotion she has assign’d a certain

whence comes

after its pioduction, naturally

enlivened

and thus

If his

us that nature gives us a disposition which produces

produce.” (287)

the idea of self. But from

passion

Hume's

33

The answer

it

think

a 'phenomenological'

must answer

it

the nature of this ‘gazing’?”

From Mine

which

I

must thus

does so by relying on indirection and
relational, ty.

to offer a positive

of the problems of personal

on evidence not produced through

rel.es

feel pride.

were not mine,

I

might

feel

joy upon appreciating

In order to feel pride rather than joy, the thing to
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its

beauty, but

which the

quality

is

attached which causes pleasure
must be mine. (291)

Hume

asserts that “pride

requires the assistance of some foreign
object, and that the organs,
which produce
exert not themselves like the heart
and arteries,

by an

original internal

(287) While the structure of pride might be a
given, present in a
its

activation or excitement requires the
presence of a foreigner.

And

object?

if

it

is

this foreign object

It

it,

movement.”

human

beings nature,

So what

is this

foreign

through pride that the self becomes an
object of concern, then does

become incorporated

would seem

into that self?

that the foreign object is the cause,
the beautiful vase.

But

it is

necessary that the vase be mine. The required
“foreign object” excites pride through the

organs (of the

added)

34

human

What

mind), as

this object thus

it

needs to be

of the passion and thereby direct
pride requires the self as

because

in

it

where does

What

is

it

object.

if

is

motion

being related

emphasis

an object which can activate the attention
self; for

if

it

according to

its

original quality,

were not mine, the idea of it as mine
to,

property

of mine come? From where and

that the disposition

to pride.” (288,

My beautiful vase is the cause of the passion, but,

‘mine’ means ‘belonging

this idea

first

towards the

would cause joy not pride

motion. But

mine such

its

“gives the

we have

when something

for pride can,

or

someone

is

of,

or related to

sets

my self

how do we come by the

from

notion of

once excited, turn toward
said to be related to

pride

self?

me ?

Mine
It

it

would seem

that the notion

of mine cannot come from the notion of my

seems the direction of the associations goes

the other way:

my vase,

excites

disposition toward pride; then pride’s gaze turns toward self. If ‘mine’
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self,

as

my

comes from

the

same
this

self that

seems

is

that

towards which our attention

rather circular; for

it

seems

precedes that of 'my self as mine

that the idea

part

is

is

directed in the passion of pnde,
then

of mine which

some sense

in

of that which stimulates the passion.
'Mine'

could not come from the self for Hume,
as the same things do not encourage
relations of
resemblance. Difference

is

necessary for relations of association.

have suggested

is

‘mine’

that

what

be called ‘yours’ by someone

which name them as

objects

else.)

is

whatever

‘Mine’

is

What

mine

that

is

What
ascription,

which cannot be a part of me,

is

relevant to our concern here,

where the meaning of the term

objects. For

something

yours. There are thus

me

to

two

which mine

is

i.e.,

is

is

mine

The one

me

or

It

would have

are those things

self

33

.

comes from

a process

it

is at least

both not

all

of me and not

implicit notions of difference involved in the relation of

i.e.,

pride as a disposition of the

(or

shame)

is

it

is

of

produced through a relationship between

that is the cause

of pride

is

not only the object that

is

not yours and not (identical to) me. These conditions of

difference are necessary but insufficient for something to be ‘mine,’ however.

‘mine’ and

which

attached, but also the presence of these relations of difference

that constitute mine-ness,

is

to

thing that cannot be ascribed

my entire

that ‘mine’

be ‘mine’ means that

The foreigness of ‘mine’

property.

not

to

is

mine (by me.

a property of me only vis-a-vis the

is

properties of these other things which are not me.
as

called

an ascription, a property ascnbed to

a property of me.

have the property of being mine. Thus, mine

is

Some commentators

mind

offers thus, is that if

I

feel pride

What

about an object then

an object which causes pleasure. Thus the condition of feeling pride

also necessary for determining that something

is

mine

36
.

idea which, through principles of association shifts the attention of the
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As

‘mine’

is

the

mind from mine

it

to

-my

self,’

‘mine’ must bear or encourage

some

relation to

‘myself

in order for this

association to be made.

Me

tor

My Self)
As

the object of pnde, the self is
something

which

is

produced through the

double associative relations in the mind
that move the mind from
impression/idea duo

of beautiful (pleasure)/mine
pnde,

is

to that

of pride(pleasure)/me. ‘Myself,’ as
an object of

produced by these associative moves which
engender relations

imagination.

The

self does not

seem

in the

to precede these associations,
except as a

requirement posited by human nature. This
requirement, however, functions more
a place holder than a

defined by

actuated,

is

it,

demand

for a certain substance.

What

the self is does not

though what can cause the passion, what can
excite

it

such that

affected or limited by the requirement that self
is pride’s object.

original qualities are that self is the object of
pride

excites in the soul (a term

and

which can be understood

like

seem

we

are so

The

that pleasure is the sensation

as imagination or

mind

for

it

Hume).

(288) Taken together, these qualities seem to proscribe the structure
but not specifically
the content of the roles or parts defined therein. Instead

it

seems

that the

emotion of

pride and the object of pride are ‘fleshed out’ through the
activities set into motion

when

pride

is

(and

we

Tis evident

are) “actuated:”:

we

never shou’d be possest of that passion, were there not a
disposition of mind proper for it; and ‘tis as evident, that the passion

always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think our

and circumstances. (287)
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own

qualities

While, Hume’s double relation
of the passion of pride seems to
refer to the
relations

of ideas and the relations of
impressions, there

is

also a sense in which the

double relation seems to refer to
relations between the cause
and the

effect

of the

passion and the cause and effect of
the object of the passion. The
disposition of the

mind

’causes’ our passion, in the sense
that

we would

never possess such a passion

without the disposition to do so; and
the excitement of the passion
turns us toward our
selves,

or

is

“makes us think" about our

selves.

an effect of the passion of pride?

it

that effect the original qualities or

a “foreign object”?

and the

It

is

determines what

example she

it

is

is

the self ‘caused’ by

it

my beautiful

an effect of the passion,

of the activity of the passion, once

unclear then what the relation

‘internal’ structure.

in effect

If

So,

is

is

it is

vase

the cause of

stimulated by

between the external object

Annette Baier contends that the ‘natural’ structure
of pride
is

that

can cause

it.

Taking owning a

fine

house as her

writes,

The

idea-object of pride (originally or a priori determined)
pre-selects the
idea-cause or pride, and the original feeling of pride
pre-selects the
quality of the cause, the separate pleasure the house
[or other fine
thing]

must give, whether or not it is mine. So in the causal sequence
getting us
from the subject case, namely my house, with its pleasure-giving
quality,
to feeling proud of myself, the effect determines
a priori what the cause
can be. Given the effect, we know that the cause must be a
possession of
mine, and that it must be independently a pleasure-giver. The
transition,
as

Hume presents

it, is from the perception of a house
as mine (idea of
cause subject) and fine (impression of cause quality) to the perception
of
pride (impression) in myself as house-owner 37
.

According

to Baier’s reading, although the beautiful

cause, that the beautiful house can cause pride

which

is itself

is

house seems

be the

a priori determined by the effect

(caused by) a predisposition in the mind. In short,
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to

if

something causes

pride,

must be mine. Thus what

it

which

feel a pleasurable feeling

I

Is

the

is

‘mine'

regarding

is that

Hume

says that

from the idea of mine

it is

to that

pride,

i.e.,

a passion in
i

my self.

the relation produced between
self and

mind?

which causes

mine engendered by the disposition

in

through a relation of resemblance
that the mind travels

of self. But

is this

resemblance pre-determined by the

requirements of the disposition? Baier’s
suggested explanation of the relation of
mine
to pride doesn’t

seems

that for

that self

is

answer the question from whence comes
the idea of self. While

Hume

the idea ‘mine’ and the impression
‘beautiful’ excite the

effect to the cause.

between the idea of mine and the idea of self?

of causal connection? Does

it

what answers we can find

them

to

make

a difference ?

38

Is

in the Treatise affect

might offer regarding self-awareness. These

self-awareness would be awareness of as well as

it

How

do we read the

a relation of resemblance or

How we

,

critique

mind such

taken as an object of concern in a prideful
way, Baier presents the association

between mine and self as occurring from the
relation

it

what

answer these questions, or
possibilities

Hume’s

possibilities include both

how such

what

self-awareness could be

epistemologically possible. The role of the imagination seems to
be the same whether
the relation

is

from one idea

one of resemblance or cause and effect-in
to the other,

connecting them such

either case,

that, in the end,

we

we seem

to

move

take concern in

ourselves.

Baier’s reading of the ‘internal’ disposition of the

selects”

mine

is

what

‘external’ objects can excite

it,

(pre-?)determined by this disposition.

mind

as the effect

which “pre-

suggests that the relation between self and

What

constitutes the relation of

resemblance between mine and self is already determined by the structure of pride such
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that

when ‘mine' and

‘beautiful’

occur

which the imagination necessarily

in the

same

transitions to.

relation to ‘mine,' but rather
‘mine'

is

object, pride

The

self

is

and self are those tdeas

not constituted by

constituted in terms of what

is

required

its

by the

ongtnal qualities of the natural
disposition of pride. This analysis
does not provide an

account of the relationship between
self and the structure of pride, however.
that the self is

self

is

merely assumed by pride.

the object of pride's view.

self is.”

It

Hume does

doesn't seem incorrect to

the passion of pride, the self

is

turn towards self being given

When

fill

It

seems

the origmal qualities are met, then
the

not provide a positive account of what
this

in this

lacuna by suggesting that according to

thus already given to us by nature. Rather
than just the

by

nature,

what the self is

is

naturally provided.

Resemblances of Perceptions: The Role of Memory

How

my self,

the imagination transitions smoothly from the
idea of mine to the idea of

accordingly, reflects a resemblance dictated by the nature
of the mind. If this

the case, then

‘reflects’

it

also does not

what the self is

seem

incorrect to consider that

that pride is

concerned with.

independent of the perception of every other object,
reason

we must

turn our

most attention such as

As our

way

to

view

lie

to external objects;

40

is

and

what counts as ‘mine’

As Hume

writes, “Ourself,

in reality nothing'.

‘tis

is

For which

natural for us to consider with

contiguous to us, or resemble us.” (341)

analysis of the passion of pride suggested,

Hume

does begin to offer a

conceive of the self as something other than a substance. And, the self as an

object of concern for itself through pride entails

notion of ‘mine’ and the notion of my

self.

s

notion of difference between the

My perceptions of beautiful things (and my
99

perception of them as mine) seem to
direct

my attention to my self in a way that

productive of what that self is. Thus
pnde gives us a

way to conceive of the

object of concern for itself without
presupposing what that self might be.
disposition of pnde seems to be behind
the ‘turn’

seems
at.

to

What

be a

way

is left

which the

in

as the

some

thing and me, and yet ‘me’

it

is

something

is

If

being ‘mine’

not something which

that

we

are concerned with

our (active) feeling of pride, then does calling
something ‘mine’ beg the question?
This

is critical

examine perceptions
is

And

take towards our selves, there
also

what the notion of mine means.

is

can be positively described, except to say
that
in

self as an

self as an active subject looking
at itself is also gestured

unresolved however,

indicates a relation between

we

is

to

Hume's

that (2)

critical

belong

to

method

it.

as

it

relies

As we noted

upon a

therefore,

do they belong

emphasis added)

As

to self;

and

how

Hume

above,

a problem regarding the relation of the perceptions
to the

self that can (1)

self:

is

aware

that there

“After what manner,

are they connected with it?” he asks.
(252,

a relation the connection between the self and
,

(its)

perceptions

is

brought about through the imagination:

The

identity,

which we ascribe

to the

mind of man

one, and of a like kind with that which

animal bodies.

It

proceed from a

like operation

The operation
of this table before

fictitious

ascribe to vegetables and

of the imagination upon

like objects. (259)

of resemblance: as the different perceptions

are very similar to each other, the perceptions are related

principle of association such that the relation of resemblance

imagination, and

only a

cannot, therefore, have a different origin, but must

at issue is that

me

we

is

my thoughts

does not explicitly answer

travel easily

how

such a

train

is

I

by

have

the

produced by the

from one idea of the table

to the next.

This

of thought produces the idea of identity,
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however. And,
as

we know
As

does not explain what the

it

that

we

able to be collected together, reflected
on as a group, what the past

perceptions have in

perceptions in

common

common

is

my mind. When

might be tracing over as

or what

is

the

I

is

that they

that

I

I

were mine. What the remembered

had them.

reflect

I

do not have other people’s

on them, consider them, compare them, what

my thinking progresses,

next, is their resemblance as

who

of the mind would involve

don’t have perceptions of it which could
resemble one another.

perceptions can have in

the

fictitious identity

easily

moving from one

my memories. Hume seems

to

train

idea to the

be raising the tricky issue of

having the perceptions:

But, as, notwithstanding this distinction and separability,

whole

I

of perceptions

to

be united by

we suppose

the

identity, a question naturally

arises concerning this relation

of identity; whether it be something that
really binds our several perceptions together or only
associates their ideas
in the imagination. That is, in other words, whether in
pronouncing
concerning the identity of a person, we observe some real bond among
his perceptions, or only feel one among the ideas we
form of them. (259)
This question of a real bond

among

perceptions or the feeling of a bond

question of what connects the perceptions in general, what

of identity

to

them

possible.

As Hume does

is it

identity,

required for the perceptions to be connected into discrete objects

objects,

and

itself into a

so:

“.

that

.

.

effect,

when

some

is

strictly

customary association of ideas.” (259-260) Thus

perceptions, “For from them

it

the ascription

what seems
act

the understanding never observes any real connexion

even the union of cause and

the

not want to argue that the objects

themselves cause the perceptions of them to be unified into

which does

makes

that

is

evidently follows, that identity

tells

of mind

among

us regarding

nothing really

belonging to these different perceptions and uniting them together; but
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be

examin’d, resolves

Hume
is

to

is

merely a

quality

which we

imagination,

attribute to them,

when we

But there

is

reflect

the key:

reflection, or reflection

because of the union of their ideas

upon them ” (260, emphasis added)

what

is

it

that is

doing the reflecting? What

on our perceptions such

that the principles

activated so as to associate the principles
in such a

imagination that

it

seems

that

having an

we have

Hume

Hume

Identity he has told us

is

is in

we have of being

in the

could be,

a self, of

to require

some

act

this self-reflection

the faculty of memory in terms of the
attribution of identity.

a quality

we

attribute to perceptions

Memory is

“because of the union of

critical to this uniting

remembered

that perceptions

of ideas

seem

in the

to take

on a

another that might help solve the problem of personal identity

terms of how the self can reflect on

its

perceptions.

The difference between having

a perception

involve the distinction between a perception

I

of association are

this reflection

does not seem able to problematize what

relation to being

way of resembling one

is self-

produce the feeling

produced through the imagination seems

their ideas in the imagination.”
(260)

it

to

an identity? Without a model of what

He does examine

imagination as

way as

begging the question. The feeling

identity, that is

of self-reflection.
could be.

is

in the

I

am

it

and reflecting on a perception might

currently having and a perception that

once had. “[S]uppose we cou’d see clearly into the breast of another, and observe

that

success of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle, and suppose
that

he always preserves the

memory of a

considerable part of past perceptions;

‘tis

evident that nothing cou’d more contribute to the bestowing a relation on this

succession amidst

all its

variation.”

41

(260)

Hume

here

makes an important

distinction

regarding the source of the relation of resemblance regarding identity: the relation of
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resemblance

is

a product not

of qualities

original perceiving, but rather

resulting

it

is

that are in the perceptions
as a result

of the

a relation that relates qualities
of the perceptions

from a faculty of the mind.

Hume

continues,

For what

is

the

memory but a faculty by which we raise up the
images of
And as an image necessarily resembles its object,

past perceptions?

must

not the frequent placing of these
resembling perceptions in the chain of
t
ought, convey the imagination more

and make the whole seem
emphasis added)

What

is critical

different ways.

The

here

first

like the

is that

Hume

easily from one link to another,
continuance of one object ? (260-261

seems

the

Hume

a perceiver.

memory

word object

in

to refer to

an object having the perception,

continues from the above quote writing, “In this
particular, then,

not only discover the identity, but also contributes
to

its

production, by

producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions.
The case

whether we consider ourselves or others.” (261) Hume’s
necessarily resembles

two very

“object” seems to refer to perception as an
object of the faculty

of memory, while the second “object” seems
i.e.,

to use the

its

object” in order to

make

states that

the point that an

is

same

the

“an image

image of a past

perception resembles that (original) perception. Thus the “frequent placing
of these

resembling perceptions in the chain of thought would make
’

continuing object, as he

perception.

it

It is

states.

But

this

seem

like there

plausible that the resemblance of remembered perceptions

is

not Hume's point. That

personal identity— whether our

own

was one

one continuing object would be one continuing

makes what were successive perceptions seem

object; but this

it

like the

such that

continued existence of one

memory contributes

to our notion

or others’— is his claim. But
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is

how

of our

could resembling

perceptions (of past perceptions) produce
an easy transition in our thinking
that results
in a

notion of our

own

identity, rather than say, the
identity

How memory “contributes to
on

this succession [of perceptions]

relation of resemblance,

Two

perception.

[identity’s]

amidst

all its

and ostensibly what

is

this

production”

is

by “bestowing a

variation.” (260) This relation

relation

is

a

being compared are the remembered

questions must be raised here: what

such that they resemble one another and
what

of the object perceived?

is it

is it

that they

that they

have

in

have

in

common

common

such that

resemblance will contribute to the production
of our notion of “the successive

existence of a

mind or thinking person?”

being perceptions, but that seems
they are remembered. But

how

trivial.

Certainly the perceptions have in

Also, as memories they have in

common

common

that

could our thought following along the relation of

resembling past perceptions as remembered engender a
notion of the existence of a

mind? What

come from

is

it

that perceptions as

remembered have such

answer might involve what the differences

present perception and a

remembered or

has to do with time, a current perception

Hume

a

of mind could

the “easy transition of ideas” such resembling perceptions
produce?

Part of the

for

that a notion

past perception.

is

be related. But

between a current or

While the obvious difference

also a singular perception.

mere movement of the eyes causes

that current perceptions are

are

a

new

As noted

perception. Therefore,

it

earlier,

seems

only singular, while past perceptions can be compared, can

this doesn’t directly

answer how remembered perceptions are

part of the

production of personal identity. The idea of a past perception must involve something
else such that

its

them-produces

resemblance to other ideas of past perceptions— when we

a relation in the imagination.

What
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is

reflect

on

the (quality of) identity that

we

attribute to perceprions

we do

“because of the union of their ideas
in the imagination” such
that

not think of the objects of the
perceptions as identical over time,
but that

we

think

of ourselves as such?

As Hume

presents in the Appendix to the
Treatise he
,

presentation of the connection between
perceptions.

review of the section concerning personal
identity
labyrinth, that,

how

I

must confess,

them

to render

explanation of how

I

neither

consistent.” (633)

we

,

know how

I

He

was not

writes,

satisfied with his

“upon a more

find myself involv’d in such a

to correct

my former opinions,

The source of his consternation

attribute identity:

“when

I

strict

is

his

proceed to explain the principle of

connexion, which binds [perceptions] together, and
makes us attribute to them a
simplicity and identity;

I

am

sensible, that

nor

my account

is

real

very defective.” (635)

[Perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only
be being connected
together. But

no connexions among

understanding,

Hume

tells us.

“We

distinct existences are ever discoverable

only

feel a

thought, to pass from one object to another.
finds personal identity,

when

mind, the ideas of them are

reflecting

felt to

It

on the

by human

connexion or a determination of the

follows, therefore, that the thought alone

train

of past perceptions,

that

compose

a

be connected, and naturally introduce one another.”

(635)

What he cannot

render consistent seems to be the fact that (a)

attribute to successive perceptions

perceptions and (b)

we do

the

mistakenly

an underlying identity which unifies those

same thing with our

our misplacing onto the perceptions our

we

we

own

selves. This mistake (c) results

from

experience via the imagination whereby

think smoothly and continuously from one idea to the next due to their relations.
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But as

we

are ourselves only a collection
of perceptions,

how do we

successive perceptions in our thought
or consciousness”?
(636)

(d) “unite our

What

is

it

that

marks

the difference

between just thinking one thought and
then the next, and the linking
of

them together

in

such a

way

connecting possible? Even

connexions among

how

can

we have

Hume
reflecting

identity.

on

its

it

is

just a feeling

aware of the demand
such that

it

We know that the mind cannot be a

perceptions as

We also know
is

it

of connection, as

a notion of our selves such that

own perceptions,

our perceptions.

itself,

if

distinct existences are ever
discoverable

clearly

is

that their successive perceptions
are united?

constituted

that the

we can

in his

Hume contends,

if“no

then

locate this feeling?

account for a mind that

is

capable of

mistakes successive perceptions for
unified substance, underlying and uniting

mind

Hume

for

by them. Therefore

there

cannot be separated from
is

its

no perception of the mind

only perceptions. But, because perceptions are separable
and distinguishable, and

attributed to the

perceptions?

constituted

its

is this

human understanding”

because the mind can never perceive a connection between
them,

on

How

mind such

that

it

its

perceptions while

perceptions.

He

can identity be

can experience the feeling of connection between

Hume's explanation of personal

by

how

it

identity presents a

also invokes a

mind

mind

that is

that is capable

of reflecting

attempts to resolve what seems to be an aporia of mind in his

explanation of the role of memory as producing a relation of resemblance amongst the
perceptions.

How memory contributes to the ascription of identity to objects that are

not us does not help us understand

how we might

be the case, given Hume's earlier exposition,

on which memory could bestow a

relation

that

ascribe

it

to our selves.

For

it

cannot

we have any perceptions of our

of resemblance on.
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selves,

Ike Commonwealth: A
Hume

has one other analogy to explain
the

commonwealth. Here

self-reflection,

actor, is represented as a kind

in

Hume's

Model

Possible

text to the question

Because of his

where the

self:

self

of system. The turn

Humean Self-awar^oo

for

that

seems

to the

of a

political

split into a

commonwealth

of self-awareness rather than just personal

project, his presentation

of the mind and

its

like a

mind

that corresponds to/is a representation

must be a

different relation

neither

distant

is

the relation

between the mind and

between the self and

its

our mental

of its perceptions. There

analogous to understanding the

is itself

is

what holds

common

purpose

is its

causal relation between the perceptions? Certainly,

writes,

for example,

42

death) changing ‘body.’ This

its

perceptions, nor

activity.

purpose of the commonwealth

Hume

its

We can sense here how the commonwealth analogy,

is

its

“Memory

production.” (261) But

in constant flux.

new members,

i.e.,

its

birth

causal connection. But what

we remember

and

is

the

our perceptions.

not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to

how do memories of perceptions

perceptions) hold together?

The

identity together despite

constantly (and necessarily due to the need for generating

And, as

identity.

perceptions such that the mind

its

Like a commonwealth, the mind has identity yet

common

back

perceptions would be, by Hume's empiricist method,

suggests that understanding personal identity

is

a turn

from them nor determined by them. Both pictures
or understandings of

rendered meaningless.

system that

is

awareness of itself cannot be

separate like that of a distant (and all-knowing)
observer watching

connected

viewer and an

“As

to causation

he writes,

107

(or

remembered

th

the ,rue ,dea ° f ,he

hUman mind

fpercept, ons or different existences,is *°

IT*
f
ogether u
by i
the relation
of cause and effect,
destroy, influence,

Causation

is

and modify each

Hume

force at

Hume

and mutually produce,

that they

“chace” each other.

likens to the

In this respect,

I

as being in a relation of cause
and

movement of the impressions and

comes from principles of the mind,
belief that

are link'd

the product of the association
of perceptions in the imag, nation.

depicts the

work such

which

other. (261)

We take impressions that are constantly conjoined
effect.

a as

’

It is

ideas as having a kind of

this relational

movement which

but yet engenders practices of custom
based on

commonwealth:

cannot compare the soul more properly
to any thing than

to a republic or

commonwealth, in which the several members are
united
by the reciprocal ties of government and
subordination, and give rise to
other persons,

of its

It

is

who

propagate the same republic in the incessant
changes

parts. (261)

not the ties between the

of government and subordination.

members which
At

unite the

commonwealth, but those

this point in the Treatise

we have

presented with any analysis of what government might
be. But from what
intimates here,

it

seems

that the ties

of government are

like the principles

not been

Hume

of the mind:

they are given and structural though evidenced through
the activities they engender,
relations

between members or perceptions. The associations are the

commonwealth and

the

mind

both.

As

i.e.,

stuff of the

such, the content of those associations-the

individual people and the impressions and ideas— are always changing. 44

The

relations

between them— which

is

the source

it

seems of their

identity

through or despite their diversity-appear to be a kind constant in that they are produced
through the structures of the government and the mind. But positing such a constant

108

is

problematic for
the

Hume

as

it

could encourage an epistemological
claim that

mind by simply knowing

‘substance’

model he

is

we can know

the structures of the mind, echoing
too closely the

trying to critique. 44

Hume

thus continues the analogy by

presenting the government itself as
changeable: “as the same individual
republic
not only change

its

members, but also

same person may vary

his character

its

laws and constitutions;

and disposition, as

maintained through changes of both

its

people and

its

manner

well as his impressions

ideas, without losing his identity.”
45
(261, emphasis added)
is

in like

The

may

the

and

identity of the republic

structure, and, correspondingly

the identity of a person continues through
changes of both the character of his person

and the perceptions of his mind.

I

think this marks a critical

development of a new model of self-awareness,

move

in

Hume's

for he is here presenting the

mind

as a

diversity both in terms of its ‘content’ and in terms
of its structure. Both have

incomplete

this

identities,’ identities that are

does not answer then what identity actually

change— it does begin
It

makes,

to

to offer a

in short, identity

relation of the

is

maintained despite/through change. While

new way to

look

that is suggested,

have a clear theory of self-awareness, or

commonwealth,
analogy.

stress here

it

is

maintained through such

at the relations

or dynamics involved.

however, needs more analysis

if

Hume

self-reflection.

on the diversity of both the body and the government of the

the perceptions and the perceiver, if you will, returns us to the theatre

We can now see that the presence of the

theatre suggests

—how

no longer conceivable as a one-to-one correspondence. The

many-to-many

Hume’s

is

two notions of diversity: there

is

‘audience’ in the metaphor of the

the presence of other persons as part

of the very constitution of the self and the multiple performances of the
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self through

its

(own) perceptions
changes, so too

46
.

Hume

As

assumed

the perceptions

‘sees’

Hume

The

body and

I

is

its

its

identity through

identity through

perceptions and

its

its

that introspects

there

is

double changes.

character. There

I

inside

its self)

in

is

minds or persons become resolved; he

(who looks

still

want

is

think the

I

is

can change and that

the person will be considered the same.

present in Hume's analogies of personal
identity

of doubling of difference, or what

double

its

the structure of the republic,
just as there

talking about

can also change, and

To summarize,

awareness

its

not lose

and the character or person (doing the
perceiving). Here

talking about both.

I

the self are both

in both the

debates about whether

which the

commonwealth does

says the self does not lose

What can change about
difference

the

to call a

“double otherness,” to

a kind

is

self-

47
.

Critical to thematizing this double-otherness,
is developing a

way to

appreciate not only the diversity of perceptions and
the diversity of perceivers, but the
relation

in

it

of both diversities together. While

Hume s
is this

of a double relation

chapter on the passions, particularly in the passion of Pride,
as

double-otherness of sense of difference that

whereby how (and what) we perceive our
in the

this notion

mind. Although

the disposition

foreclosed by

Hume

his reliance

self (to be) is already defined

developed

we saw

above,

on a model

by

the structure

gestures toward the need for a foreign object in order for

we have towards

its

is lost in

is

pride to be elicited, the ‘foreigness’ of this object

pre-selection, as Baier says,

by

the disposition of which pride

effect.
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is

is

the
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Treatise. 291.

Alth ° u Sh Descartes does in fact
state that the activity of the
mind is so reauired
or the idea of any nature outside
of myself he does not make an argument that
would
upport this distinction. While I cannot
present fully here what my argument
is that all
ideas of natures require the activity
of the mind, I do think that Descartes
does not
prowde a strong argument against including
the nature of the self amongst
those ideas
t require the mind
s activity. Certainly he
presents the wax example in a way that
s ugges ts strongly that knowledge
of the nature of the wax and knowledge of
the nature
of the self have some things in common.
He asserts at the end of the Second Meditation
lat the mind is known more
easily than physical things, but he
doesn’t support this with
any argumentation.
,

I cannot develop this
point here, but, as I allude
achievement of self-knowledge within the paradigm
of

to in the last chapter, the

self-certainty has important
implications for the achievement of the position
of objective knower. The limits of the
modem epistemological subject is constitutive of the limits

of modem moral subject,

especially in terms of the notion of impartiality.
While feminist philosophers and others
lave analyzed the construction of the position
of the impartial subject in terms of the
erasure of one’s particularity, I think the notion
of ‘neutralizing’ the subject-I adds
something important to such analyses. Neutralized, the
subject-I’s role as a

producer of

ideas, including the idea

of itself,

is

erased so that what

knows passes

as nonboth maintained and shaped into the form of
the universal rational subject-I through this move.
In the next chapter I address more
thoroughly the question of how to address the subject-I’s role
in the production of its

subjective.

The agency of the

ideas (including itself) in a
effect of)

its

subject-I

is

way which does

subjective perspective.

it

The

neither denies

its

agency nor erases

(the

recent debates about agency and

foundationalism have entailed what I consider to be a false dilemma
between a free
agent and a determined non-agent in part because I think they have
failed to offer a way
to grasp the complexity of the subject-I. I offer that
self-knowledge engenders a way to
thematize the subject-I differently.
It is

important to be clear here about

knowledge the

self claims to have about

relevant to the self s sense of itself, of what
later in the dissertation as

I

theorize

how

my terms.

itself.

It is

its

I

consider self-knowledge to be

knowledge

ontology

is.

that is particularly

This becomes important

the notion of ‘identity’

is

a form of self-

knowledge which evidences the self as (capable of) knowing its own nature. Selfawareness is not a knowledge claim or a proposition, but is rather an epistemic
111

elationship in

which

the self is positioned in
relation to itself as a

knower

It is

a

reh“ 10nsh p that both institutes
epistemic possibilities and reflects
rnetanh^
aphysica assumptions. Thus, how
this relationship is configured
( 1 ) affects the kind
of self-knowkdge
'

that

can be produced and
(2) reflects assumptions concemTng the

relationship between epistemology
and ontology.

Hume

I am suggesting
in this chapter that
challenge to metaphysical claims
about the self is limited because
h/assumes

s

determining relationship between epistemology
and ontology such
constitutes what we are. This
assumptions thus figures
subject-I

who must

be able to introspect

its

that

a

how we know

self-awareness as entailing a
epistemic contents. Thus the split-self
is

reproduced and no possibility for a radical
self-knowledge
helpful to call this splitting self-awareness
rationalist

is

available.

It

might be

self-reflection.

Because part of the problem here seems to
be the way in which the seifs
epistemological capacities are assumed to
determine its conception of its ontology
suggest an alternative version of self-awareness
must offer a way for the subject to
consider differently the relationship between

I

how

(or could be) such that the relationship

n other words, not only should

know
with a

Humean
is

we know

how we know ourselves (and what we
not necessarily what we are, but a critical
epistemology in line
cntique of the metaphysical self should also

ourselves as)

ontology that

it knows itself and what it
thinks is
between thinking and being can be challenged,

that

is

insist

identical with

an epistemology.

I

upon

the refusal of an

cannot present fully here the

rationalist

conception of the relation between knowing and
being, but I do suggest in the
following two chapters how such a critical epistemology
might be possible. What
Hume does give us, as I develop in this chapter, is the first step to this
reconceptualizing
of this relation: he provides us with a problematized
notion of the self.
This

is

where some commentators could connect Hume's position

to a

more

traditional rationalist one.
8

This two-fold task leads to an aporia such that a knowing self
is posited but yet
cannot be addressed. My listing of the two aspects of his task might
be misleading as it
leaves out the fact that he gets to the alternative ontology via
his critical epistemology.

What

thus needs to be reconsidered

different way,

Foucault examines one possible

between the

subject-I

way this can happen by envisioning

and the object-I

epistemological terms. In the

how to conceptualize the seifs ontology in a
we can know about the self. The next chapter on

is

not based on what

i.e.,

last

in ethical

chapter

the relationship

and aesthetic terms rather than

in

begin to discuss the possibilities of a
cannot know, though I am not yet convinced
I

conceiving an ontology through what we
that this can provide the radical model of self-awareness that

I

am

looking

for.

an act of self-perception, the self is both a perceiving subject and a perceived
object. For Descartes, as I have argued, this split threatens the certainty his method
In

demands, for

it

suggests a possibility of difference within the notion of self-knowledge.

How can one know
one

is if its

for certain that the self one perceives oneself to be is in fact the self

possible that they could be different? Descartes resolves this question by

112

making

the self a thinking substance,
and thus erasing the (possibility) of
such a

difference.

aware
p.

251,

vaiiauian rmiusopnicai Keview 14 ISpp 7S)401.

There

is

Some

attacking.

much

discussion in the literature on what exactly
it
it is only philosopher’s
concept of strict

critics think

others contest that

it is all ascriptions of
identity.
the self as person while others, the self
as mind.

Some
I

Hume

consider

is

that

Hume

is

identity, while

Hume’s attack is about
is much ambiguity in

think that there

regarding this issue, but also suspect that he
shifts his attention to different
aspects of philosophical notions of self in
order to accomplish his own mission. I will
try to present this line of argument
throughout this
paper.

1

Taken

together, these ‘split’ selves

rationalist epistemology,

known-is
1

and

which constitutes

that

make up

their relation-the

the subject-object paradigm of

unimpeded knower and

the transparently

rationalist self-knowledge.

Some commentators such

as

Penelhum consider

notion of personal identity

is

more

view. Penelhum, ibid.

that

Hume

holds that any

the result of a mistake, while others, consider the
‘mistake’
to be a metaphysical conception of personal
identity as strict identity.
position is

My

in line
14

sure

with the

latter

The language of Hume’s comparison here

how much we

can make use of it.

It is

is

very interesting, though

I

am

not

interesting that he does not put bundle or

collection in the plural form, but instead leaves it singular. Mankind
is one bundle, one
collection. They are a bundle. While I think this does not suggest
that together we
make a bundle, it does seem that Hume is going to some pains to avoid making

any kind

of individual ascription of what a person
15

Here we can begin

to see the tricky

Treatise he indicates that that the bundle
assert or claim to

is.

know any more

than

is all

Hume

many places in the
we can know and hence we just cannot

bind

is in.

In

In other places he does struggle with
presenting not simply a limit of our reasoning but also a positive account of what the
self is. This attempt to provide a positive account seems to be key to his critical attack
that.

on metaphysicians (it is the strength and the weakness of his approach): he does not
want merely to reveal the weaknesses of their reasoning, as he wants to limit
scepticism’s critique. Thus Hume presents both an alternative epistemology and the
notion of what the self is that could be consistent with such an epistemology. It seems
without the noumenal/phenomenal distinction that Kant’s transcendental philosophy
provides,

Hume

assert a limit to

and silenced

cannot develop a

critical

epistemology that would

what we can know about the

at

once allow him

to

self that critiqued the rationalist dogmatists

their scepticist critics.
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Hume

raiger,

on Finding and Impression of
the Self”

Hume

Studies

1

1

(

A p 85)

48^

My mtentlon

ln thls dissertation is not
to argue that the relation
between the
perceptl0ns (or any thln or Ptaelice
that mtght be considered
s
constitutive of
the
H such as ,ts actions, its relations
he eself
with others, or the social and
oh.“aTposh,o„s
P
t assumes or is
assigned) is either identical or
different. Instead, my goal is
to suggest
how such a choice ,s problematic as both
claims entail (a) posittng ,
capable of making this claim, and (b)
conceiving of the relation between
the self and
those practices in a totalizing way.
What is critical for Foucault, as I present
in the next
chapter ts resisting this impulse to
totalization. What I would like
to note here is the
poss.b'hty Hume offers for theortzing
the relation between the self and
its pernep, ons
differently as he presents the self as
both a product of its relations a*/
separate or
distinct from them. Hume is unable
to theorize this dual relation of
identity and non-

a

self

-.

° Ug

e

m

b h
which

° es presem the pr0blem

that, construction or constitution

determmed by those perceptions,

-

Whal we need

10 consider <s the

of the seif happens such

that

it

is

way

in

not fully

(without resorting to a substance, given,
a priori
use the notion of the ‘desire for
self-knowledge,” as a way to
approach the constitution of the self through its
relations of identity and difference with
self).

its

In chapter 5,

etc.,

1

constituents.

Hume is perhaps troping Descartes here as he not only takes
on a more
obviously autobiographical tone, but then suggests
that he might only be existing when
he is perceiving. “When my perceptions are
remov’d for any times, as by sound sleep;
so long am I insensible of myself, an may truly
be said not to exist.” (252)
20

According

to Traiger, ibid., Descartes'

assumptions regarding selftransparency were widely shared. “Philosophers who
did not share Descartes’
rationalism still held the view that we are intimately
conscious of ourselves, and that our
awareness of other things enhances our self-awareness, and
is epistemically dependent
on it. Butler claimed that our awareness of ourselves was
beyond doubt, since to doubt
that awareness presupposes that we already have
it.
Whenever we ‘turn our thoughts
upon ourselves we have ‘certain conviction, which necessarily
and every moment, rises
within us’ of our personal identity.” Pp 46-47. Quote from
Joseph Butler’s The Analogy

of Religion,

in

John Perry,

ed.,

Personal Identity (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1975), 103.
2

seem

to

Hume

argument against the substance self and my reading of it, together,
beg the question of self-reflection in a certain way. While I am contending that

his claim that

we

s

are collections of perceptions leaves us unable to do the self-
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exam.nanon
at

we

'

that

H
Hume

doesn

that his

method of critique

upon,

relies

recognize that he reaches his
claim
of this method.

I

are nothing but bundles through
his application

Um
i

W1 " re
th S ‘ SSUe of posscsslon later
!°
. but
raises the idea of
perceptions as mine,
'

it is interesting to
note there
as “belong[ing] to self’ but he

my

really seem to explain that relation.
I suggest that he
can’t, that doing so would
involve positing not only a notion
of self, but moreover, a notion of
knowing that self, a
aim regarding self-awareness that he is
not able to make without falling
h back into the
very paradigm he is trying to debunk.
t

Wlth Hume
^difference ubetween
of
a ' COrdanc e

'

epistemology, neither a relation of identity
nor a
its perceptions will yield
self-knowledge
while also critiquing the metaphysical
notion of self. We need thus a notion of
selfawareness a relation between the self and what
it knows of itself, that
can engender
self-knowledge by approaching this relation as
something other than difference or
r
l
fion
rela

s

the self and

identity.

have not yet found any commentator raise the
point of why we don’t mistake
way and see what is identical as diverse. Certainly Hume
writes of our
tendencies to make things easy on the mind, to be
epistemologically lazy, and so it could
be assumed that he thinks identity-making is more
smooth and easy on the mind than
difference-making. As we shall examine in the next
chapter, Baier’s claims that there is
much more behind the principles of association, especially in
terms of where they come
from and why they would tend towards identity rather
than
I

the other

difference.

There is much to note about the way in which Hume uses the
passive voice
and other awkward grammatical forms. He is clearly trying
to avoid (or

at least raise as

problematic) putting forth an agentic self or mind

made

who

does things. Often, the mind

is

do things or is acted upon. When not presented as passive, its
activity seems
encouraged by forces outside of itself. “The qualities, from which this
association [of
ideas] arises, and by which the mind is after this manner
convey ’d from one idea to
to

another, are three...

(11, emphasis added) The mind is doubly passive here. Its activity
a copy, mirroring that of the ideas, and the activity itself seems to
move the mind.
The qualities convey the mind rather than the mind conveys the qualities. I contend that
is

Hume

cannot present the mind as so active because his claim

is that this

up of its associations. The self (itself) is a product of associations,
in latter section of this chapter on “Of Pride and Humility.”
26

The connection between

particular, has

been a

the passions

and the

self,

mind

is

indirectly, as

made
we see

and pride and the self in

common

focus point for those interested in Hume's critique of
personal identity and his presentation of self-awareness. My impetus for exploring the

passion of pride

is

slightly different.

a critique of personal identity in
I

disagree with

is

that the

Campolo on

I

Book

agree with those like Christian Campolo,
I

his reading

and a presentation of self-awareness
of self-awareness

supposed contradictory usage of

5

‘self in
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in

Book

II

Hume's Treatise

in

who

Book

see
II.

however. His point
is

less controversial

became

marks

a change in usage for Hume.
How Hume uses self in Book II for
p olo, reflects his rejection of a Cartesian substance
self and an acceptance of
selfawareness. Gunpolo seems to think
that Hume has no problem
with self-awareness that
he accepts it without problematizing
it.
I think that Hume
doesn’t immediately accept
self-awareness but is trying to find a
way to have self-awareness that doesn’t
reinstate a
Cartesian substance self. I think he
considers this necessary in order for
him
to make
claims about human nature. He fails
in Book II to present such
a model of selfit

COmm0nwealt h
“7,1
hematize H
Hume new paradigm

Book I may seem to offer a promising way
of self-awareness. But I maintain that
Hume fails to
realize the potential of this analogy
because his project involves grounding
his analysis
of moral theory and politics on his
epistemology. This effects a separation
betweeiMhe
individual and the social such that
thematizing the perceiving mind
anal °gy i"

to

'

,

s

as a socially-

mind seems impossible for Hume. Chnstian
Campolo, “Unidentified
Awareness: Hume's Perceptions of the Self,”
Auslegung 18 (Sum 1992)- 157-166
relational

Hume

follows this distinction between direct and
indirect passions saying
I cannot at present
justify or explain any farther. I can only
observe the
general...
It is beyond the scope of
this chapter to analyze this fully,
but it is
interesting to note when in the Treatise
Hume simply states that he cannot justify his
claims. There are many places throughout
where he either states that “‘tis certain” that
something exists and need not be doubted, but there
are also these other moments where
he states that he cannot offer an explanation.
Both moments mark limits to his system,
though I think they do so in different ways. For example,
Hume begins section Book II,
1 .2 stating that he cannot
give complete definitions of the passions. “The
utmost we can
pretend to is a descnption of them, by an enumeration
of such circumstances, as attend
them. (277) We can begin to see here how Hume has
been considered to be the
‘father’ of logical positivism and perhaps, everyday
language analysis. See Stroud on
this topic, Stroud (Routledge and Kegan Paul, New
York: 1977).

This distinction

28

See Robert Paul Wolff, “Hume’s Theory of Mental Activity,” The
Philosophical Forum 69 flu! 960V 294.
1
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two

«

For Hume,

distinct kinds,

‘"all

which

the perceptions of the
I

enter with most force and violence,

comprehend

human mind

shall call Impressions

and

we may name

Ideas.

resolve themselves into

.Those perceptions, which

.

impression and under
;

this

name

I

our sensations, passions and emotions.” (1) Impressions can be further
categorized into original or immediate impressions which are our sensations, and
secondary or indirect impressions which are our passions and emotions.
These
all

(275)

indirect impressions are also importantly referred to as impressions of reflexion.

Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original
ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea..
passions, and other emotions resembling them.” (275)

.

Of the second

Hume

are the

limits his investigation to

and specifically focuses on the “violent” ones, “the passions of
love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility.” (276)
reflective impressions
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mind

in

lhat

Hume's

criticism of phtlosophers who
rclv on
f f° CUSeS ° n JUS ' tHiS C ' aim
of
“nscousness.
?he
he fest^e
first line of
Of Personal Identity”:! reads as follows:
“There are some philosophers
’
who imagine we are every moment intimately
conscious of what we call our Self/

mpta

.

0”5

‘

he

S<

oT^fp

While I am using the term ‘cause' here,
it must be
causa! connections are connections
produced through

remembered that for Hume
They are relations

association.

produced through associations in the
imagination.
cause of something else because of the
mistake

We believe that

we make

conjunction.

e

something

is

the

regarding their constant

same

qualities, when transfer’d to subjects,
which bear us no relation
the smallest degree either of these
affections.” (285) I might feel joy at
my friend s dinner party but I feel pride about my own. It is
also not trivial that I do not
teel pride about my self without
some other thing through which I relate to myself.
There must be a way in which I take myself as
an object of pride if I feel pride in my
self. Thus, there must also be
a way in which I assume a position of a
subject who takes
herself as an object as well.

mfluencenotm

33

Hume

uses lots of visual metaphors regarding the relation
of the passion of
It is interesting that in these
metaphors it is the passion
who seems to be the one looking. For example: ‘“tis absolutely
impossible...that these
passion shoul d ever look beyond the self...” Sometimes
there is no subject of the gaze
and the looking is put into a passive voice: “Here at last
the view always rests, when we
are actuated by either of these passions.” But
it also seems
pride and

its

object, the self.

we are doing the
the passion: “...nor can we, in that situation of mind
that

looking

when we

are actuated

by

ever lose sight of this object.” (286)
4

As we

will see the

motion of the foreign object engenders the turn of the
motion of the turn engenders the activation of the self.

passion

s attention,

Thus,

can be said that the foreign object

it

and

this

this foreigness (or otherness)

is the ‘cause’ of the self. How to maintain
of the self through self-awareness is the goal of this

dissertation. Hume introduces this idea, but fails to create a
model of self-awareness
which can address it as foreigness. I contend, though development of this point will
have to wait until the last two chapters, that maintenance of this foreigness offers a way

move beyond the limits of rationalism’s approach
ethical way to have self-awareness.
to

to the self,

and

it

engenders an

35

It could be argued that it is not obvious that my entire self
cannot be my
property— consider Locke’s famous quote, “Every man (sic) has a property in his own

person....

self who

’

I

is

individual

suggest, however, that a notion of self-ownership

doing the owning and a self who

qua a

is

still

being owned. This self need not be the

particular individual, but could be the individual

universal Individual. Being a

requires a notion of a

member of the group of Individuals
117

qua

the abstract

thus engenders a

of the self into particular self and
universal self such that the
concent of (and
perhaps rights to) self-ownership is
possible. While I cannot address
adequately the
re dmg ° f the °' i,ical s
P
^’
P lit ' self (the coirelate of the epistemological
'l u
lnht\
spl
t-self on which
it is conceptually
dependent) provides an interesting way
to theorize
Ct
WhiCh denied Cer,ai " P“ple-wo m en.
non w
splitting

1

T

nut msSe Iff‘°™ ersh 'P'

The

Je” eg

the

split-self can

be seen as a kind of ‘accomplishment’
or
•nrivi le 86 S
h ' hat those who were recognized
as being Individuals were capable
of
h
fd
(and thus
entitled
to) the right of owning their
selves.
!

If

mu
o Hume

dld n

1

°!

k " <m

some

s

account,

I

would not

was mine but thought that it might be,
according
pnde until believed that it was mine.
Conversely^
was not mine, I would accordingly, no longer

thin *

,

feel

.

I

ound out some beautiful object
1 was unsure of the
ownership of the property and

pride. If

indicate that

A
1

did consider

I

ette

Ba

‘

er ’

"

it

mine,

HUme

’

S

it

did feel pride, this would

seems.

A " alySiS 0f Pride ” Journal

978)- 29 30
38

feel

I
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Both resemblance and cause and

effect are relations of association. Such
via the principles of association as the
imagination follows them like
a shadow, transitioning from one perception
to another. According to Hume, the
notion
of cause is, like the notion of personal identity,
a mistake whereby we ascribe to
separate perceptions which are ‘in constant
conjunction’ the relation
re ations are

made

of cause and

This mistake
assisted

by

a feeling that occurs as the imagination
relations between impressions produced in

moves from one

effect.

to the other,

accordance with the principles of

would seem then that the ascription of ‘cause’ to either the idea
of mine
idea of self would in effect, be equally mistaken.
The question I have concerns

association.

or the

is

It

the relation of the imagination to the direction
or pattern of the associations. Does the
way we make the ascription affect (or reflect?) the way in which the
imagination moves
or transitions from one to the other? Or does the
movement of the imagination merely
effect (in the sense
39

of produce or engender) the notion of cause?

This absence

at least, for

Hume, beyond

throughout the

T reatise

as it leaves the self in some sense beyond knowing, or
experience. This lack of description-which Hume refers to

is critical

,

stating repeatedly that such things about the self cannot be

known--can be thematized in one of two ways: as outside beyond our view in a way
which closes its possibilities and in a way which opens its possibilities. When the self is
presented as unknowable or as given in a way that no more can be said about it, then I
argue that it is easy for it to be rendered as identical to the structure through which or in

which it exists. For how do we differentiate between the self and the structure if there is
no way to know or refer to the self? There must be a way to mark the impossibility of
defining or explaining the self while also defining

it as different from the structure
Within the context of Hume's empirical method, the sticky
wicket of course, becomes doing so without positing an epistemologically privileged
self outside of experience. The last chapter of this dissertation on adopted identity

which seems

to

produce

it.
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attempts to thematize the difference
that

is

unknowable.

would

I

constitutive of the self as both
present and

like to stress that

what is at issue is not only that
Hume posits the self
lack of explanation or description
of it needs to be addressed For
gesturing toward the self as both
present and unaccountable
as existing but

how

is

is

however

,s

that this lack

interesting-

of address, lack of self-account can
easily allow

get turned into the self of the
status quo. How to
to co-optation is the concern
of this dissertation.

make

W

what hannens

the

the self as aporehc also
distant

41

Interestingly,

Hume does

not frame this looking into the
self in terms of
bu, into the breast of another. This
suggests to, here is in
h °d
WayS
° bSen,er lnV °' Ved
the invest >ga ' ion of Personal
identity. He
entoh
f
ends
this section
on the important of memory for the
production of personal identity
tating The case is the same whether
we consider ourselves or others ” (261) While
this might be true, Hume is definitely
skirting the issue of self-awareness
here by basing
his example on looking at another.
Though of course, the point may be that it is
as
impossible to look into his breast as it is to
look into my own: bu, by beginning with
the
other rather than with the self, Hume’s
analysis avoids

looking into one's

own

self,

T

’

might be able

raising the issue of how

to look at the

workings of my

We return to this point later.

Hume’s

way in which we know the mind
investigation. As will claim later, he does

influences the
his

own

I

it

is

that

imagination.

‘discovery’ that the activity of the

mind

both the strength and the weakness of
not know how to theorize this
is

constructionism other than through scepticism. See
Manfred Kuehn’s “Hume’s
Antinomies,” Hume Studies 9 tAp 1QKM- 25-45.

My claim, as

I will present below, is that
this analogy begins to suggest that
not simply maintained despite change, but because
of it. It is the difference
between the perceptions, between the members, and their
engagement

identity

is

in their relations

that constitutes the identity.

Hume
He

writes,

“.

.

If there

was no

difference, then there could be

no

identity.

clearly does not

.the

want to posit any kind of unifying substance as the
question concerning the substance of the soul is absolutely

self.

unintelligible: All our perceptions are not susceptible

of a local union, either with what
extended or un-extended.” (250) He also resists the positing of any
kind of
underlying structure which can be known a priori: “There is no
foundation for any
conclusion a priori, either concerning the operations or duration of any object,
of which
‘tis possible for the human mind to form a conception.”
(250)
is

5
1

cannot address

this fully here, but this

claim indicates a certain kind of

agency or volition on the parts of the republic and person
the Treatise

,

Hume

or agent of an act
Pride.) Here,

that

seems odd. Throughout

puts his claims in the passive voice such that

is is

who or what the actor
not clearly indicated. (This will be evident in the section on

however, he uses the active voice— a republic

119

may change

its

laws and a

(capable of being claimed

rstw^

The question of now

these

two

“ mfmite nUmber ° f

'

therS

,hmgs are -

multiplicities or diversities internet or are

my ideas and impressions and my relations
with other persons that the kev
non-metaphys,cal approach to self-awareness
is to be found
think Tanlaoh
6
problem of theorizing this the last
chapter of this dissertation
relations of
to a

I

e ' 0lherneSS Wi "

‘

hematiZed

of ‘adopted W^ntit'
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^

l

m ° re P ° SitiVely m my preSentatio"

I don tfeel that it is necessary
to know exactly what I
am
The main interest in life and work
is to become someone
else
that you were not in the
beginning. The game
is worthwhile insofar
as we don ’t know what will be
the end
. .

1

One

s

way of no longer remaining

same

the

by

is,

the most singular part

definition,

of who I am

CHAPTER 4
CARING TO KNOW: DEVELOPING SELF-KNOWLEDGE
AS A
FOUCAULDIAN TECHNIQUE OF SELF

Introduction

Philosophers David

Hume

and Michel Foucault have many

common. Both have popularly been thought of as
negative critique than positive contributions.

sceptics

whose works provide more

Though they have

radically different

approaches to the notion of human nature, both
philosophers center
this topic.

style

Both pursue

their philosophical studies using

their research

methods which

and the content of their investigations. Hume’s Treatise

human

interesting things in

,

on

affect both the

for example,

examines

nature as an empirical phenomenon, while Foucault
presents his critique of

philosophy’s assumptions about the self through the writing
of history.

works have not unanimously been recognized

as philosophy,

As

such, their

and they themselves have

often been considered by their peers social scientists rather than
philosophers perse.

Most

relevant to our project

is

the fact that the works of both authors are

motivated by a critique of the metaphysical notion of the self as an
naturally given

self,

and

rationally

identical, unified,

knowable substance. Rather than assuming an a priori

each puts forth an idea of the unified self as a fiction created through and

121

2

constituted

by expenences and

practices.

Thus each questions

ascribe the notion of personal
or individual identity, though
natural activity of the

social activity

human mind as

of history and

polities.

the souree

last

chapter

we

presented in

in

Hume

terms of their approaches to the

Hume

self.

In the

explored the issue of Hume's “two
selves" and suggested that the
self

Book

of pride and shame

of the Treatise can be read as

II

part

of Hume's attempt to salvage

reflects a difference

for the self through the passions

between the selfas subject and the self as

We concluded that Hume was unable to grasp fully this

difference and utilize

his critique

to

investigates the

enough, both Foucault and

some notion of self-awareness. The “concern”
we have

object.

we have

of such tendencies, and Foucault
the

Interest, ngly

have also been accused of inconsistency

the tendencies

it

in the

development of a model of self-awareness consistent
with

of the metaphysical

inconsistency regarding the

implicit notion of

self.

self.

This chapter addresses Foucault's possible

In particular

it

concerns Foucault's “return to the

subject” in his later works in which he presents
the idea that the self can have what he
calls

an

ethical

relation of “care” with itself

The inconsistency

in question is less

with Foucault's presentation of the subject or self and
more with his presentation of self-

knowledge.

While

his

as in relation with

way we can

model of “care” seems
its

own becoming,

address this

self,

to offer a positive yet critical notion

is

it

unclear if this relation of “care” also offers a

and can be aware of it.

If

it

doesn’t entail a kind of caring

epistemic relation, then what the relation of self to itself is,
epistemic relation between the self and

encourage an undetermined openness

its

in

of the self

is

unclear.

Leaving the

becoming unspecified seems both

to

terms of the meaning of the relation the self has

122

W,th

itself,

and

to d.scourage a

becoming. Without a way

to

way to

thematize the difference between
the self and

mark such

a difference-even if it

shiftmg— the relation between the
‘two selves’ could collapse

is

into

relative

and ever-

one of identity, and

hence hamstring the critique of
traditional metaphysical
claims about the self that

paramount

I

knowing

to Foucault's

claim that

that

work

its

is

3
.

we can draw

out of Foucault's analysis of
“care” a practice of self-

would be consistent with

his earlier

work

critiquing such practices.

Taken

together in fact, Foucault's genealogical
analyses of truth and power and
his ethical
analysis of the seifs relation to itself
can begin to offer a political efficacious
model of

self-knowledge 4 which resists the

knowledge and
outside of the

offers a

knowing

way

modem demand

to thematize the

event.

to

know

knowing

the self as an object of

self without

While Foucault's notion of the care

assuming

a position

the self takes in itself

helps to render the self as a kind of on-going
aesthetic production, the articulation of a

kind of ‘caring’ self-knowledge

“work of art” an

I

claim, introduces into Foucault's notion
of the self as a

insistent re-assertion

of difference. The presence of this difference,

turn, discourages the relation the self
has with itself

in

from collapsing (or relapsing

perhaps) into a relation of identity. In other words,
rather than culling from Foucault's

work a

(totally)

non-epistemic model of the subject as some commentators
have

suggested as possible,

I

want

to claim a notion

a radical notion of the self and a challenging

Having developed throughout
the practices of self-knowledge

his

whereby

of self-awareness which can provide both

model of self-knowledge

work

5
.

a critique not only of the

self,

but also of

the self renders itself an object of knowledge or

Truth for itself and others, Foucault's turn toward the self has been received
somewhat
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sceptically.

His elaboration of this notion
of care and

its

political

tmpl, cations were, of course,
cut short by his untimely
death.

1

and ethical

would

that for Foucault's return to
the self through the tmperative
"take care

most effective

in terms

of fulfilling

its

it

has to be taken together with a
caring

the self. After presenting
Foucault's crittque of self-knowledge,

notion of self and

seems

of the self to be

promise of engendering more
posstble ways of

being one's self in contemporary
culture,

know

to

its

possibilities through being in a
relation

be his alternative to “know thyself,”

“caring for” the self without
potential as a

possibilities.

will suggest a

I

will then investigate

is

the self that

I

new model of self-knowledge, which
less sceptical than

address one

some

I

argue

is

know one

As

this

in

is

its

own

consistent with

terms of Truth. This

it

begins to suggest a positive

way

is

to

self completely.

—Take Care of The Self

^ rom

itself.

implicit in Foucault's notion of care,

other models offered as

s /^-ability to

will present his

sufficient for care's

think

(and perhaps required by) Foucault's critique
of self-knowledge

way to

whether or not

the self to be concerned with

model of knowing

I

of care with

some concept of self-knowledge

model of self that enables
1

like to suggest

to

of the Will

“Know
to

Thyself

Foucault’s Critique

Knowledge

Foucault traces throughout his work shifts in philosophical
thinking and cultural
practices

away from

imperative to

know

the imperative to care about the self and others and toward
the
the self.

knowledge, and analyzes

it

He

calls the force

of this

latter

command,

the will to

as a disciplinary practice using both his genealogical and

archeological methods. Understanding the term “discipline” as both the enforcement of
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rules as well as an area of

knowledge-or what he

calls

“episteme”-these methods

concern historical practices and
epistemological (or discursive) practices
respectively

Both methods question the relat.onship
between the product, on of knowledge
of the
and the production of the self or subject

make self-knowledge

7

They each ask what

.

The genealogical works look

possible.

such conditions, while the archeological
works look

at

are the conditions

at relations

6
.

self

which

of power as

systems of ideas of discursive

constructions as such conditions. Both
methods produce a kind of aporetic or

paradoxical reading of self-knowledge as
Foucault claims that neither makes

knowledge

how

really possible.

the acts through

conform

to social

Through

which the

norms such

his genealogical investigations, Foucault

self attempts to

that acts

know

itself (as

of self-knowledge are

is

produced through discursive practices such

asked about what the self is are already limited by those

way

to posit a self who

‘knowledge’

is

made

in fact

what he

known.
self is

I

we

relation

can be

There

is

no

of the terms through which such

split-self, i.e.,

an

I

who knows and

an

I

who

is

of practices of confession, for example, as we discuss below, the

into or constructed as a

is,

self-

see in Foucault’s works the dynamics of self-knowledge as

own knowledge. The knowing
knowledge

itself outside

have been calling the

In his analysis

made

know

to

calls acts

that the questions that

linguistic practices.

it

possible.

In short,

involving what

can

shows

an individual) force

of normalization. Through his archeological investigations,
he presents how

knowledge

self-

knowing

self is engendered

in Foucault’s analysis,

between the two

I’s

self by producing itself as an object of its

by rendering

itself

produced as the Truth of the

one of identity contracting
,
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knowable. As

self,

it

this

renders the

their difference into a relation

Which

reflects the dynamics-i.e.,
social practices-through

which

that

“knowledge”

is

rendered coherent. In other words,
while the self seems to be produced
as an agent of
its

own knowing,

is

it

through the practices of self-knowledge
as Truth being

determined by the disciplinary requirements

to

produce

itself as such.

In the

genealogical works, the ‘resolution’ to the
split or difference between the
the cost of the

knowing or

knowing through

its

acts

subject-I since the

knower

of self-knowing. There

is

,s

in fact

no way

because such an ‘active’ or ‘agentic’ subject
position

made

into

I

s

comes

at

an object of

to thematize a subject-I

in Foucault’s genealogical analysis

always-already entails conforming to the limits
of the power-knowledges through which

such agency

is

established.

Foucault calls

this objectification.

the subject loses

its

through which

assumes a purportedly agentic

resolution

it

that

known. As we

is

capacity for agency as

it

Through

becomes a fixed object by

objectification

the practices

position. In the archeological works, the

self-knowledge reflects the limits of the terms through which

will see in the later section

on Foucault's move

to “care

however, the relation between the self who knows and the self who

is

of the

it is

self,”

known need

not

be resolved into “identity,” since the difference between the selves
not only can be
maintained but must be.

Self-knowledge as Disciplinary Practice through
Obligations to Truth

Performing a kind of Nietzschean transvaluation, according

to Paul

Rabinow,

Foucault inverts the Weberian idea of the cost of rationality on the self 8 Rather than
.

conceiving of a self who must, for the sake of rational and ethical behavior, give up part

of what

it

knows

itself to be,

Foucault envisions a self who, before being able to
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renounce what

According

it

knows, must

to Foucault,

one wants

If

Weber

first

pay the cost of becoming a self
who can know

itself.

asks,

behave rationally and regulate one’s
action according to
what part of one’s self should one
renounce? What is the
ascetic pnce of reason?
For my part, I have posed the
opposite
question: How have certain kinds
of interdictions become the price
to

true principles,

.

.

required for obtaining certain kinds
of knowledge about oneself? What
must one know about oneself in order
to be willing to accept such
9
renunciation ?

For Foucault the question

about

itself,

but rather

self becomes a self, a

how do

human

is

not what

is

social, political,

a self or even

and

what can a

cultural practices through

itself.

it

works reveal
self,

nor even

of the

feels required or

Through

self.

self

is

make

is

intelligible to

itself so intelligible, especially to

institutional practices Foucault’s historical

something the self can claim

to

have a priori

a culturally determined or historically relative
version of knowledge

Instead, his analysis presents

how

how practices of self-knowing

are in fact

the self can be.

modem period of European

self discovered

to

of different

that self-knowledge is not

constitutive of what and

The

compelled

his explorations

is it

which the

subject, render that subject intelligible.
In particular, he

concerned with the practices through which
the self not only becomes
others, but

self know

by philosophy and

history, Foucault suggests, reveals not a natural

science, but practices of knowing through

brought into being as an object of knowledge. In what

is

which

the

considered his

genealogical works, Foucault traces through histories of such institutions
as prisons and

mental institutions the practices through which the self becomes an individual capable

of both being known and of knowing

itself.

In order to participate in the social order, he

claims, one has to produce oneself as a certain kind of subject. “All the practices by
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which the subject

is

defined and transformed,” he writes,
“are accompanied by the

formation of certain types of knowledge,
and in the West, for a variety of reasons,

knowledge tends

to

be organized around forms and norms

that

more

or less scientific.” 10

His genealogies are thus not intended
to trace back to the past a present
idea or
practice, nor to

intent

is

compare present concepts and ideas and past
ones.

to explore

how

an experience of something became possible,

experiences of our selves (and what experience
historical

moments. Rather than being the

is

and Punish and
,

free actions or

the History of Sexuality

power and systems of knowledge which make

it

how

it

our

theorized as) are different in different

phenomena of a

individual self, “experience” for Foucault in such
works as

Discipline

Instead, Foucault's

Madness and

Volume

/,

naturally

Civilization

,

reflects those relations

possible. In his History

of

of Sexuality, he

writes a history of what seems to have enabled the
“experience” of sexuality rather than
a history

of sexual

activities or

of political or social repressions. Madness and

Civilization traces not the history of the

mad, but the construction of madness such

the experience of madness (and consequently of sanity)

was rendered

that

possible.

Importantly, he describes experience “as the correlation between fields of
knowledge,

types of normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture.” 11 Thus the
focus

of undertaking a genealogy of sexuality, for example, he writes,

is

to analyze the practices

by which individuals were led to focus their
attention on themselves, to decipher, recognize, and acknowledge
themselves as subjects of desire, bringing into play between themselves
and themselves a certain relationship that allows them to discover, in
desire, the truth

Thus
which

it

of their being, be

his genealogies

became possible

if

it

natural or fallen.

12

of madness and prisons involve examining the ways

in

not necessary to recognize oneself as a subject of Reason
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and a subject of the

ways explore how

Law and/or the

State.

in these relations

truth

one

is

in different

of knowledge, normativity, and
subjectivity are

enacted by the self in his quest for Truth.
ascriptions that

These genealogical works each

It is

through one’s participation in these

recognized as both knowing oneself truthfully
and producing the

of oneself for others.

Self-knowledge as Self-discipline: Truth, Science
and Confession

Under

the force of the “will to truth,”

obligations for any subject

is

to

know

wntes Foucault, “one of the main moral

oneself, to

tell

the truth about oneself, and to

constitute oneself as an object of knowledge
both for other people and for oneself.” 13

According

knowledge

to Foucault, then, this production

is

double-edged.

means of becoming

On

of oneself as an object of one’s

own

the one hand, such a truth practice can be seen as
a

a (legitimate) subject, as

it

evidences oneself as a subject capable of

such knowing; on the other hand, because the practice of evidencing
oneself as such a

knower

is

limited

by

the discourses

and practices through which such knowledge was

possible, so the experience one can have as this

knowing

subject

is

also limited.

The

sense of moral obligation involved in what Foucault calls the obligation to Truth
can be

seen in the reliance in Western culture on the practice of confession. “Since the Middle

Ages

at least,

writes Foucault, “Western societies have established the confession as

one of the main

rituals

we

rely

upon

for the production of truth.” This establishment

involved a shift away from the practice of an individual as part of a social community,

being “vouched for by the reference of others and the demonstrations of his

commonweal

(family, allegiance, protection.” Instead, the individual
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“was

ties to the

authenticated by the discourse of truth
he
himself.

The

truthful confession

individualization by

was

was able or obliged

is

inscribed at the heart of the procedures
of

that historically self-knowledge
has provided

neither individuality nor freedom.

It

of naming oneself as a kind of being, or as
a being

act

inner truth,

is

in its

become

to

who

produce

The

itself as such.

has a soul which

is its

act

true

conformity to social norms and systems of knowledge
an

which shapes the “individual” and

claims, have

one with

has been the promise of such notions
that have

been the force by which the subject has
been coerced

its

pronounce concerning

power .” 14

Foucault's point here

nature,

to

limits

its

freedom. Acts of confession, Foucault

enculturated as part of the Western model of
subjectivity:

The obligation

to confess is now relayed through so many
different
so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive
it as the
effect of a power that constrains us; on the contrary,
it seems to us that

points,

truth,
it

is

lodged

fails to

do

in

our most secret nature, ‘demands’ only to surface; that if
because a constraint holds it in place, the violence

so, this is

of a power weighs

it

down, and

price of a kind of liberation

it

can finally be articulated only

at the

15
.

Identity as a Truth Obligation

Contemporary

acts

of confession for Foucault, where one produces oneself as

both having a nature to confess and being able to
practices as

“coming out”

as a gay person.

produced through the evidencing of what

is

When

know

that nature, can

be seen

one’s legitimacy as a subject

considered to be one’s inner

Foucault thinks the freedom of such a subject

is

truth,

in

such

is

then

limited through this act whereby one

limits one’s relation to oneself through this relation of identity. In an interview

discussing gay politics, Foucault states,
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Another thing to distrust is the
tendency to relate the question
of
homosexuality to the problem of
'Who am I?’ and 'What is the secret
of
my desire. Perhaps it would be better
to ask oneself, 'What
relations
0 “ 0 XUallt Can
eSlablished invented multiplied
and
modu ated? The
mollted
Th problem
m is not to discover in oneself
the truth of sex
6 SeXUaH ' y he " Cef° rth ‘°
arnVe * 3 muld P'>mty of
relationships^

^

By producing

'

*

ourselves through epistemologies
of truth whereby

ourselves knowable through our
"identities ”
discipline us on

two

'

levels:

we produce

we

are engaging in activities

produce the relation
to

to ourselves as

be” for Foucault, means that

calls,

man

versus

I

one of identity.

“I

I

how I am known

am

as a

and we

have internalized the disciplinary practices
of what he

known. Because

in the genealogical

(even to myself) for Foucault

is

who I am

penod of his

as a

research,

(only) through practices dictated to

through social and epistemological practices,
then
to this social construction.

be,

am what I know myself

taking the two systems together,
power/knowledges, such that

knower is who

which

woman,

etc.-which limit the possibilities of what
we can

we have

render

ourselves through normative
terms-which are

usually duahstic and hierarchical
such as straight versus gay,
rational versus irrational,

we

who am
I

as a

knower

is

me

so reduced

17

Turning toward s the Self Through Care: Technologies of the Self
It is

this notion

of the relation between the self and

with as he writes volumes

II

commentators have traced

in his

and

III

to the

work

is

History of Sexuality. The

itself.

The Will

to

Foucault struggles

shift that

many

one which moves from a focus on the

between power or discourse and the subject’s engendering,
subject and

itself that

Knowledge, as

I

to the relation

relation

between the

suggest above, constructs the subject
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within the paradigm of Truth
such that

active relation to itself is
rendered impossible.

its

If the subject is active at
all in its self-production,
as

practices as confession, then
practices

knows

it

is

which make self-knowledge

itself are thus constitutive

relation

so only in so far as

between the

I

defined in terms of its

of what

who can know and

own

the

power

possibility

relations

In

the

I

who

is

in

practices

to

be

such

in

to the disciplinary

whereby

the subject

can be, engendering an identity

can be known. This “can”

is

not

is

defined in this paradigm by what the
to

recognized as such.

be called his “ethical” work, Foucault

genealogical and archeological method, but in
a
relations

conforms

seems

through which such knowledge can
occur.

and systems of knowledge allow
to

it

that subject

of what a subject can be

what has come

certainly

individual or personal limits, but in
terms of what

intelligible to the social-political
structure

Thus

The

possible.

it

way that

still

utilizes his

highlights not the

power

and discursive formations which are the conditions
of knowledge, but the ways

which individual subjects act within and

in

accordance to such

limits.

His goal

is

not

only to show the historical contingency of knowledge
and the bankruptcy of the
concepts of truth of the

self,

but also to present

how

it

is

participating in the cultural practices of their historical
their

own

beings.

And

this being,

he points out, as

it

is

possible for subjects

moment

to

develop a concern for

engendered through actions

that

are aesthetic in relation to the production of the self, concern
not the seifs being as

given, natural, or truthful, but as a kind of becoming. This becoming

unfolding of life or

engages with
that

we must

its

human

own

activity according to a telos;

it

is

the

ways

is

not itself an

in

which the

self

differences through thought. Foucault's call in his later works

is

address this history of thought and examine the ways in which the self has
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thought about

itself

and

its

own meaning through

thinking concerns the ways in
which

we

can as

its

thoughtful becoming.

human beings

enact our subject, vity

differently, this is for Foucault,
ethical thinking about the self,
or care.
shift in the

As such

Describing the

focus of his work, Foucault says to
an interviewer:

Let’s say very briefly that through
studying madness and psychiatry,

cnme and punishment, I have

tried to

show how we have

indirectly

constituted ourselves through the
exclusion of some other: criminals,
mad people, and so on. And now my present
work deals with the
question: How did we directly constitute
our identity

through some
of the self which developed through antiquity
to

ethical techniques

now?

From “Normalization”
The

shift

of focus

shift in Foucault's

in the different

to “Problematization”

volumes of the History of Sexuality

understanding of his project which he

be a history of truth and

at others to

at

reflects a

some moments considers

to

be a history of thought. Reflecting on the process

of researching and writing these such

histories,

he writes that they involve “a matter of

analyzing, not behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their
‘ideologies,’ but the
p} oblematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily
thought— and the

practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed.” 19
Foucault’s
historical

work on Ancient

of Sexuality,

cultural practices in

Volumes Two and Three of the History

reflects his interest in presenting not a

mode of being

or living that might

serve as a model for the present, but rather what he calls a “problematic,” a
nexus of
practices and attitudes that engender certain configurations and possibilities of what
to

be a

human

engender ways

it

is

subject. “Problematics” are ethical in nature for Foucault, as they

in

which subjects can consider

the acts they
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do and the

rules they follow

m terms of the productive effects such
interested

him most about these

practices (askesis) have

practices

was

on

their selves.

that their organ, zat, on

was

on self-knowledge or self-understanding,
but was instead a “problematic”

on the seifs

relatton to

"The proper

task

human beings
live .”

20

its

own

not centered

that focused

freedom. Just reflection he calls
“problematization.”

of a history of thought,” he writes

“is to define the conditions
in

which

’problematize’ what they are, what
they do, the world in which
they

This problematizing

human beings

What

are not

is

both a sign of their freedom and
an enactment of it, as

by nature pre-determined

in either

what they are or how they

think.

Unlike Foucault’s earlier model
“docile” subjects

who make

in

themselves

which disciplinary practices engender

in the

image of the laws they followed, these

techniques of self or what he sometimes
calls “arts of existence” open up
a space for
subjects to practice their relation to their
selves differently. These cultural or
artistic
rituals,

he writes,
are those intentional

and voluntary actions by which men not only set
themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform
themselves, to
change themselves in their singular being, and to make
their life into an
oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets
certain stylistic
criteria .-

1

The major
through which

it

shift

is

here in the relationship between the self and the
processes

made

into a subject is in this notion

of problematization. Rather

than evoking a notion of determinacy or completeness, the
relationship opened up

through problematization

power and

discourse, the

relations outside

of the

is

one of possibility. As

possibilities

self.

we saw

at stake are

They subjected

above, in his genealogies of

those allowed or engendered by

the self and in that
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way

limited the self’s

possibilities as such.

for a recognition

By

focusing on problematizations,
Foucault’s genealog.es allow

of the ways

Because such participation
purpose or goal
self.

is

self,

a created product

is

which the self participates

in its

own

subjection.

undertaken by the self outside
of a discourse of Truth,

its

not to produce or to represent to
the self and to others the truth
of the

Therefore, there

whereby the

in

is

a

the form

way
it

in

which the self is able

takes,

to see the pract.ces as techniques

not an expression of inner self or
inner truth, but

is

of the seifs labor on

is

itself.

Techniques of Self

What makes
that

own

open up spaces

these problematizations possible are
actions in relation to the self
for acts

He

production.

of self-reflection whereby the self can be

calls these actions techniques or technologies

technology of the self

is

in relation to its

of self. The

furthers the analysis he has already pursued
regarding

technologies of domination, of production and of
signification. Technologies of the self

he writes, are

techniques that permit individuals to effect, by their own means,
a certain
number of operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own

own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform
themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a certain state of perfection,
happiness, supernatural power 22
thoughts, their

.

According

were engaged

in

to Foucault's

Greeks and Romans

such practices regarding their

in the first

and second centuries

diets, their sexual activities, their

marriages. This engagement took place through writing in notebooks and
public discussion with friends.^

What

is

relevant to our project here

analysis of these practices as entailing a relation between the self and
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is

its

letters,

and

Foucault's

being,

its

in

existence, that

subjectivity

is

not one of identity, that

by evidencing

whereby what

the self is

self that the self already

is

its

is

one

is,

to

is,

inside,

its

is

It

not identical to the

shifts here

from evidencing the

truth

of what

through practices of oneself. These practices,
though

actions, also

open up a space

according to Foucault. Self-knowledge
not objective.

As

such that one’s epistemological claims are
concomitant with what

producing what one

about the body and

the self undertakes.

these acts produce the self that the
self becomes.

The notion of self-knowledge thus
one already

its

inner truth. Rather, these activities
are creative acts

made by actions

is,

not one whereby the self performs

is

thus involved, but

serves another purpose which

historical investigation

for thinking about

is

more

it

is

not

what one

static,

is

not certain,

speculative. For Foucault, this

of ancient practices of self-knowledge broaden both our
ideas of

what such knowledge can be and how

it

can be used. These techniques of the self are,

he writes,

the procedures, which no doubt exist in every civilization,
suggested
or prescribed to individuals in order to determine their identity,
maintain
it, or transform it in terms of a certain
number of ends, through relations
.

.

.

of self-mastery or self-knowledge. In short, it is a matter of placing the
imperative to ‘know oneself —which to us appears so characteristic of
our civilization— back in the much broader interrogation that serves as its

What should one do with oneself? What
work should be carried out on the self? How should one ‘govern
oneself by performing actions in which one is oneself the objective of
those actions, the domain in which they are brought to bear, the
explicit or implicit context:

instrument they employ, and the subject that acts ? 24

From Subjection
The imperative “take
and

Roman

to Subjectivation

Through Care

care of the self’ Foucault finds implicit in Ancient Greek

practices as a kind of ethical principle.
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One was expected

to take

of oneself,

to take actions the

purposes of which were the cultivation
of the self and the

development of relations of oneself to
oneself.

‘'This ‘cultivation

of the

self,”’

he

writes,

can be briefly characterized by the
fact that in this case the art
of
existence--the techne tou biou in its
different forms-is dominated by
the
principle that says one must “take
care of oneself.” It is this principle
of
the care of the self that establishes
its necessity, presides
over its

development, and organizes

practice. But one has to be precise
here;
the idea that one ought to attend to
oneself, care for oneself (heautou
epimeleisthai ), was actually a very ancient
theme in Greek culture 25
its

.

While “subjection”
to practices

itself,

is

a process through

of power and discourse such

“subject! vation”

is

which the

that, as

we

self

will see,

is

it

constituted in relation

can

tell

the Truth about

a process through which the self is able to
recognize the rules

of Truth, the games of Truth through which notions
of true and

false are

produced and,

not escape them, but play with them. Subjectivation
opens up a gap between the
constitutive reality of the self, and the self s
possibilities for what Foucault considers

“ethical” reflection.

This

gap

that

engenders the possibility of ethical reflection

is

a conceptual

space between the self as an agent of its activities and the self
as a product of those
activities.

This space for Foucault

production in relation to

its

is

one

in

which the

self can think about

actions. This thinking about itself and

its

its

own

own becoming

Foucault calls care and he locates such care in ancient practices of self. “In the slow

development of the

art

of living under the theme of the care of oneself, the

first

two

centuries of the imperial epoch can be seen as the

summit of a curve; a kind of golden

age in the cultivation of the self.” 26 For Foucault,

this cultivation

137

of the self was not

excluding of the community, though

was

it

a relation

one had with oneself.

principle of care of oneself became
rather general in scope,” he writes.

He

.

,[T]he

continues

took the form of an attitude, a mode
of behavior; it became instilled in
it evolved into
procedures, practices, and formulas that
people reflected on, developed, perfected,
It

ways of living;

and taught.
constitute a social practice, giving rise
to relationships
individuals, to exchanges and
communications, and

institutions.

And

it

to the elaboration

gave

rise, finally to

of a science

a certain

27

It

thus

came

to

between
times even to

at

mode of knowledge and

.

Rather than histories on techniques of
domination or techniques of power or
discourse, this history of the “care” for the self
and the “techniques” involved, he states,

would “be

a

way of doing

the history of subjectivity.

.

.

through the putting in place, and

the transformations in our culture, of ‘relations
with oneself,’ with their technical

armature and their knowledge

effects.

And

in this

way one could

take up the question

of govemmentality from a different angle: the government
of the self by oneself in
articulation with relations with others.

its

.” 28
.

Freedom, Care, and Games of Truth
In his essay “Subjectivity

and Truth,” Foucault begins

to explore the notion

of

the “care of oneself’ using Plato’s Alcibiades where, he says, care of the
self appears “as

the general

framework within which the imperative of self-knowledge acquires

significance.’

Starting from this point, from epimeleia heautou, Foucault states that a

history of the “care of oneself’ “understood as an experience, and thus also a technique

elaborating and transforming that experience” can be developed .' 9

critical shift in Foucault's analysis

merely that which

is

made

of the history of the subject.

No

We can notice here a
longer

is

experience

possible through disciplinary practices, but rather those
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practices can be used in the
service of “transforming that
experience” the self has of
itself.

This

the heart of the care relationship:
without the obligation to

is at

know

the

self by reproducing oneself
in accordance with discourses
of truth, the experience the
self has

of being

itself

need not be

fixed, given, identical to

what

it

knows

itself to be.

Self-knowledge acquires significance,
according to Foucault's reading of
ancient

texts,

within the framework of care. This
means that the ‘knowledge’ one has of
oneself must
serve the needs of the caring relation
one has to oneself. Foucault does
not provide a
positive description of what such

We

will develop this below.

knowledge would have been then or could
be now.

What

is

important to note here

is

that the

knowledge one

has of oneself must not limit one’s
freedom in relation to one’s care for oneself.

Whereas

social, cultural,

and epistemological practices are almost
exclusively

presented as deterministic in Foucault's earlier
works, those practices involved in
techniques of the self in the later works are
viewed as engendering a kind of freedom.

This freedom does not

mean

that the self is free to

choose to be whatever

outside of practices and their limits. Rather,
freedom
self has about

its

rules, practices

and norms.

we engage

in practices

to be,

involved in the attitude that the

It is

of freedom outside of history, outside of

not from a position outside of what could be called real

of self-stylization, but

in a relation

with what

Foucault’s turn towards the subject’s engagement with such practices

escaping the obligation to

He

wants

production through these practices. This attitude engenders
a kind of

self-stylization [which] entails not a kind

that

is

it

truth,

but rather

is

is

is is real .”

30

not about

about playing the “truth game” differently.

writes,
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Things being as they

are, nothing so far has
a strategy outside of this
concern. It
obligation to truth that it is
possible to

me

shown

that it is possible to
within the field of the
about in one way or another

is

move

sometimes against effects of domination
which may be linked to
structures of truth or institutions
entrusted with truth
Thus one
escaped from a domination of truth
not by playing a game that was
totally di fferent from the game
of truth but by playing the same
game
an0ther game another hand, with
^ P
other trump

cards

^

^

’

Subject ivation and the Role of Self-KnowlerW

As discussed above,
his abbreviated career.

Foucault’s work takes a complicated
turn toward the end of

Commentators have lamented

the lack of development of the

notion of care, though they have pointed
out the complexities

it

raises especially

regarding the role or function of the epistemic
subject in Foucault's theory. While
unclear

how

Foucault might have developed his ideas
concerning care and ethics,

clear that Foucault’s “history of the
subject”

that

is

is

a critique

figured as a self-transparent, rational substance.

emphasis on

care, ethics,

and what he

model of subjectivity

Some commentators

of thought” involves an implicit

that rejects as foundational to the self

work suggests an

alternative

model of self-awareness
following section

why

I

is

its

own

argue that in trying to develop a

its

Foucault completely rejects the traditional ’epistemic subject.’
later

capacities as a knower,

I

offer that Foucault's

model of self-knowledge or self-awareness. What

however,

is

implied, but never articulated.

think developing such a notion

understanding the ethical relation of care, particularly
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is

also clear that his later

re-evaluation of the epistemological subject, at least in
terms of its relation to
activities as “self-fashioning.”

it

of the metaphysical subject

It is

calls the “history

it is

is

in

I

this

present in the

an important part of

terms of its status as a relation.

Resisting the Constitutive Force
of Power-knowledges

An

repeated criticism of Foucault’s
work, particularly his genealogical

oft

analyses of power through the
institutions of the penal system
and psychiatry,

purported pessimistic,
that

it

is

power

if not nihilistic,

for Foucault,

outlook for political change. These

seemingly everywhere and unable

is

we

that since

subjectivity

is

live in a post-Cartesian,

make our

be resisted politically as

to

is

correct,

and

it

make our

to

would seem

lives

that

submitting to the compulsion to

how we

understand

tools with

which we

interpret the

If Foucault’s

who and what we

are not only

relations are established, but

constructs or shapes our lives in terms of those
discourses.

true, as

particularly binding

meaningful (for ourselves).

dominant discourses through which power

knowledge

is

both a subject of knowledge and a subject
of desire. The achievement of

interpret our selves

critique

What

lives.

hermeneutic age, dominant (or hegemonic)

intelligibility as a legitimate subject
thus involves

use’s

critics assert

inscribed onto our bodies and into
our lives not through dominating
external forces,

but through the very practices with
which
is

is its

world seem

And

as those

to bring the

it

also

power-

world

to us as

un-mediated, as ready-made and present to us, then those discursive,
historical

practices through

which we know

incorporated into our very

own

the

world and ourselves become invisible as they are

points of view. In other words,

discursive and epistemic systems under the Will to Truth,

and ourselves

truly.

by using dominant

we

purportedly see the world

The presence of these systems (by which

things are rendered ‘true’

or natural or given) and the

incorporated into what

power

we suppose

relations they maintain, are erased, as they are

is

our

own

“objective” point of view.

\
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32

How
seems

that the

infitsed

we

then can

very

resist institutions

way we

which are repressive,

think, understand,

for example,

and even experience our

lives

when

seems

with power-knowledges? Within
the frame of the Foucauldian
critique

it

to be

we

cannot even claim that such
power-knowledges distort our experiences of
ourselves,
alienate us

from who we

truly are; for Foucault’s analysis

of power and the Will

Truth contends that such a positing of a
true or authentic self is a
us into practicing such power-knowledges
in

33
Is

.

there any

way

critical tool that tricks

to conceive

Foucauldian terms which could be a political
agent capable of acting

that resists

what seems to be the

An

totalizing force

that

is

34
.

What

inconsistent with his earlier work,

influenced by the

way

his

I

work Foucault

turns to a notion

contend that Foucault’s nascent

development of the genealogical

the above-described criticism regarding the problem
of resistance to

power-knowledge has
the Will to Truth.

such a

of power-knowledge?

that in his later

development of an ethics of self continues

method

in

of a subject

Ethics of Care as Genealogy of the Self

While some commentators argue
of the subject

to

right,

Not only

I

think,

are the

is

the double-bind the epistemic subject

ways

means through which

in

that

which we know

knowledge

is

is

in

under

the world necessarily

made

possible; any attempt to

think differently seems undermined by Foucault's analysis, if not outright
impossible. If

our thinking differently

relies

on positing a world

(thing, or self) that exists outside

power-knowledge then we are also positing ourselves

knowing somehow independently of our
intention of Foucault's genealogical

as thinkers

who

are capable of

historical-discursive constitution

method thus has not been
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of

35
.

The

to argue that ideas

which

seem
his

be

to

work

true,

which seem

to

be necessaty and

struggles with the very
methodological problem of presenting

subjects of knowledge; the
genealogical

such that

we can

recognize

how something we

place

method exposes not

how we have

recognize

some other time and
which

36
.

now as

true

While

his genealogies

the body, for instance,

body and

its

is

site

of how we know,

care of the self

knowers

is

a practice through

in relation to

desire to offer a

think, understand,

of truth for the

etc.,

focus on the ways in which

self,

such that the experience of the

become problematized,

such earlier problematizations

the turn

the subject as historical that
,

a genealogy of the subjective.

He

is

to offer a

37

In other words, the

.

which we can problematize our positions

such histories. Foucault's turn towards care

way to approach

in

Foucault's concern in his later work.

‘health’ or ‘normalcy’ or ‘sexuality’

to problematize our relation to

presents

a point of view

toward the self-toward the ethical practices of and
care for the self-begin

way

it

and inevitable was considered differently

of the prison, hospital,

becomes a

are

the real truth of things

The problem of resistance, of develop, ng

experience the world and ourselves,

Instead,

how we

mis-recognized them, but rather

resistant to the putative naturalness

is

irrefutable, are in fact false.

thus asking,

how do

is

is

as

motivated by the

to present a

way to do

genealogies which suggest that

our ways of knowing are historically, socially, politically located, affect
our positions as
critical

knowers?

If

they

reveal

to us the truth

reciting the very epistemic limits through

were constructed?

them simply

we

of our

(false) points

which our previously

How do genealogies differ from

of view, are they

‘false’ points

power-knowledges?

of view

If conducting

results in the suggestion that cultural forces are present in our thinking, but

cannot discern them really because they are the terms with which
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we know

in the

firs,

place,

research

is

wha, then? Thus, the force or
impact of Foucault's

earlier genealog.cal

hampered by the problem of the
epistemic subject and

self-reflection

“

If there are only these

power-knowledges such

that

we

cannot

its

capacity for critical

two options-our complete
construction by

know

ourselves and thus the presence
of those

power-knowledges, or the necessary assumption
of an objective epistemic position
such
that

we

‘see' the

power-knowledges

normal izing-then resistance does
I

contend that the

at the cost

in fact

later direction

seem

of assuming a position which
futile

is

itself

39
.

of Foucault's work

is

not a “return” to the

subject or a rejection of his earlier
critiques, but a further problematization
of the

of genealogy
a

way

in

itself.

which the

Foucault

is

work

trying through his notion of care
of the self to articulate

self can think about

itself,

about

its

own

production through

practices, without reverting to either a
traditional epistemic position that can
stand

outside

its

own

practices of subjection and “see” them, or
an impossible, sceptical

position that, because of

its

own

construction through social and cultural practices,
can’t

really claim to see anything about itself
at

which

the self as a

all.

In short,

he

is

trying to effect a

knower can be aware of its own contingency,

locatedness (or historicity),

its

own

its

own

way

historical

genealogy, without this claim being either

inconsistent— by assuming a position external to that locatedness—
or incoherent.
that these positions are in

in

It’s

not

themselves wrong in some sense; Foucault's method precludes

making such a judgment. Both of these
genealogy of the subject, and

options, rather,

that is his goal.

deny the

As Foucault

asks,

possibility

“What

after all? If not a

means of reflecting on not so much on what

is

relation to truth?

How, given

act ?”

that relation to truth, should
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we

is

of doing a

philosophy

true or false but
40

on our

While Foucault’s focus

in the last

two volumes of the History
of Sexuality

apparently on the action that a self
takes in terms of its

concerning an “aesthetics of existence”
in volume

volume

construction, his notions

and a “cultivation of the

particularly in terms of how the self
is able to

knowledge

that is not

is

know

itself to

have a kind of self-

only resistant, but in some sense freeing

41

Freedom, for

.

not free from the effect of power-knowledges,
but

is

means

a

subject to be able to engage in a genealogy
of its production, such that
its

actions and, perhaps, perform

them

differently.

intimated resistant epistemological position,
what

work of the

rest

of this chapter.

First,

of Foucault's notion of care, and then

own

texts offer

I

I

I

is,

how

I

will spell out

of the self to

does the self begin to engage

address this in the following chapter as

I

why

it

for the

can

on

reflect

this present but

call care-ful

will argue further

think such a relation might look like.

chapter

Developing

what such a kind of knowing might

articulate this epistemological relation

what

self’ in

both rely upon and suggest a revised
understanding of the epistemic subject,

III

Foucault,

II

own

is

only

self-knowledge,

is

the

needed component

it

is

a

some ways

in

which Foucault's

be.

As Foucault himself does

itself,

I

not

close with a brief outline of

The question

that

in or activate

such care-ful self-knowing.

explore the desire to

for

opening up the possibility of enlivening the

As

I

possibilities

remains

know

at the

end of this

the self as a

I

means

of care-ful self-knowing.

present there, the desire for and the assumption, or adoption of, the position
of self-

knower can

offer the

means

for critiquing the

power-knowledge practices which make

such “legitimacy” possible.
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The Argument

for Care-ful Self-knowledge

Care for the self involves recognizing
the seifs practices and actions
as part of
its

process of becoming rather than
revealing or disclosing

self.

As we

shall see, for

power-knowledges,

it

such a caring attitude or

must

making. Without a space

entail a

which

in

means

mode

its

already given or natural

to resist the normalization

for problematizing the seifs

the self can problematize

its

own

of

self-

becoming, two

questions arise which a notion of care
without a ‘care-ful epistemology’ seems
unable to

answer:

first,

how can we

articulate the presence

constituting practices of the self,

of self-making might

own

subject’s

i.e.,

how can we

entail normalizations?

relationship to

its

becoming,

And

to

its

of power-knowledges
assess the

second,

self?

ways

how

How

in

can

can

in the self-

which some actions

we

address the

we judge whether

or

not that relation of care involves a kind of
knowing (thinking about, remembering,
reflecting, etc.) that

does not,

subject? Arguing that there

in effect, (re-)position the

no knowing

is

rejected the epistemic subject, leaving

knowing

self that

is

made

.

rid of,

42

open the possibility of a present-yet-un-critiqued

The presence of this

however; on the contrary,

opening up one way for the self not only
constructs

itself,

way

to

I

I,

of a kind of omniscient

isn’t a ‘bad’ thing

argue that articulating

engage

in practices

its

my argument is as

for the self to

engage

which we

presence

through which

but also to problematize those constructions such that

self-subjectivation rather than subjection

Thus

self as a Cartesian

relation, that Foucault has in fact outright

invisible through the assumption

position in relation to itself

should get

knowing

it

is

key

it

can engender

43
.

follows: Foucault’s notion of care for the self offers a

in practices

which are

self-subjectivating rather than self-
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to

subjecting. This

means

that,

by practicing such

acts,

more

possibilities for being,

experiencing, and thinking are
engendered. The major distinction
between acts of
subjection and acts of subjectivation
its

own

actions, to

engage

that the self be able to

in a

is

that the latter offer a

way

for the self to critique

genealogy of itself. This requires, according

to Foucault,

be aware of its actions as self-constituting
rather than

revealing. This enables the self to

move away from

a discourse of truth.

self-constituting, one’s being needs to
be recognized as

self-

To be seen

as

becoming; there must be a

notion of one’s capacity to be otherwise,
to be different. This notion of
self-difference

comes from seeing
effect

is

the self as

One way to

it.

how

to see

ways

in

its

from analyzing the way

those actions involve normalization practices.

entails

dominant norms, the

which power-knowledges

and observe the ways
through

itself,

in

which

in

which

its

are present in

being,

its

way

By

looking

at the

sense of self or identity

Now,

is

view from which these practices

somehow

social

in

unpack

its

actions

constituted

this raises the critical

for the self to enact successful self-

genealogy: in the examination of one’s practices of self-constitution,
there

its

actions

ways

self can both begin to

and re-circulated through

actions (as well as through other practices).

issue for care for the self as offering a

actions,

its

trace these actions as self-making rather
than self-revealing, then,

which the seifs self-making
the

making

are analyzed. There

is

and cultural contexts. Without a way

a self who

is

is

looking

a point of

at itself, its

to get at that position, a

way to

analyze that position-which would also not, in effect, re-install the objective

knower position through some epistemological claim-then

there

is left

un-critiqued

(and perhaps un-critiquable) a possibly normalizing subject position. The presence of
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an unaddressable normalizing
subject position,

I

contend,

dooms

the rad, cal and ethical

potential of Foucault's notion
of care for the self.
In other words, as the self
engages in the aesthetic project that
is

becoming

for Foucault,

normal, zations,

i.e.,

that his actions are

it

how

must analyze
they

its

make him

independent of social, institutional forces.

revealing and/or being,

through which

it

practices in terms of their possible

less free, especially in

the self remains in a relation
to itself that

is

its self-

is

terms of deluding him

One way can
I

see that

one of making and/or becoming rather
than

through an awareness of its actions-especially
including ones

has a sense of identity-as no purely
self-originating. Rather than as

purely self-originating, the self sees these
actions as involving the force of power-

knowledges. Thus,

if

Foucault

presence of power-knowledges
subjectivity

is right that

in

our

own

what makes us

free is the

unmasking of the

self-making, and if this goal of freeing

from the constraints of normalizing (disciplinary
and discursive) practices

and institutions

is

the

key to what makes caring

that the aesthetic project

some way to address

for the self “ethical," then

I

conclude

of self-constitution through care cannot be ethical
without

this implicit position

of self-knower.

Without a Notion of Care-ful Self-knowledge
In his last works, including interviews

experience in a

new way. His

earlier

and

articles,

works frame the

Foucault begins to thematize

limits

of human experience

in

terms of epistemic and disciplinary practices. These practices render human subjects’
experience of themselves and their lives

as,

more or

under the former, and as “docile” bodies under the
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less,

latter.

‘duped’ into truth practices

The paradigmatic

presentation

of human experience under wha,
seems

power-knowledges

is

to

be the unstoppable and
deterministic force of

the analogy of the panopticon

«

Under the surverllance of the

ever-present and vigilant centrally-located
guard in the round prison,
prisoners in the
structure

mto

of the panoptreon become

self-vigilant,

their very self-consciousness
so as to

the prison.

Human

according to

conform

as

it

in

accordance with the judgment of that

45

structure the presence

in this analogy, to

of the guard, and

always-already have incorporated

this presence, thus

incorporated into the point of view of the
subject.

is

self-

.

Hence experience seems,
its

of

beings under the ‘surveillance’ of
social forces and expectations,

consciousness, thus restricting their behavior

into

their acts according to the
rules

analogy, incorporate the gaze of
the other, of society, into their

this

internalized gaze

mcorpora.ing the gaze of the guard

It

becomes

‘invisible’

becomes seemingly

impossible to separate the point of view of the
other and that of the subject

in

whom

this

view has been saturated. Actions of the
subject/prisoner which the performances of

which are considered
will

free, in this analysis, are especially
effective at

of the other/guard as they mislead the subject

against the system,

when

it

is

not.

into believing

Key to domination,

When we

think that the selves

argument goes, we are
into them.

.

.

we

is

acting otherwise,

for Foucault, has

construction of the notion of the free agent discovering his
or her
identity.

it

accomplishing the

own

been the

individual

are enacting are our true selves, his

less likely to investigate

how power-knowledges

are incorporated

Foucault writes,

.

the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days

to try to liberate the individual
institutions, but to liberate us

from the

state,

and from the

is

not

state’s

both from the state and from the type of
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individualization

which

linked to the state. We have
to promote new
USh ' he refUSal ° f tHiS k nd
ofindividuali.y
which
wh™h has been
be
H°on us for
imposed
several centuries 46
S

is

eC,1Vlty th

'

.

Pr oblem

How

I:

The two

to

Recogniz e Being as

mam concerns

Brmmt™

in Foucault's notion

relation to the self involve the
turn

away from

is in

this process

a process

of becoming.

And

have an awareness that

what extent the

silently thinks,

its

which
it

relates to oneself as

critical

is

self, then, is

key

is

in

not only the notion that

are self-constituting, but moreover,
that the self should

does

so.

“The object [of writing Volumes

effort to think one’s

and so enable

own becoming
The

one instead

of becoming involves actions which
the self performs. What

the self engages in acts

one’s

truth,

as such a process, one also
recognizes that

Foucault's shift towards the idea of
the care of the

learn to

ethical practice in

the Will to Truth. Rather than
relating to

oneself in terms of discovering or
revealing one’s
a self that

of care as an

it

own

II

and

III]

was

to

history can free thought from what

to think differently,”

he writes

47
.

it

The awareness of

correlative with this effort to think one’s history.

move

here seems to be the focus on the self as an agent
in relation to

own production. While

this shift to the

important, the methodological

move

presence of the self in relation to

Foucault

is

itself is

making needs addressing. As

above, Foucault analyzes in his genealogical works

how

stated

I

systems and institutions

involve practices which construct the individual. The
project of ethical care shifts our
attention toward

how

selves both

become subjected through

subjectivated.

The difference between

recognition:

am

I

the

not a substance which

I

two

relies

these practices and

on the following double

‘discover’ or ‘reveal’ through
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become

knowing

myself; and, as

I

am

a not a substance, the
actions

1

engage in are self-constituting.

Rather than merely resistmg the
substance model of self, the

becoming through one’s actions
essential, sm/transgression

shifts the

call to

recognize one’s

own

paradigm away from an

model. According to Foucault,
“The demand for identity and

the injunction to break that
identity, both feel, in the

same way, abusive.”48 As Paul

Rabinow comments,
Such demands are abusive because
they assume in advance what
one is
what one must do, what one always
must be closed to, which side one
must be on. He sought not so much to

resist as to evade this installed
dichotomy. One might say he refused
the blackmail of having to choose
between a unified, unchanging identity and
a stance of perpetual and

obligatory transgression

Thus Foucault's
by the subject

to that

4

.

transition

from apolitical paradigm of perpetual
transgression

of care for the subject depends upon
recognizing one’s actions as

not actions which confer or reveal one’s
identity. In a relation of care to

recognizes that

itself.”

50

But

“It is

how

self-difference,

not a substance.

does

one

s

it

It is

a

the self

itself,

form not primarily or always identical

recognize itself as such? Certainly recognizing
one’s

to

own

being as historical as becoming, rather than as
substantial,
,

involves more than simply taking an attitude that
one

asked to relate to the question of identity,

it

is

must be an

a self-made thing. “If we are

identity to our unique selves,”

asserts Foucault. “But,” he continues, “the relationships

are not ones of identity, rather, they

of innovation.” 51 This “have to”

have a unique
identity.

The

identity; the sense

we have

to

have with ourselves

must be relationships of differentiation, of creation,

is critically

important.

of imperative,

It is

not the case that

rather, involves

how we must

we must
regard that

relationship has to be one of differentiation; our creativity regarding
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ourselves depends upon,

seems,

it

how we

address our .dentities as not
identical-to

themselves, to ourselves. Bu,
wha, does this mean?

up

set

that

relation ?

would

52

establish this, and

definition, the

we

wha, (or who) would

states that

p bring into

“One's way of no longer remaining
the same

most singular part of who

to grasp the self as
differential?

continuously becoming,

i.e„

I

am,” the question he

» The

self raises several addftional
questions.

we

this relations!,,

And how?

Wlnle Foucault

are

Wha, kind of relations!,,, ean be

The

don', (cannot?) attribute identity
to

it,

and

I

by

think, is

how

problem of grasping the d.fference of
the

first

how do we mark

left to us,

is,

two

are

a.

how do we

see the self as

the differences, d,st,nguish the
self so that
b.

how do we mark

those differences

without assuming a third-person point
of view by, in effect, (objectively)
viewing our

own

lives ?
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The

latter

question raises an additional problem:
does seeing ourselves as

becoming include seeing

my self as

an object and

Answering

moments of our
etc.

in

my self as

seems

to

be easy:

institutions

But

this

we compare, remember,

we have

analyze,

had, different attitudes

of control, domination, persuasion,
identities.

which figurations of lives, bodies,

specific.

How

Such

etc.,

seem

multiple perceptions, then

it

who

see both

I

etc., different

show

held,

the

to infiltrate

ways

our

lives,

historical analysis will suggest the

ways

identities, are historically, socially,

could lead to something like a version of the

(aporia?) of personal identity

do

we have

as Foucault does in his earlier genealogical
critiques,

shape our bodies, construct our
in

becoming?

a subject as in-process?

lives, different beliefs

We can even,

which

a.

the self doing the seeing as also

Humean problem

seems:

if

what we mistake as personal

or what

is

perceiving ‘identity’ as such?
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and culturally

identity

Who

is in fact

is this

I

Who

‘recognizing' her

is

own

social construction or political
subject, on?

address not only the constructed
object that

How

do we analyze

that silent point

historical production as

56

self,

I

self (as both subject

of the self appears

.

we

examine

to

are?

its

a historically located point of view 55
?

which the difference of the

unfolding being

are, but the thinking subject
that

of view, in a way whtch allows us

Recognizing the becoming of the

identity

we

How do we

to the self as

argue, requires a

mechanism through

and object) can be addressed, so

becoming

that the

rather than as continuous or self-

There needs to be a kind of self-differential,

i.e.,

a

means of

recognizing the seifs non-teleological becoming,
that does not posit an origin. The
goals of an ethical practice of care for the self
thus involve creating a possibility and/or
the

means

for the self to think

and

thinks,

its

own

history, to “free thought

to enable the self through this

aim of care

for the self is to

open up a way

question

is,

differently than

what?

Problem

II:

It

genealogy of itself,

from what

silently

to think differently.

for the self to think differently.

The

The key

How To Critique Normalization

would seem

that

differently’

means

differently than

how

docile subject constituted through power-knowledges. Thus, what
the subject be able to think

point of view,

its

its

own

way of thinking

itself, is

loosened.

later

works.

What

is at

Remember: what

irresistible forces

in his earlier genealogies to the possibility

of the self in the

the self thinks as a

stake

is

having

history so that the hold of power-knowledges on

Foucault in the shift away from what seems to be

knowledges

it

is

key

is

is

its

essential for

of power-

of resistance through ethical care

the notion that the self does not think that
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that

it

knows

True

its

self.

discovering or reveal,
ng
involves

my taking on

moreover

it

does not think

It

its

through

that

true nature (to itself).

the attitude that

I

The

it

I

am

words, recognizing that the self is
not identical to what

The question we need
this,

but in

identity

some

to address

now

is,

not given,

but

not stable,

is

it

knows

how do we

is

not

in other

itself to be.

not just

know

this or think

self-difference needs to be thematized
in terms of “experience with.

engagement

in.

.”

clarity or transparency

where one

who one

is is

.

Experience suggests the necessity of some kind
of

.

epistemological position rather than an
embeddedness. This position

Instead, to claim

is

sense, experience this difference?
Foucault suggests that resisting

by seeing

rather than

is

my actions,

always in process. Care of the self
thus involves,

is

it

turn towards care not only

construct myself through

entails the recognition that the
self that

ever fully knowable since

knowledge of itself,

its

is

is

not one of

one’s identity and from that position one
speaks

not to claim a vantage point from which
one can

necessarily see clearly. According to Paul Rabinow,

“who one

emerges acutely out of the problems with which one

struggles.

experience over engagement makes

it

Foucault wrote,

is,

.

.

Privileging

increasingly difficult to remain ‘absolutely in

accord with oneself,’ for identities are defined by trajectories,
not by position taking .” 57
Foucault

I

offer,

assumes

s

idea that

that

it

is

the problems

how we struggle

we

struggle with that

make

with those problems matters.

us

who we

are,

We must take

positions in relation to these constitutive problems, and see the history
of our lives as

productive of experience in order to change our relationship to systems of domination.

Our

identity

Instead,

is

not given or natural for Foucault, as that would

who we

are

comes from

the problems with
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which we

make

it

struggle.

be unchangeable.

Doing a

genealogy of the self thus requires
seeing those problems and
experiencing them ax
problems. Practicing an ethical relationship
with the
problematize

its life,

including

its

own

self,

then requires that the self

point of view on that

problematization, that point of view can,
by assuming

its

life.

own

Without

natural, ‘view

from

nowhere,’ end up practicing normalization
which undermines the seifs caring actions

Thus we come back

to question b.

asked above:

how do we mark

58
.

those

differences without assuming a third-person
point of view by, in effect, (objectively)

viewing our

own lives?-comes

but from

problematization. In order to see the self as a
differential relation, and resist

seeing

it

its

as an (originary) identity, the self must see
the

knowledges
subject.

not from rejecting (the existence of) that
point of view,

As

ways

in

which power-

affect not only the self s being as an object,
but also the seifs

the self cannot

go outside of itself to see

assume

that

seeing.

The problem of a genealogy of the

it

can clearly see the ways

power-knowledges on the
constructing

it

which

in

itself objectively,

it

knowing

must also not

social, cultural forces affect its

subject thus

becomes loosening

subject, not so the subject can see exactly

and how; but so the subject can begin

to think

about

as a

way of

the grip of

what systems are

its

relationship to

those systems, differently.

In order to

affect

what

it

is

begin this loosening, the self must recognize that power-knowledges

as an object.

As

self-presenting, essential thing,

it

it

begins to understand that the self is not a natural,

is

necessary to see that the assumption of any such

natural, self-presenting subject position entails

relation with itself,

how

social

and

must recognize

political

that its

systems affect

it,

power-knowledges. Thus, the

own way of seeing

itself,

self, in

of understanding

for example, includes those systems.
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What

is

critical for the self to

knowledges,

is that

recognize in order for

it

to rests, the total, zing
effect

power-knowledges can become

of power-

invisibly incorporated into
the seifs

point of view. Keeping vigilant
about that point of view thus
necessitates unpacking the

ways

in

which power-knowledges are present

object of the self s

own knowledge. As

in

our practices of self-cons.itution
as an

Foucault writes,

We have to dig deeply to show how things have been

historically

contingent, for such and such reason
intelligible but not necessary.
must make the intelligible appear against a
background of emptiness, and
deny its necessity.
must think that what exists is far from filling
all
possible spaces. To make a truly unavoidable
challenge of the question:

We

We

what can we make work, what new game can
we invent ? 59

The

self can encourage a practice of
self-critique, a genealogizing

of view, by keeping mindful

that normalization

can occur

at the level

its

own point

of self-knowledge.

This mindfulness can take place by seeing the
ways in which the object

is

constructed

through practices. Recognizing the presence of
power-knowledges in our acts of selfconstitution does

is critically

two

things:

the

ways

see,

in

reminds us

important for their success

that their status is ‘natural’

what we

a. it

know,

feel,

and

that

is their

invisible,

and

one effect of power-knowledges

incorporation into our points of view such

b. this

incorporation occurs as

understand, as independently our own. Thus

which power-knowledges are present

in

ourselves, especially

who can and does know

when we

are

itself.
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it

we

take on

is critical

to see

our self-constructive acts in the

world, and from this recognition to begin to acknowledge

ways of knowing

that

how

they are present in our

assuming the position of the

self

Problem

As a
included

Ho w

III:

Address the Knowing Snhj ^t

to

self relating to itself through
care

in that self is the “I” that
is

see

I

my actions as

doing the seeing. While

it

is

self-making, and

easy to see

might see ourselves as objects which
are made through practices-we
lose weight, or

more

we go

difficult to see

through practices.

practices, that

and we become part of the middle
class-it

how we might

How

my point

my practices,

through

to college

do

I

much

recognize ourselves as subjects
which are

made

my thinking is constituted

my

of view through which
it

is

and we

is

recognize that

such that

eat less

how we

experience myselfis constituted

I

possible for

through

me

to think differently? “In the
labor

of thinking one’s own history," writes Foucault,
“one can enfranchise thinking from

what

it

view

that

thinks silently ."

we can

60

Clearly

is

through

this

problematization of our point of

loosen the hold of power-knowledges,

becoming. But how do

we do

the epistemic, thus leaving

According

it

it?

Commentators

no room

like

we

can create

new ways of

Palmer polarize the aesthetic and

for a positive critique

of the knowing subject.

to Palmer,

Foucault offers the notion of the care of the self as a
non-epistemic

model of subjectivity. The care of the

self replaces the primacy of the
traditional epistemological relation in subject formation
with an aesthetic
relation whereby our lives are to be viewed as works of
art, to be

transformed

in a continual

The problem here

is if

process of creation

care of the self is a non-epistemic model of subjectivity as

Palmer claims, how do we address the knowing

self,

caring? In other words, if engaging in self-making

epistemic

thinking

I

,

61
.

is

the subjective self in a

way

that is

aesthetic to the exclusion of

how do we

dig deeply into the historical contingency of the knowing or

such that

does not remain invisible, threatening the project of genealogy?

it
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How

do

I

think the history of my thinking
self?

which means refusing
etc.)

thought of the thinking

coming from an

make

I

my own

to see

self,

which has a

the proverbial shoe no,

as, for instance,

thought

who

the thinking-I, but rather
seeing that thinking as

influenced,

is

shaped,

is

is

constituted?

of my own thinking? Any attempts

influenced by social norms, could

to think

genealogically this self who

seemingly made invisible

is

subject

is

the

problem of addressing

the subject thinking, the subject

in his experience

even

of his

in relation to one’s

of all philosophical problems

are in this very

to refuse

moment. Maybe the

what we are

It is

in this

own

life

whose point of view

as his.

To recognize

own

is

is

nowadays

target

Raising the issue of how to

self.

is

one

not

“Maybe

the

most

the problem of the present time, and of
what

of what

The question

we

are in this

not to discover what

moment

that he leaves (or

this critical analysis is to take place.

we make

that

is

we

we

are, but

very moment.” 63

this investigation

care begins to address.

how

1

posits a subject thinking this

still

thematize this possible difference in our very
thinking Foucault wntes,
certain

do

my though,

not identical to oneself is to recognize
that this subject-I itself is constructed,

identical, is not invisible

is

How

considered outside of or free from
62
this norm.

is

The problem of a genealogy of the

is

think that h, story differently,

I

thinking as the natural
(unquestionable, given,

history,

fit

How do

left,

that Foucault's notion

unfortunately) unanswered,

Care as an aesthetic project through which

ourselves an objet d\art, does not supply the mechanism through
which

address this thinking self such that

we can

of

see

it

we can

as a construction, without

simultaneously positing a thinking self outside of this thinking
Foucault's notion of care for the self to engender a
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way

self.

In order for

for the self to refuse itself, there

must be a mechanism through
which
self as a self becotn,ng«

appreciating

self,

The

that refusal

difficulty

can take place, a

of this appreetatton

the thinking self seeing

itself,

is

way to

how

to

appreciate the

keep the

from collapsing into the self
that

is

thought. In other words, the act
of refusal needs to no. reify the
posit, on of the refuser
as itself a given position,
outside of problematization.

Care-ful Self-knowledge
If,

as Foucault contends, the relation
of care

self is in a problematic relation
with those practices

conceptual space
self as a product

opened up between the

is

of its actions, then, what

is

an ethical position whereby the

which engender

it,

such that a

self as a practitioner or self-fashioner

is

the experience of this relation

and the

between

these selves? If Foucault's critique of
disciplinary practices presents a self
whose self-

knowledge

reflects not

into being), does the

What seems
as Foucault’s earlier

its

freedom but

model of care

to

be the

and

later

its

limits as constituted

by forces (which bring

offer an alternative notion of self-knowledge?

critical difference

works,

is this

between what we have been considering

issue of self-knowledge (and

freedom). In his genealogical analyses the relation
the self has to what

about

itself represents its

it

it

its

relation to

claims to

know

lack of freedom. The production of self-knowledge under
the

Will to Truth or the Will to Knowledge represents the
subject’s being subjected by

power/knowledges. Key

powei

to the force

to limit the subject s ability to

the logic of Truth (what

Adorno

of technologies of domination for Foucault

know

itself otherwise;

calls the logic

of the self as a self-knower render

it

by engendering

it

is

their

through

of identity), the epistemological actions

identical to the
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means through which

it

knows

itself.

Thus, self-knowledge

of Foucault's analysis

is

a tool not only

institutions Foucault analyzes,
but

itself.

From what we can draw

out of Foucault's ethical works,
however, the self is

brought into being through practices,
but
participating in those practices.

it

some sense

is in

As self-knowledge was

subject’s subjection through disciplinary
itself as a

of the

powers

able to be

still

aware of itself as

a heunstic representing the

in the earlier

work,

this

awareness of

self-making self seems to be the heuristic
representing the seifs

subjectivation through care.

As

this

awareness seems to be

at the heart

between practices of subjection and practices
of subjectivation

,

it

of the difference

cannot be based on an

awareness of the self or knowledge of the self
under the limits of the Will

to Truth.

In

other words, this awareness must involve
a different epistemic relation between the
self

and

itself.

It

seems

comes not from
soul, etc.)

subject

is

can begin

“We

is.

to see

identifying

what or who

it

to itself

really (truly, naturally, authentically, in

its

at least

how

need not be) through the

such a caring awareness

is

relation

of problematization. Thus we

a form of Foucault's notion of refusal.

have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind
of

The

which has been imposed on us

critical issue

own way of thinking

free our thinking

The

awareness the self has of itself through a relation

This awareness, rather, seems to entail practices of identifying
what the

not (or

individuality

our

its

that the

for several centuries,” he tells us

of problematizing our
is

raised here.

How

own

65
.

thinking, thinking critically about

do we think our own history such

that

we

from the invisible structures through which thought has been possible?

trick here is to think in

such a

way as

to

engender new ways of thought which

necessarily includes a traditional epistemic point of view, but does so in a problematized
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way. The key to the problem
Foucault's notion of eare

with

itself.

This

I

What

above

ail else,

think can happen through
self-knowledge.

how

approach

to

What

itself.

a relation.

its

field

own

The

a relatton

It is

relation that

for

of the self

subjective point of view,

is

most conducive

is

through which care can happen,
that

is

to

through which

a relation of self-knowledge.

this relation requires taking
Foucault's suggestion to “refuse

who

are” seriously.

Rather than seeing refusal as only an
act of negation,

more deeply what

it

To

are does not

refuse

who we

could offer as

we

mean

construct a

While refusing what we

know what we
cannot

know my

latter clearly

refusing

are,

to

it

way to do

come from

we need

think

to

unpack

a genealogy of the subject.

Much

a relativization

stronger than

of all points of view.

are obviously challenges the Will to Truth

where we claim

to

also does not lead to an incoherent position
such as that entailed in

self as

my point

of view

is

maintains an invisible knowing-I

be

I

to say that all is relative.

sceptical indecision, this refusal cannot

I

paramount

is

part.es partic.pate in this relat.on,
however, needs to be thematized.

the self can interrogate

we

the notion of eare

is that it is

reproducing the terrain or

But

is in

identified with

any specific

I

determined by power-knowledges.” The

who makes

seems

the claim.

to allow for a

Thus actively

way to acknowledge

a subject-I position while simultaneously disrupting the force
of power-knowledges to

define (completely) what the content of that position might. While
the sense of negation
in the refusal

seems

totalizing, there is a

way

in

which such

a refusal, in

its

enactment,

preserves a positive space about the subject. If I refuse an identity by saying “that

is

me” am

that,

I

claiming an epistemological position. There

even though

it

is

not positing what

it is,

is

is

positing what
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an

it is

I

that is

not.

assumed, an

I

not

This

I

gives us something to

work

knowledge, the assumption of a
knowing

with. In relation to the
tssue of selfthat specifically refuses
to

I,

the ontological positions or
descriptions assigned to

way

offers us a

not,

we

to

are doing

approach care more fully

two

things:

refusing to render that

what the

I

but

is,

differently,

still

I

we

by others as well as by

ethically. In the act

are positing that there

as completely knowable.

assuming

it

it, I

contend

that

By
we

be identical with

is

an

I

of refusing what we are

we

that

we know

are and

are playing the

the self nor claiming that

assertion of the status of the

refusal to identify with that status recites
the structure

subject, but

we do

not

We are

well.

know

the self, but

way

knowing
of the

this difference, as a

for the self to be a

knowing

like

one of family adoption-it

The

related, but different.

identity

the

and

known

and the simultaneous

traditional epistemological

self in a relation with itself as a

notion of refusal and the notion of relation.

is

dis-identity.

self,

relation

is

As

it

sell that

who

it

is is

is

a

The two

self.

as ethical involve both the

suggest in the next chapter, this

a relation through which the parties are

of the self to

Because they are not

and problematize

I

it

known

itself

through care

identical, the

is

knowing

one of both

self can

examine

through genealogy critique as a product of power-

knowledges. Because they are related however, the known self reflects back

knowing

as a

kind of positive act of dis-identification, enables

elements of Foucault's theory of care for the self that figure

relation

I

I

does so differently.

it

What

are

game of identity

are rather using the position, or perhaps
better, the authority of, the
epistemic

means of resistance. The

we

not rendering a positive
account of

and thus playing the game of self-knowledge
differently as

neither claiming that

itself,

to the

also constituted by practices of power-knowledge.
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Notes

P
October

°r

r>

An Imerview

Sdf:

with M.chel Foucault,

Luther H. Martin,’*

Hurley,

.

~

et al

“>

(New York: The New

Press, 1997), xix.

T hlS P° sslblllt y of collapsing
.

into a relation

I,

not fully develop here in this
essay.
Foucault s genealogical method

I

of identity

I

gesture toward hut do

tnstead focus on the

and his notion of ethical care offer
a way to begin
conceive of a kind of self-awareness
or self-knowledge that exceeds
the limits tf
modem philosophy’s problematic relation of the
subject-I and the object-I.

^^

°f

to

° lltlCal

USefulneSS of Foucault's ideas
P
concerning the self. There is certainly
concemln^h^^Tr
much debate over the
rejection of foundationahsm.

implications Foucault's

Some

such as Taylor believe that Foucault's
critique of
oral and epistemological
foundations leave him unable to make any
normative
judgments and as such, render his work
politically impotent. See Charles
Taylor
Foucault on Freedom and Truth,” Political
Theory 12 (May 84): 152-183. I agree
with
readers such as Sawicki and McWhorter
that Foucault can be used to develop
political
theories of resistance. In particular I
am attempting to use his notion of care combined
with his critique of truth to develop a
politically useful idea of self-knowledge
This
notion is more fully developed in the following
chapters.

Of course I realize that this seems to run counter to the
flow of Foucault's
work. Foucault, having critiqued the modem
imperative to make oneself an object of
knowledge for oneself and others, presents through
his analyses of ancient practices of
se -mastery etc. a model of self that is
outside of the model of the “epistemic subject.”
I am suggesting that
without some model of self-awareness or self-knowledge,
what we
get through care is this on-going becomingness
which, as it has no implicit mechanism
through which difference can be introduced or
recognized, runs the risk of engendering
"
a self who is (must be?) immanently present to
itself. I think that a more radicalized
notion of self-knowledge that can be consistent with
Foucault's critique of selfknowledge is possible, and that its articulation satisfies the need
for a differenceproducing mechanism. What I think is still left unanswered,
however, is a question
concerning self-knowledge and desire. In Foucault's work prior
to what is called his
ethics period, Foucault claims that we are compelled
to make our selves subjects
through these practices of Truth whereby we make our selves
objects of knowledge.

Why are we
that is

so compelled?

Is

it

merely coercion or

more intimately compelling than

self-objectification?

question of how

is

there something more, something

the force of law?

What

is

the desire to

do

this

And does

“care” have a desire for self-knowledge in it? The
could our desire for self-knowledge be addressed without making

objects of ourselves and thereby limiting our freedom
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is

addressed in the next chapter.

I

s»sasss»a^
ufficiently,

freedom

though there

is

an implicit normative claim,
perhaps that having more
work of art is better than having less.
While Foucault’s
° f Sdf' master su est that
y g§
“Pleasure”

to create the self as a

‘‘d“rrr

S

as opposed to
the operative emotion at stake
in individuals’ pursuits
and practices
regarding their selves, it seems that
the desire to know the self
needs to be addressed if
F ° UCaUlt the n0tl0n 0f Care f0r
contem

was

desire

Porary political and

All of Foucault’s works can be
understood as pursuing the relationships
between knowledge, knowledge of the
self, and the self as

knower. As is reflected in
published lectures for example, Foucault
used writing and teaching philosophy
in an
xpenmental way such that he was always
pushing his ideas, abandoning some
methods, exploring others. The distinction
I am
is

making between

his archeological,

genealogical and ethical works reflects the
received notion that Foucault's work can
be
so penodized.
use of this division, however, only as
a tool for explication. As such,
am presenting ideas concerning his genealogical works
first, though according to his
periodization, these works come ‘second.’

U

7

The

distinction

between subject and self for Foucault

consistent. In general, a subject

een through a nexus of social,

is

a

is

both important and not

human being whose meaning as human being

political,

and

I

has

cultural practices has

been both inscribed
and through those practices. More than simply
a political
an historical agent and as such his or her self is
constituted, given

and assumed as

intelligible to

agent, a subject

is

shape, force, etc., through the relations of
power and systems of discourse available
within his/her historical moment. A “self,” on
the other hand, seems for Foucault to be
a more personal being, it is for instance
as we see later in the chapter, that about which

we

Our

care.

self and

its

possibilities are

what

at stake in practices

of subjection.

See Rabinow, “Introduction,” in Ethics: Subjectivity
and Truth The Essential
Works of Michel Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert
Hurley,
.

et al

York: The

New

Foucault, quoted in
Truth,

The

Hurley, et

Introduction,

Paul Rabinow, Ethics: Subjectivity and

Works of Michel Foucault; vol. 1,
(New York: The New Press, 1997), xxiv.

Essential

al

(New

Press, 1997), xxiv.

ed. Paul

Rabinow,

trans.

Robert

10

Michel Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” in The Politics of Truth eds.
Sylvere Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth (New York: Semiotext(e),
1997), 177.
,

1

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Vol. II: The Use of Pleasure
translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books,
1985), 4.
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Ibid., 5.
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Ibid., 60.
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ed. Sylvere
,

Friendsh
r
Lotrmger,
lt

’.

'P as a

trans.

Wa y of Life,” in Foucault

John Johnston (New

Y^ki

live limp™-,.,.

Semiotext(e), 1989)?

U

Shurmann offers a P owerful Foucauldian
analysis of how identity
nr _„..
practices
can be oppressive as they are practices
through which we name our
selves and thus shape ourselves
in their image. While external
modes of oppression
have certainly not disappeared, he writes,
“new forms

W

odes of subjection have appeared as urgent
heteronomous voices that tell us our identity.

what we

of inner, allhough heteronomous

targets in today’s struggles.

To

learn

and to recognize ourselves in their dicta,
nowledge. Indeed, in saying-tn acknowledging,

“

objectives

fo r mastcry
u I
although
Sl

’

’

These are the

soft sciences

are,

the subject

q

from the

who and

to intenorize

power in the form
confessing- ’This is what I am
is

’

’

itself

with

itself.”

Exemplifying “the

modem

version of the

‘Self-identity,’ endlessly invoked, thus
results

from intenorized
heteronomous, subjection. Self-identity is
self-objectivation accepted and
enforced as self-subjection.” Reiner Schurmann,
‘“What Can I Do?’ In an
Archaeological-Genealogical History, The Journal of Philosophy
82 (Oct 1985): 544.

’

1

Ml,

Foucault, “The Political Technology of
Individuals,” in Technologies of the
eds Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick
H. Hutton

(Amherst, MalcolmUniversity of Massachusetts Press, 1988). While
Foucault often makes the point of
stating that his histories are neither to be
read as locations of the origins of current
conceptual frameworks nor as proscriptions for healing
contemporary ills,

moments such

there are

as this one

where he does suggest that his project involves tracing
practices of the present through the past. Here he
states his work as asking “How did
we directly constitute our identity through some ethical techniques of
the self which
developed through antiquity to now?” What is critical to understand

is that Foucault is
not using the past as a heuristic for the present, such that
the present can become clearly
present to us. While I cannot fully examine Foucault's notion
of “historical ontology”
here, it is important to stress that the present is always
historical for Foucault. If there
are analogies or connections to be made between the present
and the past, the then and
the now, they are always secondary to the larger point: the
subject is always,

in its

being, histoi ical such that

Foucault

s

histories

knowledge of itself is always as an historical knower.
present past knowers as historically located as a means to suggest
its

without reliance on a transcendental argument, that
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all

such knowing

is historical.

I

20

Ibid., 10.
21

Ibid., 11.

F °UC *ult

“

Sex uality and Solitude,”

in Ethics: Subj ectivity 9n H
Truth
The F
Essential Works of Michel
Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paui~Rabinow,
trans. Robert
Hurley, et al (New York: The
New Press, 1997), 177
I

do not have
nt PraCt C ® S
'

notTsTh
f
not as an h.stonan,

’

the space here to discuss in

-

any depth Foucault's analysis of

He h,mself states man y <™es

but as a genealogtst. His aim

is

'hat

he undertakes such projects

not to secure the origins of an
idea

or a practice, not to locate a practice
which can be “imported” to the present.
Foucault’s
putpose rather is to locate places of
tension, where “the subject” (though
there is no
unified ^stance or structure as
such for Foucault) is engaged

dunng which

in

a shift or tens, on

m

bo*

the

Thhat

m
the self hasTknown

,

ways

T"

an historical

moment

present. Foucault's histories are
produced to reveal
which “the subject" is itself a historical
production, not a substance,
,he re ati0n of ,he sub ect t0 ils own

different histoncal

is

'

J

itself,

moments

cared about

for Foucault

is itself historical,

itself,

thought about

is critically

important.

itself differently

during

By presenting

these as

histones suggests not only that such thinking
changes but that such thinking
Cntical to Foucault's oeuvre is this notion

historical

How we know ourselves

is itself

of the historicity of the subject.

is

through our historical moment.

We will return to this later.

24

Michel Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” in Ethics:
Subjectivity an H Tmth
Works of Michel Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans.
Robert
Hurley, et al (New York: The New Press,
1997), 87.

The

Essential

25

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. Ill: The
Care of the Self
(New York: Vintage Books, 1988), 43.

,

trans.

Robert Hurley
26

Ibid., 45.
27

Ibid.,
28

The

44-45.

Michel Foucault,

Works
(New York: The New

Essential

Hurley, et

al

Subjectivity and Truth,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth
of Michel Foucault; vol. 1 ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert
,

Press, 1997), 88.

29

Ibid., 88.
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30

Hurley, et

al

(New York: The New

**“*

’

Press,

9 97), 31

1

NllC e 1 Foucault “ Th e Ethics
of the

Concern for the Self as a Practice of
^
n Shies: Sub|eclivity and
Truth , The Essential Works
of Michel FoJaulf
p 3U Rablnow
trans R obert Hurley, et al
(New York:
’

F

,

v :r

°m
’

,

6;

'

i

-

295.

The New

-

Press, 1997),

Foucault's example par excellence,
of course, is that of sexuality
oj tory
In his
of Sexuality Vohi meJ, for example,
he traces the ways in which
sexuality as an
object of study was created. He
and others such as Katz, present
how
constmetTon
of the category (and use of the term)
“homosexual” came years before that of
heterosexual” Wh„e these tenns seem
like -natural' opposites, thdr
Invemions came
at very different times and
were utilized in very different ways.
,

t

S
Sexualitv
0^.1ity

6

Vnf T

6 P° UCault
’

TTl
Introduction

,

'

S cntlc ue
l

trans.

199

of the n °h° n of repression The History of
(New York:

Vm^^T

Robert Hurley

This position

is also held by C. Colwell
in his/her article “The Retreat of
the
ubject in the Late Foucault,” Philosophy
Today 38 (Spring 1994): 56-69. S/he argues
at those critics are mistaken
who “. take Foucault as saying in the later works
that
there is the possibility of the onginary
subject taking an active role in its
constitution as
opposed to its merely passive role in the earlier
works.” (65) This mistaken
“interpretation represents a fundamental
misreading of Foucault. It is a misreading
because it fails to recognize the relational
mode of power/knowledge and in doing so
ails to see that the form of the self
in the volumes 2 and 3 of the History
of Sexuality is
not fundamentally different from the form
of the subject in the first volume and in
Discipline and Punish:' (65) The critics this
response addresses in particular are Peter
Dews and Thomas McCarthy. See their respective articles,
“The Return of the Subject
in the Late Foucault,” Radical Philosophy
51 (Spring 1989): 37 - 41 and “The Critique
of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School,”
Political Theory
n 990 V
.

.

,

x

437-69.
35

One of the ways

in

which power-knowledges have been

1

effective (since

Descartes) has been through the constitution of the self as a
subject of knowledge who
believes he is capable of such independent, autonomous
thought. The Cartesian turn
toward the self effected both a sense of the internal, knowable self
and the objectively

knowing self. Foucault traces this paradigm of modem subjectivity as itself
the
grounding of the human sciences. See Michel Foucault, The Order of Things:
An
A rchaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).
36

Foucault's genealogical

method

is

anthropological project which aims either to

not to be confused with a kind of

show
167

the relativity of claims to truth, to

show

the universality of such claims.

While the reasons

his project does not entail
the
not the former demands a few
words Firs the
histonca! and discursive practices
through which we construct
ourselves are not relative
he sense that they are highly
determinative to who we are. While
Foucault does
claim that normative values are
culturally contingent if not
accidental, their effects on
subjects are not to be minimized.
Second, Foucault’s genealogical
method does not
assume a neutral or objective point of view.
There is no way genealogy could
accommodate the assumption of a point of
view which compared multiple cultural
or
leal practices as if its own
point of view was
latter are

obvious, the reasons

why

it

is

neutral.

His

is that we
ways see from our own points of view,
but history can show us not what
others’ points
‘ he e thmgS we
take t0 be universal static, naturally-given
have
TT''
f
been considered
differently.
The point is not to make us believe in
nothing, but to
re ect further on the practices
which go into establishing something as

critical point

>

naturally-given
focus on cultures and/or
intended audience of late Capitalist

own c ° ntext And thlrd hi * histories specifically
moments which are both different from our own
(his
°Ur

.

uropean/American readers) and yet like our
recognition of resemblance.

own enough

to achieve

some kind of

While some commentators consider care for the
self a mode of self-relating
of self-knowing, I do not. 1 do agree with those
such as Daniel
Palmer who view Foucault's turn to the subject
through care

that excludes relations

as a positive alternative to
e traditional epistemic subject. Foucault
makes several references throughout his later
interviews, for example, that the Ancient Greeks
he studies do not oppose the call to
know thyself and the call to take care of thyself. Knowing
and caring are not so
exclusive. Part of the shift in Modem philosophy
and culture he says is to a prioritizing
of one-knowing— over the other-caring. I believe that
Foucault's larger project is not to
reject the subject in general or the epistemic
subject in particular, but to problematize
the relation between thinking and knowing.
His critique of the ways in
t

which subject

formation has taken place under or through the demand for
Truth

which the subject knows

itself becomes that

which the subject

is

is

ways

that the

in

as a static object. His

ethical project is to theorize ways in which the subject
can be differently, can engage
with the world such that experience can be different. Because
ours is a modem world, a
world which was bom through the Enlightenment-socially, politically,
economically-

rejecting practices of knowing in favor of some kind of acting
or being free from

practices of knowing

would be naive

epistemological framework he

work with both

is

at best,

and a reconstituting of the very

trying to resist at worst. Foucault's project

is thus to
practices of being and practices of knowing such that their relationship

can be problematized, such that subjects can reflect on their own experiences in
ways
that allow for actions that are self-constituting in ways that allow for
further different
kinds of self-reflection and self-constitution. While there is the problem of course of

no normative system by which a subject can judge which particular actions and
which particular understandings are better than others, there is a clear imperative here to
offering

know and

ways which promote both more options for examining the subject’s
historical moment in which it dwells and, through such examinations,

act in

relation to the
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e
than

ti0nS f0r Creatms 0nese,f such
,hat

|^

°" e has more capacities

to experience rather

38
I

think that

it

could be useful to

call this the

“

problem.”

epistemic subject’s ‘so what?’

39

The P° s of thls epistemic problem
certainly
f
what has been called
the debate over foundationalism.
,

.

,

,

cite those positions

The

taken in

mam point of this chapter is

to suggest that with an explication
or development of its implications
for a critical
epistemic subjectivity, Foucault's ethical
notion of care of the self can offer
an
t0 the Ch01 G
the subJ ectlve/relativism of
social-constructionism and
theTbfeJt!
/
the objective/umversahsm
of liberal
i

^

M Chel Foucault

“

The Masked Philosopher,” in Ethics: Subjectivity
and
Works of Michel Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow,
trans. Robert
f^
al (New York: The New Press,
1997), 321.

t m tu
7~~’ The
Flurley, et

humanism.

o

’

ential

Foucault's challenge to liberal political theory
is complex and critically
I am only able to begin
to suggest here the implications his
notion of care
has for a critique of liberal notions of freedom.
I cannot develop fully here
the political
implications of the alternative notion of self-knowledge
that I am offering in this
dissertation. I begin to gesture towards
these in the conclusion. For analyses of
Foucault s work specifically in relation to the issue
of freedom and liberal politics see
such authors as James Bemauer Michel Foucault’s
Force of Flight

important.

(London, England:
Humanities Press International, 1990); Thomas Dumm
Michel Foucault and the Politics
of Freedom (London, England: Sage Publications,
1996); Lee Quinby, Freedom.
Foucault, and the Su bject o f America (Boston, Malcolm:
Northeastern University Press,
1991); and John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: The Freedom
of Philosophy (New York,
,

’

NY: Columbia

University Press, 1985).

As I noted

above, this position

supported in readings by such commentators
“On Refusing Who We Are: Foucault's Critique of the
Epistemic Subject,” Philosophy Today 42 (Winter 1998): 402-410.
as Daniel

Palmer

is

in his

43

Subjection, as discussed above,
subject,

an agent

is

the

means through which

the self becomes a

in the world, a political being, through

its conformity to and
recognition by hegemonic norms. (As “conformity” here is short hand for the
myriad
processes through which the subject is constituted by its successful participation in
various legitimating practices such that it can act as a subject in that system, any notion
of self-conscious ‘choice’ that conformity connotes should be disregarded.)

Subjectivation

is

the process through

which

that

conformity becomes an object of
and resist or practice differently those

critique for the subject such that she can question

am suggesting here and developing at the end of this chapter the
idea that rather than attempting to create the possibility for subjectivation through the
eradication of the Cartesian I position, we should fully embrace that knowing subject,
constituting actions.

I
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but in a

way that allows us to be conscious of its
assumption.
We afe reCOgnized as 'estimate objective
8

In other words bv
knowers
and what systems of
Ta make that recognttion
power-knowledges
possible, we can open up a way
to ri one dte
normat.ve practtces that constitute
us. Thts adoption of the I
will 1 contend help us
achieve the context necessary for
the relation of the self to itself
that is the foundation of
care. I am not willing to
say that this is the only way to
do so, however Foucault for
ent m
orY oF Sexuality Volume Ij the notion
that ways of caring for
he telT’
d
the
self can develop
through journal writing and different
practices of fnendship "l n
works such a. T fe, No, a Pipe Foucault
offers how surrealist art, for
example offers
Pene Clng d fferen,ly which we ma consid
«
care
in light of the
V
later works. What I am willing
latoworkTwhaf
u
to suggest, however, is that
each of these ‘caring’
practices involve a critical notion of
how we know. See Michel Foucault, This is
Not
te. bans. And ed. James Harkness (Berkeley, CA: University of CalifomlTp^ a

n™
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Discipline and
P

tu °n

'

‘ ,C

°n aS

Punish Foucault presents a lengthy
analysis of Bentham’s
tHe PerfeCt Pris0n Michel Foucaul
‘. Discipline and Punish,

'

H ° f fu"
The n nS ° n ’ tranS Alan Sheridan
‘

(

New

195 22

York: Vi nlage Books, 1995), esp

The analogy Foucault makes between humans in
societies
power-knowledges and humans living in the literal
structure

constituted by
of the panopticon has been

many feminist philosophers and critics. What the panopticon
model
an analysis of the ways in which the actions of
subjects which seem to be
of their own ‘free will’ are acts which enable them
to conform to and be recognized by
society s rules. One of the first scholars to
take on Foucault for feminist purposes,
Susan Bordo, for example, uses the notion of the
panopticon in her ground-breaking
work on anorexia-bulimia. She argues that women internalize
the male/patriarchal
notion that equates women’s thinness with moral virtue
such that
appropriated by

allows for

is

women

practice

thinness through eating and exercise rituals so as not
only to be thin but to be morally
accepted subjects. See her book, Unbearable Weight: Feminist,
Western Culture and
t he Body (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993) and her classic article
“The
Body and the Reproduction of Femininity,” in Gender/Bodv/Knowledge: Feminist
Reconstructions of Being a nd Knowing eds Alison Jaggar and
,

Susan Bordo New
Brunswisk. Rutgers University Press, 1989). What is critically important
about such
work is how it allows a way to examine how power-knowledges are systems which
oppress (and repress) individuals, but which also produce them as certain
types of
,

subjects.

work on the production of types of sexuality has had a huge
impact on sexuality and gender studies. For a Foucauldian analysis of sexuality as
a
Foucault's critical

socially constructed category, see Ladelle McWhorter’s, Bodies
46

Foucault:

Michel Foucault, “Afterword,”

in

and Pleasures.

Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel

Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics Second Edition (Chicago,
.

University of Chicago Press, 1983), 216.
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Michel Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern
for the Self as a Practice of
n
lcs Su biectivity and Truth The
Essential Works of Michel Foucault;
;
;
ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert
Hurley, et al (New York: The New Press,
1997),
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voh,?1,

riess, ivy
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5

Foucault, “Sex, Power, and the Politics of
Identity,” in Ethics: Subjectivity
The Essential Works of Michel Foucault; vol.
1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans
Robert Hurley, et al (New York: The New Press,
166
1997),
emphasis added.’
'

a nd Truth

52“

,

As develop in the next chapter, wish to explore
way to approach identity that is itself always in
I

I

related” as a
its

history, with others, with social
53

The

and normalizing

the notion of “being

relation-with

itself,

with

practices.

Quoted

in Paul Rabinow “Introduction,” in Ethics:
Subjectivity and Truth
Works of Michel Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert
(New York: The New Press, 1997), xix.

Essential

Hurley, et

al

4

The assumption of this position would be a practice that would (still)
render
the self docile for Foucault, as it would involve assuming
the position of the Cartesian
knower. The practice of knowing the self from this position would, under
the Will to
Truth, limit the self in terms of its possibilities for resistance.
I am suggesting implicitly
here and explicitly at the end of this chapter that we can use this
position more
creatively than is immediately obvious. Within the context of performing
a

genealogy
of the subject (or self-genealogy), the assumption of the ‘knowing I,’ the legitimate
“knowledge-claiming” I, can engender the differential needed for ethical self-knowing,

and

it

can open up a space

in

which we can

critique the

means

for achieving such

“intelligibility.”
55

C. Colwell counters those

who

think Foucault relies upon a notion of an

originary self by arguing that the self for Foucault

term here

is differential.

What

this

denotes

is

is

always a differential

that there are

elements of power or of the subject. Both arise within a

field

that the subject arises, or emerges, as a relation, a relation

of itself (and other things), a relation between

itself
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self: “The key
no positive or originary

of relations. This means

between

itself

and knowledge

and those who have knowledge of it,

a relation between itself and
those who coerce
see here is that tt is possible for
the
e

Colwell

°Th

(Spring

1

™' se w
’

it

or are coerced by

'

to

one of selh

itself,

thou ' there bein anything originary
8
to be mastered." Cartesian
JeC ‘
Fou cault," Philosophy Today 38

^

“

994); 65-66

What we need

it.

subject to have a relationship
to

56

Laddle
cWhorter re gardin g the idea is becoming
without telos in her
RnHip«
hp,
dies and
Pleasures: Foucault and the Polities
of Se xual Normalization (Bloomington
In

^

.

Indiana University Press, 1999).

teleological approach to ourselves.

development of who we
ability to

make

legitimacy.

An

I

wonder how we

How

(really) are,

do we

resist

resist the

reading our

seduction of a

own

lives as the

of our ‘promise,’ especially when exhibiting
our

sense of ourselves
interesting

is a critical component to
social intelligibility and
example regarding what we might call ‘compulsory

teleology’ could be the medical
‘normalization’ of ‘transsexuality.’ See
article,

ways

in

The Empire Stnkes Back: A Transsexual Manifesto”
which pre-operative transsexuals have historically

conditions as being

“bom

in the

wrong body”

for

Sandy Stone’s

an analysis of the

be required to describe their
in order to receive the surgeries they

wanted. Stone, Sandy. “The Empire Strikes
Back: A Transsexual Manifesto,” in
Writing on the Body: Female Embodi ent and
Feminist Theory eds. Katie Conboy,
Nadia Medina, and Sarah Stanbury (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1997) 337-

m

Paul Rabinow, “Introduction,” in Ethics: Subjectivity
and Truth The
Foucault; vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley
.

Essential
al

Works of Michel

(New York: The New
58

See,

et

Press, 1997), xix.

Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford
.

University

Press, 1986.

Foucault,

Friendship as a

84), ed. Sylvere Lotringer, trans.
60

translated

Way of Life,”

in

Foucault Live (Interviews, 1966-

John Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989), 209.

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Vol. IE The Use of Pleasure
by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 9.
Daniel Palmer,

“On Refusing Who

We Are:

,

Foucault's Critique of the

Epistemic Subject,” Philosophy Today 42 (Winter 1998): 409.
62~

One of the

reasons Foucault most passionately criticizes psychoanalysis,
regards just this problem: in his view, psychoanalysis both revels in a Will to Truth,
where the subject ‘discovers’ his true inner self, and lets off the hook of real analysis the
I doing the discovering.
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Foucault, “Afterword: The Subject and Power,” in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul
Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics Second Edition
,
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(Chicago, IL: Un.vers.ty of Chicago
Press, 1983), 216. Foucault
makes this comments
of course, ,n reference to Kant.
The influence of Kant on Foucault
cannot be
overestimated. While I cannot develop
this fully here, I would
like to note that an
explication of the Kantian critique
of reason in general, and of the
transcendental
deduction in particular is a key element
for the further development
of my project
of
J
developing an ethical’ way to address
the knowing subject
' he qU° te
'
ah ° Ve F °UCaU "
Kant S famous " What is
Enlightenment?”:

^

When

in

'

784 Kant asked,

Was Heisst Aufklarung?. He meant, What’s
going on just now? What’s happening
to us? What is this world, this
penod, this precise moment in which we
are living? Or in other wordsWhat are we? As Auflddrer as part of the
Enlightenment? Compare this
with the Cartesian question: Who am
I? I, as a unique but universal
and
unhistoncal subject? I, for Descartes is
everyone, anywhere at any
moment? But Kant asks something else: What are
we? in a very precise
moment of history. Kant’s question appears as an analysis
of both us and
our present. I think that this aspect of philosophy
took on more and more
importance. Hegel, Nietzsche... The other
aspect of “universal
philosophy” didn’t disappear. But the task of
philosophy as a critical
analysis of our world is something which is
more and more
1

,
,

important.

Maybe

the

most

of all philosophical problems is the problem of
the present time, and of what we are, in this
very moment.
64

What

is

certain

critically

important here

is

that this refusal is not a refusal

based on a
being misunderstood or limited or
repressed. There is no alternative self or being behind
the refusal. It’s danger and
riskiness lie in that fact. It is through the act
of refusal where the self actively disidentifies with what is thought to be that a space
of possibility is opened up. The act of
refusal engenders a space of problematization where
the self engages with its own
production as a production rather than as a process of revelation.
mis-recogmtion.

It is

not the case that what

we

are

is

,
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Foucault, “Afterword,” in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow,
Michel

Fo ucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics Second Edition (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1983), 216.
.

IL:
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Foucault originally planned to write a volume of the History of Sexuality on
practices regarding the family and reproduction. He did not, though the end
of Volume

does make some mention of the topic. Such issues would come under the notion of
bio-power for Foucault. Although I cannot go into this topic here, it would be most
interesting to connect Foucault's later writings on friendship-there are several important
interviews on this topic-with his re-evaluation of the relation of the self with itself
through care. There are many important writings on the notion of the self as relational,
I

including those from psychoanalytic points of view (see Jessica Benjamin’s work, for
example) and feminist philosophical points of view (see Diana Tiejens Meyers’ work,
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for example).

My own interests in this idea involve a re-evaluation

z rr “r
f

that the term

va, uating the

off

t

.

i

,

atEs

identity as a term whteh assumes
a cultural, ethnic racial or
other odal
“*®g0ry ‘° be a (lf not lhe essence °f
)
a human being, comes from
a certain historical
adtng of the consanguineous
family. Thus, if we want to
play the identity game
different y, we need to do a
genealogy of ‘family relation.’ For
me, taking** self as
re a lonal might still preserve
some of the relation-equals-blood paradigm
such that our
re a, ions make us what we
are.
Foueauldian take on the relational
seTwould
I
involve displacing the importance
of family (especially in terms of its
hetero‘
y) a " d replac ng >'
<‘h a re-appreciation of
friendship. Foucault thought that
/

A

w

effect,

we

live in a legal, social,

and

institutional world where the only
relations
possible are extremely few, extremely
simplified, and extremely poor.f.
We should
]
‘

mp0Ven * hment of the

.

relati

°™l

fabric.

We should secure recognition

fofrdm
/provisional co-existence, adoption.” “Of
for relations of
children,” confirms tluf
interviewer. Or-whynot? Of one
adult by another,” replies Foucault.
Foucault “The
Social

Triumph of the Sexual Will,”

in Ethics:

Works of Michel Foucauh; vol. 1, ed.
York: The New Press, 1997), 158.

Subjectivity and Truth The Essential
Paul Rabinow, trans. Robert Hurley,
et al (New
.
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The problematizing and practical

m Wh,Ch "

•

'

subject renders manifest the
enclosure

T^e » no deep originaje.
sef etpressZin
problematizations and practices.

Reiner Schurmann

CHAPTER 5
BEING ADOPTED. A MEDITATION
ON IDENTITY AND THE ‘DESIRE
TO KNOW’ DIFFERENTLY

Introduction

As we discussed

in the

previous chapter, in what

is

considered his later or

“ethical works,” Foucault describes
his project of analyzing the
subject as involving the

analysis of techniques of domination
as well as what he terms techniques
of the

These he defines as “techniques which
permit individuals
a certain

number of operations on

thoughts, on their

own

modify themselves.
subject

their

own

to effect,

bodies, on their

own

by

their

souls,

on

self.

own means,

their

own

conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform
themselves,

”2
.

Foucault suggests that in order to analyze the
genealogy of the

we must examine

these techniques together, “to take into account
the points

where the technologies of domination of individuals over
one another have recourse
processes by which the individual acts upon himself.

we have

“to take into account the points

into structures

I

think,

conversely,” he continues,

where the techniques of the

self are integrated

of coercion or domination. The contact point, where the individuals
are

driven [and known] by others

call,

And

to

government.”

is

tied to the

way

they conduct themselves,

3
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is

what we can

1

It is

the

ways

in

this place

of contact where the will and
knowledge of others

whtch we conduct ourselves

our attention on

how

the

that is the focus

modem demand

the contemporary desire to

know

to

make

of this chapter.

is

connected to

1

wish to focus

oneself an object of knowledge
and

oneself through the 'discovery
of one's identity'

come

together and “govern” the subject.
This government of the subject
can be theonzed,

analyzed, resisted, as
set

we

discussed, through Foucault's
notion of problematization.

A

of practices and concerns which
engender individuals capable of
experiencing

themselves— and thinking about
resisted

things

by "making

we can

it

that

experience-in specific ways, a problematic
can be

an issue” for our selves. What

we make

issues for ourselves are

think about, question, and ultimately
practice differently.

While the trope of secrecy and the concept of
“illegitimacy” no longer have

much

direct currency in

contemporary

culture,

want

I

to suggest that the popularized

notion of the adoptee’s “searching” for her
birth family can be a very useful “contact
point” through which to analyze the production
of the subject.
self through narratives of bodily identity,

know
desire

as both a desire

which can

resist

a consideration

a desire to

know

of both

What

how

into structures

resisting such structures

techniques of domination

practice of subjection— and

how

--i.e.,

how

the

to present the adoptee’s “desire to

of coercion” as well as a

such coercion, and instead offer the self a self-practice that

or discursive practices of searching

This

want

which can be “integrated

Foucault’s terms, ethical.

is

I

As

of coercion requires,

may be

I

is in

propose,

present in the symbolic

“searching” can be a disciplinary

such practices can be reconceived.

move away from knowing

the

body

as containing the truth of self and

toward a more ethical way of knowing echoes Foucault’s work on shifting the meaning
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of ethics. As Margaret McLaren
presents, Foucault
reliance

on a

scientific

Foucault calls ethical

is critical

paradigm rather than on an aesthetic
one. The “work” on the self

is

work of art. According

aesthetic work;

to

it

is

work by which one's

life

becomes one’s

McLaren,

work on

the self involves the intensifications
intensification of relations is characterized

knowledge.

of traditional ethics’

of relations

to oneself; this

by self-mastery and

Work on

self-

oneself and the correlative intensification
of
relations to self contribute to the
formation of ethical subjectivity.. ..An
aesthetics of existence is thus an ongoing
project that requires ethical
work.

If the self is

others, then

is

what

not given to us, not to be discovered by
the self and presented to

is it?

Again McLaren

writes, “[Foucault] rejects the notion that
there

a true self, or deep self, to be discovered.

given to us,

I

think that there

ourselves as a

is

only one practical consequence;

desire to

be considered an ethical practice then,
in

a

(for self) that

says, ‘[fjrom the idea that the self

way which

resists

does not subject

6
,

know”

we need

to see

how a

Hence,

my project

is

how

We

need a search

a search for “self-

for the self. Foucault offers that the Ancients

from practices of and demands

Modem

to create

self might practice the

to suggest

practiced techniques of the self through the care of the

and

not

the self through the searching process to

techniques which coerce or dominate.

knowledge” can be a means of caring

different

we have

is

work of art .’” 5

In order for the seifs

“search”

He

self.

This self care was markedly

for self-knowledge that

Enlightenment thinking. However, as ours

is

came with

Christian

a Post-Cartesian, (Post-)

Christian culture, the Ancient practices cannot simply be imported into our world;
are to have ethical practices of the self caring for itself in these Post-Cartesian
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if

we

times, then these practices
cannot exclude practices of
self-knowledge.

we must

confront practices of self-knowledge
and, as

functions as the contemporary trope
for self-knowing,

knowledge

is

it

via identity (includmg the search
for, right to,

must be transfigured. Thus

I

want

to suggest that

surrounding the adoptee’s desire to

know

outline the possibilities for an ethical

the concept

is

it

On

the contrary,

of identity

that

our practices of self-

and claims of identity) which

by examining the discourse

via the trope of the search

way to engage

we

the seifs desire to

can begin to

know

itself,

especially in terms of the body.

By presenting my own
know my

self,

I

hope

meditations on (and actions motivated by)

to offer a

way to approach

problems and dilemmas we have thus

As should become

self-certainty.

on what

know

I

desiring to

or even what

know

some way

in

focus on

self

is

something

my desire to know myself rather than

is,

because

First, the

that

I

want

I

consider the act of

notion of desire suggests the
to

know

that

I

do not

(yet)

my desiring to know, am a subject engaged (with herself); am
I

in relation to

productive than, Foucault

with which to engage in

know

I

one’s self useful in two ways.

know. And second,

desire to

clear,

self-knowledge that avoids the

explored which result from the demand for

knowing one’s

notion of incompleteness: there

active in

far

my desire to

s

its

what

it

is

I

I

want. In a

way

notion of refusal, desiring to

similar to, but

know

own practices of subjectivation.

the selF offers a

way

to thematize the self as

more

offers the self a

means

Like the act of refusal, the

an agent without the

requirement that the self have certain knowledge of itself. Unlike the refusing subject,
the subject

who

wants to know

desires to

who

know

or what

it is.

itself is already

While both

engaged

refusal
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in a relation

of with

and desire connote

lack,

itself,

I

as

think

it

that the relationship

wan. to but do not
about

who we

between the subject-I and the
object-I

(ye.)

are?”

know my

self)

more possible

makes

adopted.

I

have, in

when and how

I

I

can remember,

fact,

was

I

always had a

told about

myself have always included

the quest, on

Ad opted

my parents

difficult

my adoption,

before they

knew

that

I

existed.

my parents,

who

identified herself as

time answering the
as

my memories

my being adopted.

were not always

of “why should we care

and A Philosopher

have been someone

was

It

knowledge included, and perhaps was even
constituted
that

(1

to answer.

AMeditation on Being
Ever since

that desire’s lack entails

that

I

common

questions of

of and stories about being

as if coming into

my own

in relationship to, the

was bom,

I

later

My claiming of ‘being adopted’

came

self-

knowledge

to think,

as an identity has thus

included claiming the contingency and ambiguity
such a grammatically awkward
statement involves. The meaning of my self of who

been

different.

That

While being raised by

my parents

identity- formation including

ethnicity,

was,

I

thought, could always have

my parents were my parents was accidental,

could be (and hence might not have been)

and

I

my parents was

determinative to

my understandings of myself through religion,

family;

it

me, then, has not been an

are

was.

class, race,

arbitrary.

identification with an

unknown

has not been a marking of myself as scarred or damaged or as having

knowledge than others who

I

fact that these identifications

could have been different. They were, in short, constitutively
for

who

from infancy certainly affected many aspects of my

my identity as adopted was produced by the

Being adopted

while the fact that they

bom

into their families.
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lost

less

Instead, being adopted has

been

an identity of possibility-

it

has been a

way

make sense of the

to

tensions produced by

being both at once the product of
one’s environment and someone
whose meaning

always exceeds

that env.ronment. 7

place from which one

comes and

adopted self has encouraged

bom

my sense

in

which

investigate the

meaning of my

I

to

some

to understand family as
both a

which one

is

always looking.

Bemg an

imagine the self as both known and
unknown, as

more than

either natured or nurtured.

identity,

I

think,

have been the

have been able to approach ’being
adopted’ as a position from which to

identity open,

without an identity,

resolving

way

of the possibility of adopted

problem of identity

hidden from me.

has been a

a place for

as well as produced, in short, as

Crucial to

ways

me

I,

left

me

it

in general.

was not

While having been adopted

left

the

the case that the act(s) of adoption left

me

missing something, or

in a position in

which something was

My concern with my identity has thus not been defined by attempts at

particular ‘identity issues’ or

overcoming some senses of loss or

inadequacy. But rather, because adoption involves social,
cultural, and historical events,

and because taking having-been-adopted as the basis

for an identity necessarily

the idea that social practices are intimately involved
in one’s

with

my identity as

in general is

adopted has propelled

more than

me to

own

think about the

either essence or construct. Thus,

identity,

ways

in

my concern

which

identity

my philosophical

investigations of my identity as adopted have engendered certain aporias
which,

come

to believe, are not specific to

There

is

evokes

I

have

having been adopted.

an intended slippage throughout

this

paper then, between

my narrative

descriptions of my experiences of and struggles with claiming for myself an identity as

adopted and

my use

of ‘adopted

identity’ as a

term applied to the problem of identity in
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general. Thus, like the

meaning of my

identity as adopted,

multivalent potential of ‘adopted
identity’ as

I

want

I

want the phrase

to

encourage the

to suggest the possibility

of claiming an identity based on
the history of the production
of one’s

one was

(literally)

adopted,

and the

idea that identities are neither

bom

identity, i.e„ that

nor

made

but are

adopted.

While the difference between the notions
of ‘bom’ and ‘adopted’

may be

obvious,

it

is

the difference

between ‘made’ and ‘adopted’

both ideas refer to the notion that identity

and individual

(itself)

from some essence of self but are instead
the products of social,
forces, the notion

historicity

to

of an

of an adopted

identity.

have been adopted

(as

I

am

identity, as

I

am

exploring

it,

in this context

that is critical.

identities

cultural,

While

do not come

and

historical

also refers to the

here exploiting the double meaning of
‘adopted’ as both

someone

else’s)

and

different sets of practices (and, importantly,

adopt (as one’s own). Connoting two

to

two

different temporal locations

of self),

these different meanings of adopted together
generate a liminal space where the subject
is

positioned as that which

is

subjected to/by social practices

and that which

is

the

subject of such practices (in both senses, as content
and agent, perhaps). Such dual
positioning,

I

claim, entails both a sense of opacity about the

ways

in

which the subject

submits to adopting an identity, and a sense of agency by which the
subject
in her

own

identity.

Thus, as adopted an identity

attempts to understand one

one

is

and

historically

adopted as such,

at

s

own

produced

history.

at the

evoked, claimed, and articulated,

is

the position from

An adopted identity

same time

once cannot be known

is

in

8
.

some

How

identity,

involved

which one

both essential to

who

when considered

as

transparent sense, but yet can be

the question of this essay.
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is

is

Wh.le such paradox-producing
notions regarding adopted
rise to

an overtly problematic chtldhood
or an overly rebellious
adolescence, they did

perhaps direct

me

toward the path of becoming a
philosopher. Phtlosophy as a

discourse of Truth has interested
in

.denttty did not give

me

not in terms of what

it

provides arguments

for,

but

terms of the tensions within such
arguments which cannot be erased.
Philosophy’s

concerns with

truth, objectivity,

knowledge, and certainty have called
to

me as

a scholar

as such concerns also suggest
notions (and, perhaps, fears) of
falsity, relativism, fiction,

and uncertainty. There has been an

interesting tension for

me, sometimes acknowledged

and sometimes only recognized through
feelings of anxiety and even
melancholy,

between

I

my knowing myself as adopted and my encountenng
philosophical
think

my reaction to much philosophy,

and especially

texts.

to writing

philosophically, has involved assuming the
position of the outlaw, the one on the

margins

who

critiques the normative discourse of
philosophy,

which such discourse might contribute
been so

to the marginalization

difficult in writing this essay, then, has

who names

the

ways

in

of the other. What has

been the complexity not only of

including the personal within the philosophical, but
of working with the different voices
that

each of those styles demands. Finding a way to be

(in the

space writing offers) both

an adopted self and a philosopher has been the task of this
essay, the unexpected journey
it

has taken

me

on. Negotiating the tensions between these

positions has involved reckoning with not only

two voices or author(iz)ing

my insecurities as a

writer, but

my

insecurities as a knower.

I

have wanted

to write

an essay from the point of view of being adopted-an

essay which would counter philosophy’s obsession with knowledge and clarity with
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my

own

(foundational) post, ion of contingency
and ambtguity.

critique of the traditional

their denial

demands

,

have wanted to present a

for epistemological certainty
as clearly oppressive in

of difference. But, the truth

is,

1

have always wanted to know.

as adopted has always involved
a “desire to know...” such that

my being adopted, my

experience of myself as an adopted
person, has been defined by and
desire.

My identity

in relation to this

9

Wh,le

my “desire to

knowing

is

adoption

in the

to open,

key

know.

has been of personal import to me,
the concept of

.

to the cultural signification

United States over the

and the social

of adoption as well. As the practices
of

last fifty

attitudes about adoption

years have changed, shifting from closed

have moved from those of shame

to

acceptance or even celebration, the issue
of ‘knowing’ (through such metonyms as
finding or ‘searching,’ for example)
continues to be an important part of how adoption
is

made

what

sense

of.

know when

I

When

I

have for example, almost always been addressed
by questions about

I

tell

did your parents

people that

tell

I

am

adopted.

Is

the usual litany of responses. Interestingly,

the last or seemingly most important question

I

know.
what

I

know, but what

.

.?

want

to

identity claim as

to

know

adopted

is

is

always the same and involves not only

know: “Have you ever searched?” “Do you want

Sometimes the question

might want

knowledge.

I

long have you known?”

you?” “What do you know about your biological family?”

“Do you know why you were given up?”

what

“How

cannot

really does

itself be

have a sense of an

named.

No

ellipsis in

it,

to

as if

matter the time and place,

my

almost always addressed within the context of self-

My claiming of adopted as an ontological position, or one about being, is
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re-inscribed in such dialogues as
an ep.stemological claim,
or one that

is

essentially

about knowing.
This reinscription not only

shifts the

weight of my claim, but importantly

it

raises an issue about the status
of knowledge in relation to identity.
Rather than merely

asking

me what know,
I

such interrogations address both the
object of knowing and the

sublet of knowing. The questions (and perhaps
the questioners themselves)
assume not
only that there

can know
desiring to

it

is

and

know

something

it is

to

know and

important to

me to know. While

is

how

How my desire

interpolated as such a self or subject

is

important, but that

that the

ways

I

both the issues of knowing and of

to

know

what

has been

has been possible and impossible to articulate,
involves

suggest here

is

I

want

to

the figuration of desiring self-knowledge
can itself be

productive of a certain kind of self.

it

such information

circulate in the cultural imagination
about adoption,

begin to address here

how

that

in

(who

is

made sense

how / have been

able to claim an identity).

which the “desire

to

know.

.

of,

What I want

to

” has been both denied
and

(mis-)recognized in terms of adoption reveals the ways in
which the what of self-

knowledge

is

intimately tied up with the

driven by the following questions:

fundamental to

somehow

my identity as

I

am

going to claim

This project

How can know my “desire
I

claim being adopted as an identity?

I

need

to

to present

know.

.

in a

And how might philosophy’s

my experiences of being adopted come together to make

possible?
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allows

.”
.

as

is

my “desire to know.
way which

thus

is

my “desire to know.

adopted, and, further, if my identity as adopted

a different kind of identity, do

differently?

and

if

who of self-knowledge.

.

me

to

claims about knowing

such a presentation

Issues of knowing and desire
were paramount to

adopted child

who

both

knew and accepted

in that narrative a desire
to search.

denial of this desire.

of course, then

told

my birthmother.
in

my

Importantly, the

occurred when

my mother that

I

1

was

six.

first lie

me

my intentions outloud.

about

my cousin's

(and to

Despite

its

feeling

the

was

telling

I

would search

articulation to

in a rather

someone

bragging kind

of ‘knowing...’ or of

‘finding...’

Kim

was an

Leighton.

was

they assured me,

a dangerous

I

now

way

intention to search, while

lied,

I

it

making public
exhibited

it

perhaps, was because

I

to really

‘desire to

my six-year old

sensed that not only was

be adopted.

being adopted, but the shame
the best of intentions,

my

more poignantly, exhibited me

also,

was not supposed

also sensed that being

should

I

someone who wanted to know

to be.

believe that

determination,

I

My

as true the cultural stereotypes associated

with the trope of 'illegitimacy.' While having
been adopted was not something
of,

for

should not feel adopted, which for them
meant

abandoned or inadequate or accepting

be ashamed

a

my saying "no” to my mother when she

important part of my imagination about
being an adult, a grown up
I

was

had told her mother who,

was eighteen

I

this desire

story, the fantasy

parents were always concerned that

I

remember

I

My cousin

when

said that

sensed that admitting to

child.

herself as adopted, and yet
always ineluded

mother's family) was impossible, and
regretted having,

of way, spoken
asked

I

It

me as a

I

do

not adopted, and, as such,

felt

feel)

I

I

lied out

know.

.

was never

me

The reason

as adopted.

I

I

think

I

not supposed to feel adopted, but

of shame, perhaps— not the shame of

as just the

same

rule.

as

referred to as adopted, nor
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my

senses of curiosity, will, and even

from breaking some implicit

considered

by speaking

.’

My parents (with

my cousins who

was

I

ever (that

I

were

knew

My brother and

Of) treated differently.

my cousins
I

grew up

got the

feeling that

nothing to do with

what people

liked, loved,

I

the sensitivity

also felt an

was

in

I

had

to

to

my aunts,

Obviously,

parents as “adoptive” nor could

whom

I

looked

also important not to

I

like.

make

this

me had

was good.

in

not adopted in

such practices, a

uncles, etc.: they

(i.e.,

clearly,

was

my extended

commandment

were who they were

not adopted).

I

not

(i.e.,

My being like them

my following this command of

which ‘family’ language games

I

could (and could

could not talk about being adopted-I could not refer
to

I

myself as adopted or discuss how

about

who were

be the same as they were,

likeness took the form of limiting

in.

of course,

that

that they were.

my family felt about my being adopted meant that

some ways an achievement. Most

not) participate

ways

and found annoying about

unspoken imperative present

which was not addressed
adopted), but

from our grandparents

gifts

my being adopted. And in many ways,

seemingly treated the same as those children
family,

same

We were seemingly loved and teased in the same

did.

While

I

I

it

felt to

be such.

I

could definitely not refer to

could muse outloud about

In addition to

my birth

my

family or wonder

being silent during some conversations,

logical mistakes

which would

raise the spectre

it

was

of adoption.

could not, for instance, compare myself to members of family in ways which
didn’t

make ready

sense.

way, or

way which could

in a

could ‘have’

But

I

I

could be “just like”

my father’s

could not say

seemed too close

I

had

“gift

(if

my father or grandmother in

a general kind of

necessary) be explained as a product of socialization.

of gab,” for instance, or

their legs, their eyes, or

some

to the body.
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my grandmother’s

stubbornness.

other particular feature that

I

My silence around my body and its relation to
unspoken the

was just

of my adoption, but moreover,

fact

like those

who were

it

the bodies of others not
only

helped invest

left

in the narrative that

I

not adopted. The markings of
my bodily identity could,

without being talked about, be ‘read’
as if they had the same meanings,
the same

(imagined) history as those bodies of
my relatives.

markings are

which

in

some sense

exists pre-culturally

‘real,’ that

and

is

I

to suggest that bodily

they reflect some natural meaning
(or identity)

then ‘expressed’ through language.
The notion of

bodies as meaningful containers of signs
of relation,
constituted (in part)

do not mean

I

am

suggesting,

is

a notion

by spoken language games of family resemblance
and

silent

language games based on assumptions and
on habits of association. 10

While
between the
family,

it

is

it

is

am

my project here

cultural constructions

do a philosophical analysis of the relationship

to

and meanings of the body and the

politics

of the

important to note that the two themes here of “being
just like” the non-

adopted and being

I

not

silent

about the body or the bodily are key to understanding
the issues

raising about the desire to

know.

1

I

was

silent

about

my body so that my body

could be considered as part of the body of my family, so that

it

could reflect

(constitutively) the identity that such inclusion engendered.
This practice of making a

body seem
se.

I

to be ‘naturally part

was able

to

be

silent

about

of the family was not particular

my body,

already being spoken, in part, because

able to live without

my adoption,

1950’s and 1960’s, was (probably) conducted in a

would (seem

to) exist.
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like

to

its

my own

that

per

difference always

many others

way such

family,

during the

no such ‘difference’

The dominant ideology regarding
adoption

at the

time during which

adopted involved policies which, when
implemented, would
cbility ,0

know

that a child

was adopted. This was done

in fact limit

in terms

I

was

anyone's

of both htdtng actual

informal, on whteh pertamed to the
‘difference’ of the eh, Id and the
process by which he

or she

was begotten-sealing

records, changing birth certificates,
etc.-and ‘hiding’ those

bodily markings by which a child’s
difference might stand out. In order
to clear the
child (and the family) from the stigma(s)
of adoption,

physical

it

was thought

that child’s

appearance should ‘match’ that of the adopted
family. While most clearly

(and comphcatedly) about racial likeness,
the policy of ‘matching’ included
other
features thought to be tokens important
to (creating) family likeness.
the

euphemism of "background” such

As

contained

issues as class, education, and interests
could

become themselves morphological, or thought of as having
some connection
bodily identity and identification of the family
So, while

my family’s

idea that ‘being adopted'

which could be claimed
that

was

that.

articulate a

I

desire to

silent about,

desire

known,

as painful as

it

sensitivity

it

was

was not something

different,

know.

.

something

to

it

12

in

to

many ways

I

let

it

did promote the

alone something

was “a Leighton.” And

seemed, and there was nothing “to know.” To

were, like

wonder about

seems, was to disown

was impossible

helpful,

be talked about,

then was as illogical as

.

to the

.

as an important part of my identity.

my desire to know,

musings about
be

was not

in

it

was improper. Hence

my

my musings about my body-something to

alone.

To

my identity as

13
.
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articulate

them and make

a Leighton, a rejection

my

which was

The manipulation of ‘difference’-especially
through
‘body’- as a means of creating
identity

is

the figurations of the

not unique to the practices of
adoption.

[A]s conscious ly constructed and
scripted kinship,” writes Judith
Modell and

Dambacher, “adoption reveals fundamental
premises about
which themselves

reflect ideologies that in

nature and culture, fictive and real .” 14

To

Western

birth, blood,

.

Naomi

and contract,

societies enshrine the dichotomies

construct any collective identity as
if it

is

unified— culturally, politically, historically,
ethnically-for example, can involve
practices

which deny the importance of difference, or
even place

difference onto others

who

are then considered outside the

the

marker or sign of

main group. Such

formations of unity also often rely on a notion
of sameness based on something
naturally given rather than socially or legally
constructed. This sameness gives the

cohesion and unity of the group formed a kind of
facticity that

Borrowing a term from Theodore Adorno,

Iris

Marion Young

is

refers to the

through which a kind of ontological sameness as a kind
of being

of identity.

The

logic

of identity,” she

of substance rather than process or

beyond questioning.

is

means

created as the “logic

writes, “tends to conceptualize entities in terms

relation; substance is the self-same entity that

underlies change, that can be identified, counted, measured .” 15

Hence, the logic of identity engenders the possibility of having a nature
a
,

something which can be one’s essence. Such an essence,
be transmitted to others, assuring

that, like

property

identity will continue on. This construction

which

is

itself,

this logic contends,

the property that

is

can then

the

of identity as a kind of natural essence

transferred through practices of inheritance-both reproductive and legal,

perhaps-but

is

not constituted by them

is

not unsimilar,
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I

want

to suggest, to the kind

of

‘as-if-the-same’ construction
involved in a traditional,
historically ‘closed’ adoption

such as mine. According to
anthropolog.st Barbara Yngvesson

consmuted

as a location

re-inscription

of the

‘the family- is

,

and source of identity through the
s.multaneous denial of and

‘natural.’

She wntes regarding .rational
closed adoptton:

American adoption laws circumvented
the common law ‘repugnancy’
reating chi dren by act’ with
a kind of legal sleight-of-hand
in

the films nullius [the concept

to

which

of the child as ‘nobody’s child, a
child
could be incorporated into the new
(adoptive) family by
Y
erasing the old (biological) family;
this ‘old’ family then became
the
covert mode! for the new one, in the
‘biological’ space made available
through the law’s erasure of ‘original’
blood ties. In this way the ‘blood
institution (Shaley 1 989: 1
1 ) that is central to the concept
of family in
nglo-American culture and law was simultaneously
eradicated and
without

filiation]

affirmed.

As

a kind of simulacra then, the adoptive
family

is

reproduced as the ‘natural’

through the denial of bodily details and
traces in the family

produced by law. As the
essence of its

own

identity to

cultural participation,

adopted,

i.e.,

*

I

who

‘passes’ as if it

as the natural family, the adoptive family
can transfer the

its

kin.

In order to

have an

identity, then, a requisite for

not only had to be a Leighton, but

I

had

to

be ‘bom’ and not

without ambiguous or fabricated or un-natural origins.

I

not only the language games of my particular family,
but the language
identity.

heritage,

Being able

who

to take

on

my name

fact

to

game

meant being someone who could

marked

as “adopted”

(i.e.,

as not a bastard in

perform

that is

trace her

some important

and epistemological senses) involved adopting a model of identity
is

had

could trace through the logic of patronym the lineage of her family.
The

cost of not being

sameness,

was not

founded on nature, and believes

of adoption

is

in essences.

17

In

historical

that celebrates

such adoptions where the

erased, being adopted thus involves not only being treated just like
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those

who were

not adopted, but moreover,

being adopted" as an

It

is

it

involves denying taking or claiming

identity.

not only the institutional practices
of the State and the family which
perform

such “sleight-of-hand” acts-acts which,
as Modell and Dambacher describe,
make
18
possible “[t]he slide from appearance to
essence.”
Part of the ongoing construction
of

the fiction of ‘naturalness’ in general
and the natural essence that

connection of the family-i.e.,
reiteration

its

identity- in particular,

the morphological

depends upon the constant

of the logic of identity through the everyday. 19
Having an identity thus

entails being addressed as a certain kind

particular (normative) ways.

non-traditional

grade family

told

is

families),

tree, or filling

“you look just

like

I,

like

of subject

most adoptees

have had

to face the

who

both

is

and knows her

(as well as others

identity in

who come from

awkwardness involved

doing the 7th

in

out ‘medical histories’ at the doctor’s office, or simply
being

your parents.” Such instances evidence the assumption and

expectation of the ability to perform an identity in a certain
truth-ful, non-ambiguous

way. Other everyday practices show
disciplinary

practices.

my telling them
look

that

that

I

Many times

I

am

likeness

like

your Dad.

them (biologically

comes from

in

was adopted by

(are, act, etc.) just like

how

such expectations of identity involve

my life,

for instance, people

saying, “No, you’re not.

Such denials

related to

have responded

You couldn

’t

be.

to

You

indicate not only the assumption

my family),

but an additional assumption that

a kind of biological essence, a kind of naturalness. Together these

assumptions eradicate the possibility

(in a

difference. This position of impossibility,

most

literal

where

way) of my claiming a position of

my difference

because of the assumptions of others continued through
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could not be articulated

much of my

life.

I

was

constantly addressed as not adopted,
and such acts of interpolation, such
readings of

being just like the non-adopted, not
only rendered
responses to such addresses impossible.

How

my adoption

could

1

answer

invisible;

it

made my

their address as

someone

they seemingly could not recognize?
In

middle school,

I

was not adopted. Because

simply decided to ‘fake
I

knew

that the

biological lineage, a tree of ‘begetting’,

I

remember having

made

home

deliberated about

for discussion,

my family,

of my parents’

mind

you.)

as

I

managed

families.

I

I

knew

how

also

me

to

that

what

I

I

know

that

could claim to

who I was was what

I

didn

wonder now what she thought was
“lucky.”

What

was not an

to

did she think

it

a tree of

true.

issue

I

I

20

had

brought

teacher wrote

have so much information

Simultaneously her comments were directed

having chosen to write what

was

wrote was not exactly

my humanities

that

was “lucky”

knew

I

had, in a sense, plagiarized, having copied

critical to

this tree

as if I

proceed with the assignment, and that

remember

that

I

my family tree

to include in the project facts about several generations

completely missed me. She did not
that

assignment assumed

a ‘choice’ to take the path of least resistance.
(This

under the A-minus that she gave
about

I

‘drawing’

it’,

’t

know

this ‘lineage’

down

know

at

me and

was a

fabrication,

another’s family tree as

rather than expose that

yet

my own,

what was

(and in some sense couldn’t know).

the import of such knowledge, such that

I

I

was

gave me?

Later, through high school,

I

confronted

my own

feelings of forgery and

complicity, of ‘passing’ as a ‘lucky’ one, and the assumptions of such institutional

practices

by

deliberately writing

on

all

requests regarding medical information and

“family history” (which were surprisingly many)

in big
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bold

letters

on a diagonal across

“ADOPTED.”

the page:

was old enough

I

to

out such forms by myself, and
so

fill

without the presence of my parents’
imagined gaze,

took

I

this step

of marking myself as

not the same as biologically-reproduced
subjects. Interestingly, this
self-ascription or

marking was usually met with a kind of
lacuna: upon learning of my
adoption almost
all

medical personnel would not (and

either about

still

often don’t) ask any family history
questions,

my adopted or about my biological

individual history portion of the inquisition.

families, skipping right along to
the

They read

“ADOPTED” as

indicative,

it

seems, of the position of someone incapable
of answering such questions. Perhaps they

assume

that if

statement, and

I

knew my biological medical

history,

I

would have not have made such

would have just simply checked off the appropriate
diseases and

a

filled in

21
the corresponding lines left blank next to
“relationship .”

While the demands of a “matching” ideology
the legacies of shame and secrecy-made

know.

own

.

earlier in

.

issues

similar for

my life

,

the

which make such an

me

in

new

meant

that

rather impossible to speak

it

my “desire

to

age of “openness” regarding adoption has had

articulation

my “desire to

misrecognized) as normative, that

t)

adoptions-including

of desire

difficult to perform.

What

its

is

both paradigms involves the tendency towards being read as just like

the non-adopted, such that

wouldn

in traditional

is

know.

as being

.

.” is still

understood (and

what ‘normal’ subjects would

(or

do. Being just like the not adopted or ‘as if not adopted while growing up

my desire to know could only be

like theirs as well.

While adoption

itself

has become a more public phenomenon of late, the greater access to information and

more open discussions of adoption have made
to

know, but not necessarily more

likely to

it

more possible

to talk about

my desire

have such desire understood. What
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is still at

issue in both of these contexts

the need to address

is

absence of such information means, what

having an

am

we

gives or takes

think the presence or

away from one’s

notion of

identity.

Just as

I

it

what

unsure

if

I

I

could not answer the question “when
were you told you were adopted?”

could answer the question

Unlike the ubiquitous questions

you know,
nervous, as

etc.) this

I

“why did you

search for your birthmother?”

have been addressed with (how old were
you, what do

I

question of why has never been asked.

often feel

when

I

start telling

my

Its

makes me

inarticulation

‘story’ that there are

unspoken

assumptions about the meaning of my search, including
misunderstandings about the
desire to search, the

Two common

identity.

First,

meaning of the body, and

many people

the understanding of and importance of

notions evoked reflect what

often express their belief that

it

is at

stake in such a misrecognition.

is ‘natural’ to

want

second, they extend this claim of naturalness to (or perhaps even
base

imaginings of what they would want to

know

here are something like

natural to be curious”

adopted

I

would

In both

knowledge,

in

“Of course,

definitely

want

of these tropes

to

we

it’s

if

is

begin to see that what

articulations about desiring

While

I

used to think

this

to

on) their

and “Well,

if

.

.”

is

own

were

I

oneself,

involved in claims of self-

is

not only the establishment

my

well.

More

was just an
more

than being

‘coming out’ as adopted almost always invoke

knowing, articulations which assert a who who

natural to be curious about me,

And

.

know.”

claims about “desiring to know.

known, responses

it

22

know

they were adopted. The tropes involved

of the object of knowledge, but of the subject of knowledge as
about what

to

interest in

recently

I

what / desired

have begun
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to

know,

to consider

is

that

how

desiring.

it

was

others’

articulations regarding their

adoption invokes

in general.

involved in knowing
reason to not

own

know

(or,

desires to

know

reflect

Th.s insecurity opens up a

an insecurity (or anx,ety)

way

to see

how

that

the fantasy

conversely, in not having reason
to des.re to know, no. having

or even to doubt oneself) which
elides into a kind of being (one

doesn't have to know, one just

an X)

is

is

a fantasy that establishes the
self with

its

coherent, natural, and unquestionable
identity, as capable of being a
legitimate knower.

While

am no

1

longer quiet about being adopted,
especially

as biologically related to

identity: either

my

my

family,

being adopted

is

I

am

still

uncertain

‘forgotten’ or

Having, as an adult, searched for and found

am

I

how

when

I

am

speak about

to

my adopted

constructed as the ‘lucky’ one. 23

my birthmother, am cautious about how
I

respond to the responses of others when they
leam of my ‘successful’ search

have often

what

1

felt like

now ‘know’

identification

I

felt

people respond to

and how great

Thus

it

it

it

was easy

or what

when

1

to

have

my desire

to

know

(and

I

seems

to

story, for

I

my understanding of

often feel uncomfortable

my story with a kind of empathy about what

must be

I

‘found’) appropriated and misread. Similar to the
false

‘passed’ as not adopted,

1

mis-read

it

means

when

to be adopted

know my birthmother.

that haunting the articulation

recognized within an identity discourse

—

i.e.,

of the desire to know, when

the logic of identity

—

is

a kind of

ontological un-certainty, an uncertainty relieved by the presumption
of an

epistemological power. That such knowing

more about
denies) the

is

less

the (cultural) legibility or legitimacy

its

knowing subject became more apparent

mentioning to a colleague that

my birth

about the information

having offers (and

to

me when,

mother was coming
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known and

its

absence

several years ago, after

to visit,

I

was

invited to

tell

‘my

story' to a local

presented

At

I

first

told,

my

how did

woman who

that

was

quite interested in

make me

feel,

It

was

the

forum and

I

time that

did not

I

had ever

know what

to expect.

my experience of being adopted-when

was

later their interest shtfted

my story of searching

for

and finding the

gave birth to me. After outlining the details
of my search, many of the

became apparent

to

me

own

stories

that this not

of what they did not ‘know’ about

knowing was of crucial importance

Several parents lamented that they did not or even
could not
children’s backgrounds.

infinite list

first

was I teased by others-but

became very engaged with

parents began to offer their

It

24
.

narrative of adoption in a public

the audience

as the parents

group of adoptive parents

know

They wished they could have names,

of items regarding information they seemed

their children.

to them.

the details of their

dates, places, stories—an

to think critical to their

children’s identities.

At
that

this point in

I

began

to

become uncomfortable

as

it

was

clear

such lack of knowledge was a lack more crucial to these parents
than to their

children.

I

was being constructed by

information, as

they.

my presentation

As

somehow more whole

a group, the parents

one’s past, of one’s

I

the audience as “lucky” (again), as full of

seemed

made one

life,

than their children, or

to suggest that not

less than a

wondered, sympathetically,

if the

maybe more whole than

knowing

were raising me.
give them.

It

I

parents weren’t transposing their anxieties as

my own anxieties, perhaps,

began

was during

to

wonder what

this presentation

of the details of

whole person.

both parents and as adoptive parents onto their children, though
resentfully, transposing

all

it

if

I

my parents

also wondered,

felt this

way when

they

was they thought such “information” would

of mine and the audience’s response
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that

I

really considered not

not solve

‘who

all

what

I

did

know

of the identity issues

that

about

1

my birth

relationships,

and encouraged

all

my identity,

Anxious and

am

I

I

I?” ever

more

clear.'

slightly frustrated in the face

asked the group

if

then asked if any of them had in the

they had never

the case,

known

new

last ten

startling.

they and their loved ones were.

s

histories

own

how

s

hands went up.

were between 35 and 50,

I

groaned

changes

in

in response, raising

what they knew about

suggested to them to consider in relation to their

and

identity

was

was revised such
itself

the complexity of their desire to

an

(i.e.,

that a true

ideal, if not a fiction.

know, of our (Western modem)

imperative regarding the knowledge of the self and the failure to meet such an

idealization,

truth

No

such ‘knowledge’ in and of their «o«-adoptive

definitive narrative of their family

culture

(all

of adopted

families and histories, something

Many of them

biological or natural) families circulated, changed,

To underscore

in the context

or even something that contradicted what they
had believed to be

maybe even something

adopted children

identity.

5

years or so

about their

its

of my audience’s implied assumptions

their hands, rolling their eyes as they considered
the

who

problematized some of my

any of them were themselves adopted.

thought) found out something

my questions about

the impossibility of definitively

(and misunderstandings) about the status
of knowledge
families,

such knowing did

kinds of re-def,n,tion of my family
and

Knowledge" of my birth family has indeed
made
answering the question “who

how

had. Rather than resolving

am,” ‘finding' a new family complicated

1

family, but

of my

I

offered a story from

identity.

through which

I

my own

search for and failure to find the (imagined)

Like other agencies in other

states, the

Catholic organization

was placed offered me “non-identifying” information when I presented
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myself to them
offered that

I

moved when
the

name, the

age of nineteen.

at the

Among other details the

social

worker there

had been named “Mary Kathleen.” 26
The parents

in the

room were audibly

1

relayed

original

my knowledge of my (non-identifying ongin-al) name.
name of their

child

seemed so important

to them, as

it

To know

had been to

me.

I

that

met

finally

name around

my birth mother when

as a secret

was

I

27, so for over eight years,

and magical key which carried

me back

part of

my imagining a life

I

did not have.

shining ring, the stone of which represented the truth
of who
self

whom would have
I

Mary Kathleen

been had

I

not been adopted.

I

I

It

carried

towards a past

which had been hidden and forward towards a future
which might have

name was an important

I

existed.

was

a

The

gift, a

was, a secret true me, the

would have been,

I

thought, a

not a Kimberly Jean.

After several conversations and meetings with

my birthmother,

of “the name.” In a casual voice, perhaps unaware of the investment
those two words, she responded, saying “Oh,

I

had forgotten about

I

raised the issue

I

had made

that.”

in

The audience

gasped. This was almost as “bad” as saying that she had forgotten the actual date of my
birthday,

it

seemed.

asked

I

my birthmother why she chose

both silenced and relieved me: “I’m not sure.
friend at the birthing

Something

to give

home named

with...”

I

that,

though,

The emphasis

if

here, as

I

I

in a

think

thought

you as a good-bye, knowing

There was a pause. She continued
have named you

Kathy.

I

that

it

I

that

name and her response

had an aunt named Mary and a

was a pure sounding name.

you certainly wouldn’t keep

voice hesitant and sensitive: “But,

was going

to

keep you.

It

was

a

name

I

it.”

never would

to leave

you

heard her words, was on the leaving not on the with.
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There was

now

a tension in the

room with

had done something wrong. Something

some unspoken

who

people

As

I

metonymic object

I

had also broken a key

re-read this event now,

speak to the group about

to

how I had

I

that stands in for

my self.
self,

was

I

the

same

them how
justified

I

as mine, not something

had constructed

know

I

was asked

my birth mother,

to present to the audience

“need to know”

I

to

a

my “desire

satisfied that

(to

show them

as adoptive parents)

that

it

by showing

as natural, as morally right, as

by the happy ending.

As I had

presented

my search narrative to the audience,

of a happy ending with a kind of aporia, however,

Western culture
satisfy the

I

I

between adoptees and the

and the means by which

to

felt like

rule about the role of the speaker
in

odd about them

my own need

I

had not only perhaps broken

think that on a meta-level

My narrative was to legitimate the parents’

desire.

I

searched for and found

know” my history, my biology, my

was

wrong.

rules (of hierarchy) about the relationship

adopt them, but

such a forum.

really

the adoptive parents, and

to present oneself as an object

I

had challenged the demand

of knowledge

demands of the

in

to oneself and to others, to

demands of such knowing by rendering myself as an

had, in short, aroused but resisted the

replacing the simplicity

object free of ambiguity.

logic of identity.

My narrative of

searching and finding did not end with self-knowledge in a traditional sense, but instead
left

open

(in

an unclose-able or aporetic way) what the meaning of the knowledge

I

found was.

While the adoptive parents’
refusal

of the desire

to

something they have

know

in

desire to

know seems

to

be very different from the

within the paradigm of matching and silence, there

common

in

is

terms of the production of identity. Both contexts
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involve knowledge (about the child, the
families, the bodies,

provide th e force of identity. In the
paradigm of silence,

this

being thought to

etc.)

knowledge was produced

through an erasure of details which might
contradict what could be read or seen
about
the body; whereas in the

are at issue, but the

to

know

paradigm of openness

power they seem

involved making the

,

to hold as

unknown of their

bodily moreness in ‘matching,’ their desire to

it is

not the bodily details per se which

unknown. The adoptive
children

know

known;

involved,

I

the otherness that haunts the construction of
identity. Again, as

presented, difference

She

when seen

as otherness

is

parents’ desire

like the desire to erase

think, a desire to erase

Iris

Marion Young has

a threat to the construction of identity.

writes:

Through the

logic

of identity thought seeks

to bring everything

under
and unpredictability, to spiritualize the
of sensuous immersion in a world that outruns the subject, to

control, to eliminate uncertainty

bodily fact

eliminate otherness. Such a subject
origin,

it

has no foundation outside

autonomous

it

to

it

might

is

in fact

know

self-generating and

when

the identity in question

know such

involved more than just getting more

It

seemed they

information because they wanted to eradicate the uncertainty to

it

(themselves) evoked.

complicated; for clearly, these adoptive parents wanted to

biological information not because such

identities, a truth they

is

be merely difference. But the

details or stories they could offer their children.

the establishment of identity that not having

here

is

seems, might be acceptable

passion involved in the parents’ desire to

wanted

it

27

not one produced through adoption;

more

conceived as a pure transcendental

itself,

.

Such otherness,

information,

is

and

knowledge was the

their particular cultural values
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truth

The

know

issue of truth

their children’s

of their children’s

and practices could not

compete with, evidence

that there

because nature had already

won

was no eompetit.on between nature and
nurture

out.

Rather, having such information
would give the

adoptive parents, in some way, th e
power invested in such knowledge, power
that seems
to

deepen (and to threaten) when such
knowledge

Aware of the ever-changing

is

absent.

narratives of family definition and
the uncertainty

present in any intimate organization,
the parents in

my audience

implicitly

were

still

appealing to an ideal of self-knowledge, to
the possibility of knowing with certainty
the
origins of individuals.' 8 Despite their

parents

still

the importance of it.

knower of the Western
his

uncertainties of their

own

families, these

believed in (or were strongly imagining) both
the possibility of such

knowing and

knowing

own

own

political

self-origins.

They were

in their desires to

know

citing the ideal

and epistemological subject, an agent capable of

Despite their obvious care about and investments in the

families they were making, these parents were treating
knowledge about the ‘others’

(and the otherness) in their families in a

way

similar to the

ways

in

which Western

philosophers have considered knowledge-its status and power-for
several hundred
years: as discernible, knowable, capable of certainty,

the answers to one’s identity.

(itself, in

some

and

of, paradoxically,

providing

My intuition here is that rather than having the bodily

sense) be the morphological substance through which identity

is

established and transmitted, this example suggests that knowledge of the bodily can
itself when

known be

that

not exactly sameness that

which
is

here

is

the morphological ‘source’ of identity.

at issue, there is

supplement the adoptive family, allowing
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it

is

something about knowing without

impediment, some romance with (biological) information giving
that will

While

it

it

the status of Truth,

a sense of normative identity. In

other words, what

it

known

is

thought to be able to render identity,
but rather than

is still

being the facts themselves which
evidence identity,

unified, transparent,

So
know.

I

unambiguous,

tale,

had questioned the purpose of their
naturalness of the desire to know,
the social,

know

—engenders

learned that the parents’ desire to

had, in the telling of my

I

etc.

and even the

political.

is

it

know was

not the

had put into

I

making

it

There

is

which—as

identity.

not only presented

desire.

the having of them

a desire

same

my desire

as

my desire to

as different, but

relief the issue

more connected

of the

to the cultural,

a paradox of sorts involved in the desire
to

within the logic of identity, especially in the
context of knowing the self through

The

family.

seems

to

desire to

know

as natural, as something ‘anyone’

would want

be about connection, about relation, about one’s intimate

such, what

is

known could never be

to

know
As

ties to others.

complete. If how one becomes ‘who one

linked to the lives of others and the meanings of their lives,
then an

ad

is’ is

infinitum quickly

develops. But what if according to the logic of identity, identity
doesn’t become

How
to

does the notion that an identity

be relevant information about our

I

do not want

to

Scheman, a paranoid
There

is

a

way that

go too

logic at

far,

work

is

has being,

is,

is

substance affect what

identities, especially in

but

I

think that there

in the construction

information about the

be patrolled for otherness, such that

There

I

its

when

self,

is,

On

the one

it is.

consider

terms of the family?

borrowing from Naomi

of identity as a substance

29
.

constructed as knowledge, has to

status as identity-knowledge can be secured.

a tension for instance in the adoptive parents’ desire to

children’s lives.

we

;

hand they want

to

reflects their children’s connections to others

know of this

—

know

the ‘facts’ of their

information as that which

other people, cultures, languages,
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ethnicities,

and even other names. But

once known, must become

details,

their children, the facts

of the

identity

children

s identities less

less a different kind

asked, the parents

their identities

I

wonder

is

that there

identity.

is

says that she

(The exact predicate here, what

my shorthand.
is less

It

when
and

is in

it

to believe that self-

the facts about

definitely

who

ellipsis

know

were adopted,

if

The

seems we want

common

“Oh,

I

only

it

suggested by the other

be without the knowledge

or even unstated.

yet,

someone

would

I

would
it

is that

definitely

would seem,

that she has.

want

my speaking

response to

want

to

to

know

know.
is

as she asserts that she

The

would not

She could not imagine not knowing.

must be known,

itself,

.”
.

referring to

is

necessarily

left

incomplete

involved in “I would definitely want to know.

the statement

else’s

about our own. That such a fantasy involves the

her experience as a non-adopted person,

to

their

that information about themselves

of identity

in fact not

we can know them

(non-adopted) person

want

having such information doesn’t make

was no way

we can

fantasy of self-transparency

my adopted

if

the adopted

life,

constant, secured, without change or ambiguity.

possible, that

identity, but that

and complete. As knowledge they have about

adopted, less about being adopted (which the
parents were not),

In order to construct the fantasy

knowledge

then the

facts,

of identity than they themselves believe they have. But

knew

was

finite

they want these details to be

can be used within the construction of the new

For me,

child.

if

indicating that what

it

is

that is

.

.” is

being

not

known

important than the act of knowing (imagined or otherwise).) This inability to

imagine not knowing

(...)

would seem

to indicate that the content

of this knowing

important to her identity that she could not imagine (being) herself without
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it.

is

so

But
part

how

of the trope

even though
different

then of her imagining herself
as adopted?

definitely

same person with

the

words, these subjects

who would want

I

to

same

the

know,” but the

to

know”

having totally different familial,

we have been

desire to

(to

at

is that

is

know), and simultaneously

cultural, class, etc., positions.

relies

know

desire to know’, then,

upon and

his

to

know

own

were

would

in

raise the spectre

of

While the notion of

articulated here suggests that

Such an

familial.

constitutes a notion

I

articulation

of the

of identity as .ve//-sameness

What

this suggests

(one’s family), paradoxically, can be a desire which
asserts,

want

autonomy (from

to suggest, recites

autonomous, particularly as

way through

I

exploring has been that which maintains a kind
of self-sameness

constructs, and even confirms one’s

identity as

“If

are imagining that they

foundational to the status of the individual subject.

the desire to

is

once assert a sameness over time of their

of self-sameness transcends the

know' both

over time that

part

desires and needs around their
identities

between (and among) family members, the desire
this establishment

first

The second

thought experiment, they are imagining
themselves in a very

In other

desires and of the

identity

want

who “would definitely want

in their

life.

would

is “I

adopted,” Those

some sense be

make sense

to

it

family).

The

naturalizing of the

and perhaps re-enacts the paradigm of

posits the existence of the self as

—a movement which reduces

identity

knowing

his

the complexity of

‘relatedness’ to the singularity of identity

The

desire to

know

for both the adoptive parents

imagines herself as adopted, as
certainty.

As both

knowledge of that

I

have explored

parties invoke the

identity as finite

it

thus

and

far,

for the interlocutor

who

involves a desire for

model of identity as substance, they construct

and suggest

that the
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having of such knowledge

itself

performs a legitimate

identity.

subject's (desire to be able to

The desire

know

in fact, is a desire

with) certainty, and thus

existence of the subject (and his identity)
as real.

which exhibits the
is

a desire

which

The exhibition of such

asserts the

desire to

know

functions as (or becomes metonymical
with, perhaps) the idea that such
a desire to

know

can be

satisfied (by the subject itself).

Foucault,

era,

knowing oneself was

he writes,

“.

to tell the truth

.

.one of the

According

a requirement for

to historian

modem

main moral obligations

and

for oneself.”

subjectivity. In the

any subject

Michel

modem

know

is to

oneself,
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That the exhibition of such self-knowledge
that the obligation

is

doubly required: To

recognized as a subject

for others.

it

I

is

part of this moral obligation

is

satisfy this

of the subject and evidence or proof of one’s

it

critic

about oneself, and to constitute oneself as
an object of knowledge both

for other people

performs

for

and social

moral obligation

means

both the work

is

subjectivity. In other words, to be

required that one have such self-mastery and that one

think that the exhibition of the “desire to know.

.

.” in this

sense

performs one’s status as subject, and thus attempts to secure one’s
position as (socially

and

politically) intelligible.

(exhibition of the desire to

the capacity for

if

Critically then, there

know)

is

is

a paradox here, for as “desire” this

necessarily a performance that at once entails both

knowledge and the absence of knowledge. Being through

desire,

even

a desire for knowing, opens up a space of vulnerability. Working through this

dialectic

of vulnerability, of certainty and

lack, is the heart

of my project

in

developing a

notion of adopted identity.

Intelligibility, i.e., the erasure

alludes to lack,

comes

at

of the desire

to

know

a cost. In one sense, the cost
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is

as desire, as that which

a kind of schism in the subject,

a kind of impossible position.
In another sense, the eost
their

meanings) with others. Discussing the
ways

in

is

a limiting of relations (and

which philosophy, having shaped

the standards of knowledge, has
affected this schism in the subject,

how

highlights

splitting.

As

the maintenance of epistemological
certainty might result in a kind of

the subject has to secure his

estrangement from that which

unknowable of the self— those

Scheman

Naomi Scheman

is

own

certainty through a process of

uncertain— such as the body,

parts of him

calls ‘epistemic authority,’

relations to others, the

which thus impinge

must be denied. This

his claiming of,

what

denial, she explains,

engenders a subject (both the individual subject
and the subject of philosophy) severely
divided. This division leads to a kind of
paranoia, as a subject

authorized,

who

as

can pass as bodiless) feels he must choose between
the legitimate status

of epistemic authorization and the il-legitimate
identified) with the body.

Such a

(who can pass

Scheman

status

of being too closely associated (or

writes:

by its estrangement from its own body, from the
external world, and from other people, will, in a culture
that defines
self,

privileged

such estrangements as normal, express the paranoia of such a
stance not
only through oppression, but, more benignly, through the problems
that

are taken as the

most fundamental, even if not the most practically
pressing: the problems of philosophy.
Such problems are literally and
.

.

unsurprisingly unsolvable so long as the subject’s very identity
constituted by those estrangements.
subject whose authority

A

by

his location

gulf away.

'

is

defined

on one side of a gulf cannot authoritatively theorize

that

1

My project here is to approach the
adoption in a

is

way which does

‘desire to

know’ within

the narrative of

not re-invest in such a paranoid logic, and which would

allow for an articulation of such desire without disciplining the subject according to the

norms of epistemic

authority.

As

the paranoia of which
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Scheman

writes seems to

come

from the very dichotomies by which
western philosophy

is

compelled, any attempt to

develop a philosophical subject who/that
escapes the costs of such paranoia
must escape
also the logic of ‘splitting’ endemic
to

such paranoid logic,

I

For an adopted subject

it.

to resist the

contend, the ‘desire to know’ must not
be a desire that strives for

resolution, for unity, for oneness, as such
(imaginary) singularities will
splitting off of that

I

want

to suggest a

achieve a

way

which

is

way to

Naming my own

demand

inconsistent, incoherent, unable to be
assimilated.

As

such,

of (aporetic) self-knowing without paranoia.

‘desire to

know’

is

thus a risky business for me.

I

believe that being adopted, assuming ‘adopted’ as an
ontological position,

always recognizing that the complexities of “who one

is” are

in discursive flux,

who one

is is

always

have come
is

to

about

produced by and

negotiated through multiple social practices and relationships.

always changing, always

the

explore the moreness of adopted identity as a
means to

to articulate a kind

production, so too

dangers of

As

these practices are

and depend upon repetition

in process, in relationship

for their

with others, and in

need of re-signification. Claiming being adopted as an identity thus involves
appreciating the fact that identities in general are socially constructed and that the

appearance of solidity, of substance or essence,

While
fill

I

believe this to be true,

in the gaps, to flesh out

another,” has had in

my story,

my life.

I

is itself

an effect of such construction.

also recognize the force the desire to

and

yes,

even

to “see

my face

know,

in the face

to

of

There has been an affective or emotional place constituted

where the trope of ‘being adopted’ as

the story of my identity and the trope of ‘being

adopted’ as the story of my body intersect.

It is

here in this intersection between the

narratives of identity and of body (which are, perhaps, the limits of the metaphor of
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adoption), that

my desire

space, however,

I

to

know becomes

both announced and

cannot claim (to know) that

this is its place

felt.

As

a liminal

My

of origin.

philosophical and political explorations
of what being a(n adopted) subject
means to

have produced

this ‘desire to

believe that the self

that the subject

know' as a kind of epistemological
excess:

transparent to

is

and

citational is limited.

socially or biologically caused,

truth,

nor

is

such

it

it

It is

is

know my

of the

such that

cannot explain (away)

a kind of remainder

which points

knowing

but not an explicable desire based on

a desire not to

who

is

I

itself or for others)

neither a desire for certainty, for

self as a subject outside

subject

it

As

neither

desires can be explained, nor

its

an abandonment of the search for authority.

me and my history,
lack.

such that

can be an object of knowledge (for

status as in-process

my self. As

itself,

I

is

It

some

a

this desire as

to a

my own

its

moreness of

essence, or

felt desire,

particular to

discernible feeling of

self as an object of knowledge, but to experience

limits

of knowing with

me

certainty.

It is

my

a desire to be a

has authority without abandoning as foundational
to that authority the

pleasures of uncertainty.

In order to be able to speak

my desire

to

know,

I

have

to articulate that desire as

not a desire for privileged, normative, intelligible identity.
In one sense, of course, this
is

impossible.

My desire to know (differently) has necessarily been produced in

relationship to this desire for (legitimate) recognition.

know,

in fact, has shifted in

resisted social

and

my life

in relation to

My relationship to my desire to

how I have

cultural recognition and/or legitimacy.

here in the space that

is

desired, received,

What I have

tried to present

engendered by exploring adoption philosophically,

having been interpolated as an epistemologically legitimate subject,
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and

i.e.,

is

how,

a subject

who

can claim the status or privtleged
position of (self-)knower,

from the mtv-recogmtion of me as not
adopted. These (repeated)

misrecognition have, throughout
its

specificity,

my life, made

difference— quite

its

difficult.

Even when

really

has been understood has suggested that

.

my claim
in

in

of

know—

of being adopted as

which

my

‘desire to

my difference as adopted has

not

been appreciated.
This essay, then,

difference.

It is

also,

is

a (partial) account of those practices which
have denied

I

cannot argue, in short, that the ways in which

have been addressed as not-adopted, the ways

would never have been
been able

to

claim

to

which

know. But neither can

difference, of possibility, of being adopted

me

in

I

have ‘passed’ as someone

referred to as a ‘bastard,’ are not part of the very
reason

my desire

identity, didn’t give

I

deny

questions as what

location where

is

my sense

into

I

I

who

have

of

my family and

its

the strength to resist the seductions of such an offer of

to think,

being-in-the-know that

that

by rather than born

legitimacy. In other words, if being adopted did encourage

some might want

my

however, an articulation of that which has not only
resisted such

denials, but has desired through them.

as

acts

has come,

the articulation of my desire to

an identity position seems to have been
recognized, the ways

know.

,,,-able to claim

My recognition as someone who can know herself

a position as adopted.

fact,

have been

I

I

it

is

me

to

not because philosophy offered

become

me

a philosopher,

the position of

lacked as an adoptee. Philosophy, as a field engaged with such

knowledge, what

my ambivalence as

as desire can find home. If I

am

to

a

is identity,

and what

is

desire, has instead

knower can be explored, where

speak that desire in
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this

been a

my desire to know

home, then

I

cannot, like the

logic

of identity might demand, separate from

known

to

know— is thus to

only affirm

who we

identity, but

are,

in

it

has become

me

an identity based on the desire to

which not only give us

which also make the

it

has been denied.

To

being those processes of becoming which
not
the

means with which we can assume an

articulation of an identity impossible.

then, identity evokes both the past through

interpolated,

for

is

include in that very identity the ways in
which

be adopted then, involves including

which our

identities

As adopted

have been assigned,

and determined, as well as the present through which
we claim imperfect

positions of knowing ourselves.

metaphor of adopted

framework of lack and

By

exploring the trope of identity in general through

identity in particular,

it

is

my aim

to transcend the dualistic

certainty that drives the subject toward both the need for

epistemic authority and the dis-ease that

adopted engenders the possibility,
subject in relation to her

emphasis

means by which

me.

To have an adopted identity— which

the

the

it

own

in the ‘desire to

I

want

desire to

is

paranoid logic. Approaching identity as

to claim, for locating a positionality

know

(herself).

know’ from knowing

By re-placing

to desiring,

it

is

of the

or shifting the

my hope

that

we can

engender a subject position which involves both a recognition of and resistance

to the

(limiting and oppressive) social and political systems of identity-ascription and their

corollary authorizations of epistemic privilege

towards the personal ways

in

which

a subject

and

is

a recognition of and

movement

concerned with knowing her processes

of being and becoming. By reading the trope of identity as necessarily impossible
(thoroughly) know,

I

am

offering a

I

am

way to

not claiming that

it

is

to

necessary to give up on identity. Instead,

re-read identity as adopted as a
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way to

highlight that identities, as

objects of our desire, can be seen as
both locations of subjection and
places of potential

freedom.

Conclusion

F oucault, Freedom, and Curio sity:
In order for “searching” to

An

Ethical Desire to

be an ethical practice

it

Know hh*

needs to be a practice which

engenders more opportunities or possibilities for
ways of being, more ways

one can make the

want

self,

and

to consider, is not

engage

on

live one’s life as a

its

own

s

desire to

an ethical or unethical desire.

in regarding this desire that

Foucault

work of art. The

we must

It

is

which

in

know

the self,

th e practice

consider in terms of ethics, for

it

is

basic claim that practices of self have moral content
in the sense that

through them that a notion of the self (its possibilities,
responsibilities, desires,
constituted.

How we engage the

desire to

self thus needs to be evaluated in terms

means knowing
change and

the self in a

political action.

know through

of its

His project

For Foucault

.

it its

is to

characteristic split

of truth and

error,

freedom and

.

.

.

are willing to accept in our world, to accept, to refuse, and to change,

both in ourselves and in our circumstances. In sum, it is a question of
searching for another kind of critical philosophy. Not a critical
philosophy that seeks to determine the conditions and the limits of our
possible knowledge of the object, but a critical philosophy that seeks the
conditions and the indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of

transforming ourselves

32
.
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this

possibilities for change, for political

This would be a theoretical analysis which has, at the same
time, a political dimension,
[i.e.,] an analysis that relates to what we
constraint.

is

etc.) is

ask which techniques and practices for the Western concept of the
subject, giv[e]

it

search for self-knowledge the

ethical possibilities.

way which opens up

we

I

Freedom and

From our previous
seem

that within the

the following:

am

enacting

I

my

am

the Cult of Identity

discussion of Foucault and the
above meditation,

paradigm of the Obligation
‘free’

to Truth,

this

would

freedom becomes defined as

only by ‘discovering’ myself as

freedom through

it

I

‘truly’

(and already) am.

uncovering of my true nature which

I

am

I

then

able to produce (to myself and to
others). Foucault considers the
contemporary desire to

know

the self as a kind of “cult of the self
[where] one

true self, to separate

from

it

that

is

which might obscure or

thanks to psychological or psychoanalytic
science, which

you what your true self is.” He claims
self diametrically

opposed.””

It is

that this cult

supposed to discover one’s
alienate

is

to decipher

supposed

to

its

be able to

truth

tell

of self and the ancient care of the

not the outright desire to

Foucault sees as most troublesome as he writes

it,

that,

know

oneself that

“Taking care of oneself requires

knowing oneself.” 34
It is

cult

important however, to highlight this connection between
“freedom” and the

of authenticity, especially

ethical practice

to

be located

of care of the

in a history

of a form of relation

if

we

self.

are going to be able to pursue self-knowledge as an

In Foucault’s terms, the history

of ethics, “a history of ‘ethics’ understood as the elaboration

to self that enables

of ethical conduct.

It

is this

an individual to fashion himself into a subject

form of relation

that is crucial to

question becomes what relation(s) are engendered or

self-knowing? If I

am

correct that within the

basic relation one has to one’s self knowing

this

of the subject needs

made

possible by our practices of

modem paradigm

is

our project, for the

of truth obligation the

through the search for “True Self’ then

does not offer an opportunity for relation of the self to
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itself at all.

Instead

it

merely

has the self subject herself through
the logic of self-identity
motivated through the

ideology of authenticity

to think

she

enacting her freedom. But this

is

is

not an act of

freedom.

For Foucault, “Freedom

is

the ontological condition of
ethics. But ethics

considered form that freedom takes.” 36

is

the

Thus, for acts of self-knowing (or
those

responding to the desire to know) to be
practices of care rather than of those
of
subjection, such acts of self-knowing
have to be ethical. This involves ridding
from our

practices of self-knowing both the notion
of the true nature of the self and actions
which

construct this natural

need for

this

self, this

becomes

essence (of our individuality) as our political
goal. The

clear as Foucault writes,

have always been somewhat suspicious of the notion
of liberation,
because if it is not treated with precautions and within
I

certain limits,

runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there
exists a
or base that, as a consequence of certain historical,

human

one

nature

economic, and social
processes has been concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in
and by
mechanisms of repression. According to this hypothesis, all that is
required is to break these repressive deadlocks and man
will be
reconciled with himself, rediscover his nature or regain contact
with his
origin,

and reestablish a

full

and positive relation with himself. (The

Ethics p282)

So what of the

relation

suggest that based on Foucault

between freedom and
s

self knowledge?

I

would

like to

work, a notion of self-knowledge that could be ethical

needs both to have an ethical notion of self and an ethical notion of knowing.

Regarding

this

Maybe

change of self, he writes:
the

positivity,

problem of the

maybe

the

self

problem

is

not to discover what

is

not to discover a positive self or the

positive foundation of the self.
that the self

is

it

is

in its

Maybe our problem

is now to discover
nothing else than the historical correlation of the

technology built

in

our history.

Maybe

technologies.

And

in this case,

one of the main

political

be nowadays,

in the strict sense

of the word, the

politics

the
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problem

is

to

change those

problems would
of ourselves.

37

Curiosity and Ethical Self-knowledge
In order to

the self,

think

I

it

change the technology of knowing,
of the knowledge production of

is

useful to analogize this

knowing with an

adoptee’s search for identity. Such
an ethical search
hiSt° riCal praCtlCes throu h
S

one’s

own

whlch one’s

is at

ethical version

once a recognition of the

was produced and a recognition of

identity

individual desire concerning oneself.

I

would thus

like to

end with the idea

of appropriating from the discourse of
adoption the notion of “curiosity,’
‘curiosity’

about identity

adoption,

think

and

natural

less

I

finite

it

is

certainly naturalized

can also be used

answer.

As

of the

for while

by contemporary discourse on

in a practice

which does not necessarily lead

to a

presenting us with a practice that remains
open, that

about finding an answer and more about a

way of being,

curiosity offers us a

is

way to

desire ourselves, to relate to ourselves as
not completely present to ourselves. Thus, to
act

upon our “desire

of the self to

itself,

to

know”

ourselves in a

way which encourages

perhaps keeping curiosity alive in the desire could be a way
to put

relationality into (even) the

body

itself.

Psychologist and adoptee, Betty Jean Lifton

is

widely known for her

books on adoption as well as her activism concerning the
triangle,

i.e.,

rights

of those

articles

in the

and

adoption

adoptees, birth parents, and adoptive parents. In her introduction to her

book Journey of the

A dopted

Self:

A

Quest for Wholeness Lifton writes of her
.

curiosity as an adoptee. Naturalizing her curiosity, she views the

adoption as effectively “repressing”
repressed

the ethical relation

it.

her “natural need to know”:

came from, and

She describes her

life
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shame and secrecy of

as a ‘good daughter’

“By denying my natural

my grief for my lost birth parents and

own

curiosity about

for the child

I

who

where

might have been,

I

I

was shrinking

my emotional

space to the size permitted by [the
adoption] system ” 38

For Foucault, however, curiosity
"evokes ‘eare’;
exists

and what might

immobilized before

it;

exist; a

evokes the care one takes of what

sharpened sense of reality, but one
that

is

never

a readiness to find what surrounds
us strange and odd...I dream

of a new age of curiosity.
infinity

it

We have the technical

means; the desire

is

of things to know...”' 9 As an ethical
practice, a care of and

curiosity encourages the aesthetics

of existence such

necessarily a life-long project.
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that desiring to

there; there is an

for the self,

such

know who we

are

is
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1

exploring

hope
it

here

invent oneself.
arbitrary

way to

that this essay will

means

make clear that the notion of ‘possibility’ as
not a kind of pure freedom entailing the idea that
one could
am also not suggesting that having a sense of one’s identity

I

am

is
I

that

‘re-

as

one can simply change

it,

nor

am

I

proposing that adoption offers a

see identity as constructed and therefore not real.

paradigm (or metaphor) for

What I am

offering

is that

as a

identity, ‘being adopted’

opens up a space of non-identity
(or non-identicalness) between the self as a subject
and the self as an object such that
one cares about the processes (social, historical, cultural, political,
and
relational)

through which one has come to be.

through

of care, or what I want to
desiring knowing’ (but do not explore as such in this work), that
one can undertake
(the pleasures and pursuits of) self-knowing in a way that
engenders a recognition of
self-difference (i.e., that the self one is (and can be) is not identical to
the knowledge(s)
It is

this relation

call

of it).
g

As such, I want to propose that an adopted identity is (necessarily) incompatible
with a notion of complete self-transparency. While this incompatibility gestures toward
the constitutive presence of social and historical forces in the production of identities,
also,

want

it

to stress, allows for

an assumption of an ontological position which, though
not outside of such constitutive forces, is not thoroughly available as (an object)
explained by them. This chapter is part of a larger project that explores the relationship
I

between such (ontological) opacity and the notion of possibility

that

adopted identity

implies.
}

I want to leave my ‘desire to know...’ open and undefined.
This
meanderings both personal and philosophical, is an attempt to present in a
legible way stories through which I know (and have experienced) myself as adopted. As

Importantly,

essay, in

its
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should become clear, there

is

no

essence of being adopted which

™^

real object
I

am

which 1 desire to know nor is
there some
trying to convey. Instead
am elai
,i.

V’

<a>

’T

*

me “ s notion™ pLftilUy
'

always there to be desired a kind
which ,t has been mis-rceo^ zed
and
^

of moreness,
(c)

•

1

f Wha ' bei " ad° Pted meanS
S
‘°
°
ffthauh
there > s something to be engaged
with that is
1

(b) connected to the very
ways in
(re-)produced through the failed attempts
to erase

it.

put the “desire to

know” in quotations because, while I am
claiming it as
also an important trope in the
signification of adoption.
use of the
Phrase is thus also a citation of this trope.
As I raise
I

desire,

it is

mv

My

later in this paper when
tell
almost always addressed with others’
curiosity about what
I know.
I am presenting
my desire to know within the context of how 1 have
been
addressed as a knower in order to suggest
both the ways in which this address
has
p aced me in a certain position as a knower (and as a kind of
legitimate subject) and the
ways in which I have resisted this address.

people that

I

am

I(V

T°

.

m
•

,

see

adopted

how

I

1

am

Witt gensteinian philosophical tools might
offer a

e

Ctl0 n of (essentiahzed) family
Pr
likeness,
u °?r
T
The
View ffrom Home (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

way to

analyze

see Charlotte Witt’s forthcoming
essay
University Press, 2004).

am making

a slight distinction here between body
and bodily, by “body” I
the physical fleshiness of a person and
by “bodily” I mean the ways in which that
flesh is perceived, understood, and read
as meaningful. So for example, how the
body is
t
ought to represent or contain family-relatedness
is part of how it is bodily. It is
part of
my larger project to find a way to discuss the ways in which bodies
are conceptualized
I

mean

(and experienced through such conceptualization)
without falling into a kind of
idealism. By expanding the grammar of the body
into the bodi -ly I am trying to create a
space of action which both affects the subject and,
once (necessarily) taken up by the
subject, affects the world.
1

“

“The refinement of matching attempted to render adoption invisible.
The
adoptive family could fade into the woodwork, as it were.
No one had to know about
the origins of the family, not even the child himself.
For the sake of the child, adoption
was kept secret and the Active quality of the relationship covered over
by the real
that is, perceptible
surface resemblances between members.
During the two postwar decades, adoption practices locked a genealogical model of kinship to historically
situated class and race distinctions. Judith Modell and Naomi
Dambacher, “Making a
Real Family: Matching and Cultural Biologism in American Adoption,”
Adoption
.

Quarterly
1

1,

.

no. 2 (1997): 17.

^

The choice of verb here is very difficult for me both theoretically and
To write that I was given an identity feels very painful. I grew up watching
of television, particularly shows of the Norman Lear variety. In one episode of All

personally.
a lot

Family Mike, the son-in-law, argues that he doesn’t want to have a child
biologically because there are so many needy children ‘out there’ who need families.
in the
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Archie

is

hought

furious and, as usual,

that

amtly, that

dumbfounded. While watching the show
at ten or so
was one of those ehildren, that I was
taken in because I
Vhave a
there was a sense of doing
something good for me by giving me
a name.
1

I

dl

There

a sense of an impossible choice
present in my dilemma: either I snoke
had an identity. More than simply having
a name, having an identity in
this sense means having an ontology,
being an X. On the one hand, it was
through my
successful subjection (my successfully
becoming a person capable of having her own
mgs ideas, sense of self) that I could have my
desire to know, while on the other
and, articulating my ‘desire to know’
was an act which would undermine the
very
means through which 1 gained a sense of being
in the world. Not only did it
feel in
some wayungrateful’ to want to know, but
it felt like I would lose
my access to
Rowing by speaking my desire. To give up being for knowing was not a
fair trade.
Judith Butler explores this kind of
impossible choice as itself constitutive of
modem
subjectivity. See her (The Psychic Life
of Power: T heones

my desire or

is

I

in Subjection

LA: Stanford University
14

15

Modell and Dambacher, “Making a ‘Real’ Family,”
Iris

ts.mHWH

Press, 1997).

Marion Young,

Justice

and the

Politics

7.

of Difference (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1990), 98-99

Barbara Ynvesson, “Negotiating Motherhood: Identity
and Difference
'Open' Adoptions” Law and Society Review 31 no
.

While
right to

know

I

is

1

in

(1997): 43.

am

supportive of any adoptee’s desire to know, I do question how
the
formulated in a way which reifies the notion of the naturalness

of

Adoptees are necessarily in a position from which they can claim
that family—
its importance in one’s life and sense of
self— is not decided by blood. It seems critically
important to me not to sacrifice this knowledge in order to
accomplish political and
identity.

legal change.
1

“The slide from appearance to essence is characteristic of American adoption
policy and stems from a deeper tendency of western culture: utilizing biology
as the way
of constituting and conceiving human character, human nature, and human behavior’
(Schneider 1984: 175). What a person looks like signifies what a person is and becomes
an indicator of ‘biology, in an American scheme.” Modell and Dambacher, “Making a
‘Real’ Family,” 24.

This ability to have an essence that is something connected to others and
independent of them is crucial I think to the conceptualization of individualism. For an
analysis of the discursive formation of the Individual, see Joan Wallach Scott, Only
Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
.

University Press, 1996).
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Even

if the

assignment was articulated as a tracing
of ‘cultural’ heritage mv
it involved the
assumption that one individual had one
tree
hat there was a way to know and to
trace one’s production through
a re-produceable
line of facts, it still would have
caused me as adopted to feel uncomfortable.
(It would
have left no room for me to be what I am
calling an adopted knower.)

rgument

is

that

because

were whole parts of me that I was leaving
out, huge things about
know and hence couldn’t include in such a ‘tree’,
there

Knowing

that

me that

didn’t

I

suggested to me that any version
family tree was a construction and that
such narratives of identity were
themselves constructs. In other words, what
was problematic wasn’t
ot

my

assignment assumed

we were

did

I

just that the

from families constructed through biology;
more
critically the assignment assumed that
becoming (a self, a person, etc.) was a product
of
a traceable (knowable) lineage, that how
one was produced could be evidenced such
that
what mattered about the being of a self was what
could be known. Because this
knowability became evidenced through the metonym
of the body, the assignment
importantly collapsed together the facticity of being
bom, or biological reproduction the
all

social-epistemological requirements for recognition,
or socio-political reproduction.

’

Interestingly this metaphor of the form (as a site
of truths about the self) raises
the complexity of taking “adopted" as an identity
in a culture which doesn’t really have
different words for relations which are biological
(or kin) and relations which are social
(or created through family practices). The biological
becomes the truth of identity here
as what is relevant in such documents as medical
forms is the kin

So

relationships.

while

could check off “cancer" on such intakes (as my birthmother’s
mother died of
multiple cancers), I couldn t really, in truth, check off
“grandmother.” My
I

grandmothers died of pneumonia and strokes. But checking off vascular
disease or lung
disease didn’t
22

seem

‘true’ either.

When my some members

had searched for and found

of my extended (adoptive) family found out that
my birthmother, they addressed my (adoptive) brother upon
I

terms of my search. They asked him not
search, expecting without doubt that he would want to.
seeing

him

in

of his desire, about

how

they were reading

constructing us as siblings.

it

if
I

when he was going

but

wonder about

in relation to

mine, and

to

this expectation

how

they were

some might consider to be cultural
would want to search because we were both raised by the same people or
because we were both adoptees.
I

involves reading what

as natural: he

23

for

me

r->

Even amongst

friends

who know

that

am

I

to listen to others talk about their families

attitudes

toward them without them realizing

adopted,

and

it is

a

common

their relationships with

experience

and

that their experiences etc. are very

much

based on their (assumptions about) being from a biologically-constructed family. This
is most common, of course, around body talk, including ‘looking like’ and disease
discourse. It is often uncomfortable and even a bit hurtful when such exchanges turn
toward a kind of celebration of (the morphology of) a kind of bodily likeness. I liken
this to a

kind of ‘family romance’ and have seen

do not have children) discuss

their (biological)

it

particularly arise

nephews and
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nieces.

when

friends

(who

24

While

am

relying here

on an actual event which I participated
in I also
event is wholly my own. I am using
this event to
elucidate some of the complex and
often unspoken assumptions about
the meaning of
mformatmn regarding the family and the
individual. I do not mean in
I

readily admit that

my reading of this

assert that the interpretations

any way

I

to

make of the adoptive

parents’ concerns and articulations
re true of either all adoptive
parents or even of those parents in the
room with me As I
hope is clear in this project, I think it is
important to use experiences of the
everyday as
a means of analyzing the ways in
which subjects are constituted and performed.
un erstanding of the Truth of identity as an
impossibility, however, also extends to
the
meanings of those events of the everyday. In
short, my interpretations of the
desire to
know as presented by the adoptive parents should
themselves be considered as
speculative, though perhaps instructive as
well.

My

25

Since both giving this presentation and
beginning the arduous journey of
writing this essay, the dynamics of my family
have changed considerably, changes

which

ongoing impossibility of finding a true self or ‘becoming
whole’promoted I think, in certain adoption literature. While the
death of a close
family member engenders huge and painful shifts
within the identity and identifications
of a family, the (sudden and unexpected) death of my
birthmother’s husband has
reflect the

lllusions

caused

did not expect. In particular, as he was not my
father, but
birthmother s other three children, I have ended up feeling
more
shifts

I

was

the father of my

of a ‘bastard’ than

ever

felt

when he was

at his funeral.

(This word, in

alive.

fact,

continued to present

itself to

I

my mind

never had before. This was in part due to his unquestioning
acceptance
of me into their lives.) This feeling of being a ‘bastard’ after
he died was a reversal of
what might have been expected, viz. that when he was alive I would
have felt more
acutely the sense of being somehow an outsider, not his,
put up for adoption, without a
It

father, illegitimate.

my feelings

in part,

about the

man who

my alienation

from my half-siblings’ grief that has engendered,
of otherness. This alienation includes both my inability to talk
It is

died as

“my

about anyone as ‘my father”

my inability to and discomfort at talking
my relationship to these

father” and

when

I

am

with them. Since

based more on a kind of biological essentialism than anything else (the
sibling issue has been THE most complicated part of searching/finding)
in that it is
based on the fact that we (problematically) ‘share the same mother,’ I am left without
siblings

father

is

when I am with them. And my

very different from

do wonder
as

acutely

I

not

when

when meeting

sorry about your Dad”).

is

a

reach them in their

I

tried to get

in this

way to approach

grief.

I

I

is

this feeling

I

have had in mourning a
no name for who he was in my
I

time off from work for the services, and as

this story in part to

a

moment, of course, so

of being a
have not yet figured out how, but

loved. There

strangers at the funeral

I tell

is,

not a part of the difficulty

my father but whom

discovered

felt

me

if the ‘bastard feeling’ is

man who was
life,

Perhaps there

theirs.

bastard that can help

fatherlessness

I

(who kept crying as they said “I’m so
show the complexity not only of the

family relationships within the context of adoption, but also of the complexity of the
shifting terms with which we make sense of such relationships. That the term ‘bastard’

could appear for

me

in the context

of death suggests
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that its force continues in

my life

as

an adoptee, while
be maleable

in

it

also suggests that

some

Ironically, perhaps,

information

There

.

perfonnative, as

its

meaning

creative way.

much

is

my name

as shifting and unpredictable,
might

was not considered

to

political sedimentation in the

says that the

name given

be ‘identifying

meaning of this

me is always-already unavailable for mv
the rules for non-identify.ng
informa, ton are constructed to
the other parties involved, calling
my given name non-identifying raises questiontfabout
how much cultural force is needed in order for a
name to be considered a means of
identification, to be an effective interpolation,
and how included in such force is the
power of patronym.
‘name’ was non-identifying, i.e., not able
to give or lend
b CCaUS e 11 lacked a sir -name.’ Although
this lack of a(ny) last name
sites both
f my u
he ack of
birthmother’s name and my birthfather’s
name, the history of adoption in
e US as a means for white middle-class
young unmarried women to hide their
pregnancies suggests that the weight of these
absent last names in terms of their abilities
to identify was not the same. It is here
that the intersection of non-identifying
and illegitimate needs to be unpacked.
it

to

Wh„e

,den,,nca„on

pZct

;

My

‘

27

Young,

28

.

am

uncertain of their class positions, but it was
of those present were middle to upper-middle class and
I

all

Justice 98-99.

organization through which

I

was

my reading that

most
were white. As the

if not

invited to speak brought together those parents
who
many of the parents present had adopted non-white

specifically adopted internationally,

children and most if not

World

countries.

It is

such adoptions, but
in part

due

that they

it

is

all had adopted children from “under-developed”
or “Third
outside of the scope of this essay to analyze the complexity
of

important to admit that

to the parents’ positions as “First

were seemingly easily able

to

I

am making

the suggestion that

World”, white, middle-classed

US

it

was

citizens,

assume the position of hegemonic

epistemological subjects.
29

Naomi Scheman, “Though This Be Method, Yet There

Paranoia and Liberal Epistemology,” in Feminist Social Thought:
Tietjens Meyers (New York: Routledge, 1997), 342-367.
30

Michel Foucault, “Subjectivity and Truth,” in The
(New York: Semiotexte, 1997), 177.

is

Madness

A

Politics

Reader

,

of Truth

in

It:

ed.

,

Diana

ed.

Sylvere Lotringer

Scheman, “Though This Be Method,” 356-357. Emphasis mine.
32

Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning,” 224, n.4 (emphasis mine).

notion of ‘indefinite’ that

I

It

is this

consider crucial. Freedom involves such indefiniteness.

By

ridding the discourse of self-knowledge of the normative expectation of complete and
transparent knowledge, we can open up a space for the self to know itself differently,
that is for

what the

self is to be not definite

and therefore more possible. This
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indefiniteness,

offer opens

up possibility because it defers the
issue of certainty or
of knowing oneself ‘clearly and distinctly.’
Without this deinand for
certamty, the knowing I and the
known I can be different from one another
As such
they can be in a relation with one
another. ‘Becoming oneself thus
can be refigured
C
8 3 86 f 0 "! a ready 15 (or has been) t0 the on-going relationship
between
the7wh
the
I who is knowing
and the I who is known.
completeness

I

t.e.,

°T

'

Michel Foucault, “On the Genealogy of
Ethics: An Overview of a Work in
Progress in
es: Subjectivity and Truth The
Essential Works of Michel FoucaultPa U Rabmow trans Robert Hurle * al.
*
(New York: The New Press,
y>
Y°o
oti ,
7), 271.
contend that rather than ‘psychological’
sciences,

Mi

,

-

’

’

it

1C

is

those sciences

t0 reV6al the

hldden meanin § of the body— via genetics, in
particular, but
“U
nu" discourses in
health
general-that have captured the general imagination
in terms of
pursuing self-knowledge as Truth. This turn
towards reading the body as a site of truth
via genetic ‘pre-dispositions’ also entails
a shift in our notion of Truth Obligation.
How
we choose to know or not know our genetic makeup-especially
as potentially childbearing-might reflect a sense of moral obligation not
only to believe in such

T°

rt

information, but to consider such information the
right of others-i.e., our children-to

know.
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